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Writers dating back to at least Adam Smith have advanced the importance of good
governance for investment, innovation and growth. More recently, empirical work has
quantied the economic benet of good governance, using various governance proxies.1
A limitation of these analyses is that a countrys governance is typically represented
unidimensionally.2 This dissertation constructs a multi-dimensional assessment of
governance quality and estimates each dimensions importance to long-run economic
performance.
The economic contributions of good governance clearly come from a variety of
di¤erent directions. Casual observation suggests that countries can excel in some
governance areas (like regulation) even as they lag in others (like civil liberties).
Relying on a single, catch-all measure of governance quality makes it impossible to
estimate the marginal economic contributions of di¤erent categories of governance
and may obscure a countrys underlying strengths and weaknesses.
One solution is to replace the catch-all measure with a vector of measures that
each capture a di¤erent aspect of governance. However, this approach creates several
challenges. First, all governance measures tend to be highly correlated. In a regression
setting, this poses the problem of multicollinearity. A second challenge is variable
1Over the last decade, the empirical study of governance and economic performance has taken
o¤. Part of the reason for this is the novel application of expert assessments from political risk
consulting companies. These perceptions-based variables are often available for a broad cross sec-
tion of countries; they touch more directly than previous measures on the very governance concepts
thought vital to economic decisions; and, they have proven capable of explaining much of the oth-
erwise unaccounted-for cross-country variation in income.
2See e.g. - Mauro (QJE, 1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (QJE 1999), Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (AER, 2001), Sachs (2003), Easterly and Levine (JME, 2003), Rodrik et al.
(JEG, 2004)
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selection: how does one choose the best subset of governance variables from the
many that are available? A third challenge is signal extraction: how do we control for
extraneous information (e.g. - measurement error, biases, idiosyncratic measurement
methodology, etc.) in governance variables - especially perceptions-based ones?
This dissertation addresses the above concerns by using a factor model to construct
four new orthogonal indices of governance quality. In Chapter 1, I estimate the
factor model using a diverse dataset of 45 governance-related variables (primarily
expert assessments) from twelve di¤erent data sources. I interpret the four factors,
discuss their robustness to rotation and method of extraction, and speculate on the
potential biases created by the large amount of missing data. I also compare and
contrast my governance factors with another popular set of measures produced using
the same expert assessment variables - the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
of Kaufmann et al (1999a).
Chapter 2 applies the factor score predictions developed in the rst chapter to
the study of comparative development. Using instrumental variables regressions, I
estimate the causal impacts of each area of governance on per capita income. Across
a wide variety of specications, I nd consistently that two of my four factors (market
infrastructure and civil liberties) emerge as highly statistically and economically sig-
nicant. Consistent with some recent work (Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al.,
2004) I nd that controlling for the quality of governance, neither latitude nor trade
share of GDP has any direct e¤ect on income. Unlike earlier work, however, I am
able to decompose the overall contribution of governance into distinct components.
Chapter 3 performs a robustness check - a monte-carlo-based examination of factor
2
score prediction using polytomous data. Many of the 45 variables used to estimate the
factor model parameters in Chapter 1 are polytomous in nature (e.g. - "rate country
j on a scale of 1 to 7 in the independence of the judiciary"). In addition, many
have distributions with distinctly non-normal shapes - including bimodal, skewed left,
skewed right and U-shaped. Strictly speaking, the maximum likelihood (ML) factor
model estimator used in Chapter 1 is valid only for continuous, normally distributed
variables. The question addressed in Chapter 3 is the extent to which a countrys
predicted factor scores from Chapter 1 (which were based on the ML estimator) may
deviate from that countrys true factor scores due to the polytomous and non-normal




This paper uses a factor model to construct four orthogonal categories of governance
from a diverse dataset of 45 governance-related variables. The data are primarily
expert assessments and were drawn from twelve di¤erent data sources.
In contrast to previous research, I use a unied statistical framework to determine
the number of governance categories to create, the conceptual content of each cate-
gory, and the relative importance each has in accounting for the observable data. I
label my categories market infrastructure, civil liberties, downside governance risk,
and order.3
Because my measures are orthogonal, they can be used jointly as regressors with-
out the problem of multicollinearity. Orthogonality also makes the measures con-
ceptually distinct from one another, and it helps them to accentuate strengths and
weaknesses in a country more sharply than a set of highly correlated measures can.4
Furthermore, as I demonstrate in the body of the paper, the factor model also ad-
dresses the variable selection and signal extraction challenges in appealing ways.
With respect to variable selection, country scores in my governance categories are
constructed from linear combinations of all the variables in the dataset, alleviating
3While the precise wording we use to label our categories can be debated, we will show in the body
of the paper that the substantive interpretation of these latent constructs is quite straightforward
and unambiguous.
4Given that observable governance variables tend to be so highly intercorrelated, one legitimately
might wonder how closely a set of orthogonal measures like ours can capture the concepts they
purport to measure. However, we will show (see, e.g., Tables 6 and 7) that each of our measures is
in fact highly positively correlated with popular observable benchmarks.
4
the need for the researcher to make a priori judgments about which observable vari-
ables are the most informative, or which observable variables represent which latent
governance categories. All such relationships are estimated simultaneously within
the factor model. Variables found to be more highly correlated with a governance
category are assigned greater weight in its prediction.
With respect to signal extraction, the model decomposes the variation of each
variable into governance-related and idiosyncratic components, thereby isolating sig-
nal from noise. Variables estimated to have smaller idiosyncratic components are
given greater weight in the prediction of country governance scores.
My work is most closely related to the work of Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton (e.g. - 1999b). Kaufmann et al.s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI),
now updated annually, are a popular set of governance measures - used widely in
economic research and among policymakers.5 In my analysis, I use largely the same
dataset used by Kaufmann et al. for their WGI.6
There are three aspects of my work that are shared with Kaufmann et al. First, I
produce aggregated governance measures - that is, measures constructed through lin-
5TheWGI have lately become popular as a measure of governance in cross-country growth studies
(Glaeser et al., 2004; Djankov et al. 2003; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al. 2004). A recent
download statistic from SSRN provides some quantitative evidence of the measures popularity:
Governance Matters VII (the most recent version available) was the most downloaded article in
SSRNs Economic Research Network (June 26 - August 25, 2008), with more than three times the
number of downloads as the second most popular article for that period. The previous version,
Governance Matters VI, was the second most frequently downloaded paper for the twelve months
ending April 16, 2008, with twice as many downloads as the paper one notch below. The WGI have
also gained inuence among policymakers; for example, the U.S. Millenium Challenge Corporation
uses the WGI as one criterion for distributing billions of dollars in foreign aid.
6Our paper uses a substantial subset of the perceptions-based governance variables collected
by Kaufmann et al. for estimation of the 2005 version of their WGI. Our analysis excludes only
the following types of variables used by Kaufmann et al: i.) variables available for only small,
non-representative country samples, e.g. - Afrobarometer and Latinobarometro variables; and ii.)
variables not publicly available outside the World Bank , e.g. - the World Banks Country Policy
and Institutional Assessments.
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ear combinations of dozens of observable variables. Second, my conceptual approach
is to treat governance as a latent variable, reected noisily through the observable
data. Finally, the statistical technique used for constructing the latent variables is a
factor model.
However, I apply the factor model to governance data in a new manner, advancing
the Kaufmann et al. results in several important ways. One way is my ability to force
orthogonality on the governance measures that emerge. Another is my ability to
quantify the relative importance of each governance measure in explaining the data.
A third is my reliance on objective, statistical evidence to determine the optimal
number of governance measures to extract from the data. Finally, a fourth is my
ability to purge governance measures of data-provider e¤ects.
The di¤erence in my methodology that generates these advancements is straight-
forward. I estimate a single multi-factor model on the pooled set of 45 governance
variables, whereas Kaufmann et al. divide the variables into six categories and es-
timate six independent one-factor models on the non-overlapping subsets of data.7
This departure highlights another relative merit of my approach. It can be replicated
easily by di¤erent analysts using di¤erent governance data because I do not rely on
subjective categorizations of the observed data.
Each of my governance measures is dened according to what makes it unique
from all the others. Governance, under this perspective, emerges not as a tangle of
overlapping characteristics, but as an array of strongly di¤erentiated capacities.8
7The Kaufmann et al. governance categories are: Rule of Law (RL), Control of Corruption
(CC), Government E¤ectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Voice and Accountability (VA),
and Political Stability/No Violence (PSNV).
8For 2005, the minimum pairwise correlation among the six Kaufmann et al. governance cate-
6
The paper proceeds as follows. Part two provides an overview of the factor model
that I use for extracting latent variables from governance data. Part three presents the
data, motivates my model specication and presents estimation results. I interpret the
governance measures that emerge from my model and contrast them with Kaufmann
et al.s WGI. Part four discusses potential biases due to missing data, and part ve
concludes.
2 The Factor Model and Governance
2.1 Motivation
The perspective of the factor model is that observable data reect the systematic
inuence of latent variables called factors. An obvious reason to use the factor model
is that governance capacities as typically envisioned are inherently latent - one cannot
observe them directly. For instance, the growth literature routinely posits broad
intangibles like "social infrastructure" (Hall and Jones, 1999), "protection against
expropriation" (Acemoglu et al., 2001), "institutions" (Easterly and Levine, 2003).
To measure such concepts, one needs to infer the general from the particular - to
translate observable attributes like the frequency with which contracts are enforced or
the speed at which one can obtain a building permit into more fundamental qualities,
like market infrastructure. A factor model is one of the most well-established methods
for doing this (Anderson, 2003; Stewart, 1981).
To be sure, broad governance constructs arent necessary or even appropriate for
gories is min = 0:7; the maximum is 
max = 0:96; the mean is  = 0:83.
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all governance-related questions. Where interest centers on a particular manifestation
of governance (e.g. - freedom of the press), individual variables exist that measure
specically that institution. But for analysis of the overall governance environment
facing consumers, businesses and investors, treating governance as latent is a sensible
way forward.
It should also be noted that the use of latent variables is not new in economics.
As mentioned, the WGI are latent variables estimated via a factor model. Other
economic applications have included using factors as predictors of macro time series
(Stock and Watson 1998, 2002; Cristadoro et al., 2005; Bernanke and Boivin, 2003;
Boivin and Ng, 2005), and as proxies for systematic risk in asset pricing (e.g. - Roll
and Ross, 1980; Chamberlain and Rothschild 1983; Connor and Korajczyk 1993).
2.2 Overview of the Model
At its core, the factor model is a tool for decomposing the intercorrelation of p ran-
dom variables into systematic and idiosyncratic sources (Rao, 1955; Anderson, 2003).
The systematic forces are called common factors, or simply, factors. An appealing
characteristic of the model is that the number of factors required to summarize the
systematic comovement of p variables is generally far fewer than p. From this perspec-
tive, the factor model is a data-reduction tool. Most importantly, the factor structure
so derived suggests relationships both between the variables and between the subjects
(i.e. - countries) that would otherwise be impossible to perceive from the raw data .
In my case, I show that just a few common factors can explain a great deal of
8
the comovement in the 45 governance-related variables in the dataset. Furthermore,
interpretations of the most important factors are straightforward and illuminating. I
then go on to estimate each countrys scores in each of the factors, enabling us to rank
countries in the various dimensions of governance, and to investigate the economic
role of good governance.
I begin with a brief overview of the factor model itself, including consideration of
the rotation problem. Essentially, the rotation problem is the challenge of identifying
parameters in a latent structure. I then proceed to issues of estimation and nally,
to a common method for predicting the factor scores. For more detailed treatments
of the factor model presented here, see Anderson and Rubin (1956), Harman (1976),
Anderson (2003), or Wansbeek and Meijer (2000).
Let X = [X1; X2; :::Xk; :::Xp]
0 represent a vector of normally distributed random











Matrix  is called the loadings matrix; its (i; j)-th entry is the covariance between
the i-th variable in X and the j-th common factor. When ij is large and positive,
variable Xi is said to load heavily on factor fj. Vector f is the vector of m < p
(unobserved) common factors, modeled as a random vector with density f  N (0;).
Random disturbance vector u is iid with density N (0;	), 	 diagonal.
For clarity, I assume all elements of X have been centered and scaled such that
E (Xk) = 0 and sd (Xk) = 1;8k 2 f1; 2; :::; pg. It is assumed that all m factors
9
are independent of all p disturbances (otherwise, disturbance uk would not represent
variable Xks idiosyncratic variation).
Given equation (1) and the stochastic assumptions stated above, one can write ,
the VC matrix of X, as follows:
 = 0 +	 (2)
Equation (2) is the fundamental hypothesis of the factor model. The factor model
posits that  can be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric, positive denite matrix
of rank m < p (i.e. - 0), and a diagonal, positive denite matrix of rank p (i.e.
- 	). This hypothesis is testable; i.e. - a given p  p population covariance matrix
 may or may not be decomposable in this way for a chosen value of m (Anderson
and Rubin, 1956; Lawley and Maxwell, 1971; Browne, 1969).9 Anderson and Rubin
(1956) provide some conditions on  such that a solution to (2) exists.
Matrix 0 represents the variation in X that is due to factors common to all
elements of X, while matrix 	 captures the variation in each Xk 2 fX1; :::; Xpg that
is idiosyncratic.
2.3 Indeterminacy, rotation and simple structure
The model in (1) and (2) with no further assumptions is underidentied. Assuming
that a solution to (2) exists for the chosen value of m, matrices 0 and 	 are iden-
9Lawley and Maxwell (1971) construct a simple example of three highly correlated variables,
and one factor. Given the values they specify for the o¤-diagonal terms of  = V (X), the factor





tied uniquely; but to identify ; individually, one needs to impose an additional
m2 independent conditions on them (Ledermann, 1937; Anderson and Rubin, 1956;
Lawley and Maxwell, 1971; Anderson, 2003; Hayashi and Marcoulides, 2006).
In this paper, I make headway toward identication by imposing  = I, so that the
m factors are required to be orthogonal. Because my goal is to construct governance
measures that are sharply delineated from one another conceptually, orthogonality is
a natural constraint.10
When  = I, (2) reduces to  = 0 + 	, and the number of additional re-
strictions needed for identication falls to 1
2
m (m  1). A common tactic is then to
require 0	 1 diagonal (Lawley, 1940). This additional requirement just identies
the parameters and produces what is referred to in the literature as the unrotated
solution. I designate the unrotated solution with 0. Imposing  = I and 0	 1
diagonal in no way restricts the p  p rank-m matrix 0, meaning one has not
ruled out any solution to (2) through these conditions (Anderson and Rubin, 1956;
Anderson, 2003).
In truth though, the 0	 1 restriction - while common in practice - is an arbitrary
technique for gaining identication.11 It selects but one of an innity of admissible
solutions to (2). In particular, it can be shown that post-multiplying 0 by anymm
nonsingular and orthogonal matrix T produces a rotated solution, e = 0T , that will
10Neither the identities of our four governance factors, nor the estimated factor scores for the
countries, nor the growth regression results shown in section 4 are changed signicantly by moving
to an oblique rotation. So the practical consequences of this restriction turn out to be minimal.
11Another tactic for identifying ; is the imposition of zero-loading constraints on individual
elements, ij , of . For example, a priori theory may suggest to the analyst that variable Xk should
be una¢ liated with factor fj , implying the restriction kj = 0 (Anderson, 2003). We do not pursue
identication by zero-loading restrictions here because the point of our analysis is to impose as little
a priori sorting to the data as possible.
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generate observable moments of the data identical to those generated by 0.12
Matrix e = 0T is called an orthogonal rotation of 0.13 The question is: on
what basis should one select one rotation over another? The answer provided by the
factor model literature is "simplicity". That is, some rotations of  generate factor
structures that are simpler to interpret than others; since ultimately one is interested
in solutions one can interpret, only the simplest, most interpretable rotations should
be selected for analysis.
Motivated by this identication philosophy, Thurstone (1935, 1947) codied rules
of simple structure - i.e., descriptive guidelines for extracting a more easily inter-
pretable : Literally, these rules seek a loadings matrix with a small number of large,
positive loadings, and a large number of small, near-zero loadings (Harman, 1976;
Lawley and Maxwell, 1971). Conceptually, Thurstones rules aim at two objectives.
Objective one is to clearly dene and delineate factors from one another (by associat-
ing each factor with a small subset of the variables in X, and by forcing that subset to
di¤er su¢ ciently from the subsets associated with the other factors). Objective two
is to simplify the factorial characterization of each variable in the dataset (by mini-
mizing the number of factors with which each variable is correlated). Objective one
is sometimes called factor simplicity, and objective two is sometimes called variable





0 = T 1for T orthogonal. The observable data does not distinguish
between a model with 0 and a model with e. See Anderson (2003), p. 571-573 for a thorough
summary of the rotation problem in factor models.
13Rotations can also be oblique, meaning they allow for correlated factors. In an oblique ro-
tation, fewer constraints are imposed on the rotation matrix T than in an orthogonal rotation.
In particular, any m  m nonsingular matrix (not just the orthogonal ones) may constitute an




Beginning in the 1950s, psychometricians and statisticians started to operational-
ize Thurstones simple structure guidelines. This was accomplished by translating
them into mathematical objective functions that score the simplicity of any rotated
loadings matrix e = 0T . Simple structure is then achieved by nding the unique
rotation, e = 0T , that maximizes (or more often, minimizes) the chosen objective
function. The optimization approach to rotation has provided an objective alternative
for what used to be an arduous and subjective procedure for selecting one rotation
over all others (Browne, 2001).
There is, however, no universally accepted mathematical measure of the simplicity
of a loadings matrix. Thurstones guidelines, while intuitive, are too vague to pin down
a single objective function embodying all the characteristics of simple structure. In
response, the literature has formulated dozens of rotations over the years (Harman,
1976; Brown, 2001). In fact, though, nearly every rotation pursues variable simplicity,
factor simplicity, or some weighted average of the two objectives.
Two of the earliest, and still most commonly used orthogonal rotations (I limit
discussion to orthogonal rotations for the reasons stated above) are called the varimax
rotation and the quartimax rotation (Harman, 1976; Browne, 2001; Bernaards and
Jennrich, 2003).14 The varimax rotation pursues factor simplicity (objective one), by
maximizing the variation in squared loadings within each column of . The goal for
each column is a few ones, and many zeros. The quartimax rotation pursues variable
14For example, the widely used orthomax family of orthogonal rotations, - which includes special
cases parsimax and equamax - are dened as weighted averages of the quartimax and varimax
criterion functions (Harman, 1976). One rotational criterion that is not a linear combination of
quartimax and varimax is the orthogonal minimum entropy criterion, due to McCammon (1966).
13
simplicity (objective two), by maximizing the variation in squared loadings within
each row of . The goal for each row is a few ones and many zeros.






v be the varimax-rotated
15 and quartimax-rotated16
versions of 0, respectively. Under certain conditions (that is, for certain 0), the
varimax and the quartimax criteria push in the same direction - that is,  = v = 

q.
In general, however, v 6= q because in general, the objectives described in i.) and
ii.) are not coincident. One can understand this better by considering a few examples.
First, consider a 0 for which v 6= q. Let i1  1;8i 2 f1; 2; :::; pg and ij 
0;8i 2 f1; 2; :::; pg ;8j 2 f2; 3; :::;mg. In other words, rst-column entries of 0 are
all near one, while entries in all other columns are near zero. Under this 0, f1 is often
called a "general factor" because it is the most inuential factor for all variables in the
dataset (i.e. - all variables load most heavily on f1). A general-factor conguration
is consistent with maximization of the quartimax criterion (since a general-factor





where, s2j  1p
Pp
i=1
e4ij  1p2 Ppi=1 e2ij2, and where eij is the (i; j)-th element of rotated loading
matrix e  0T .







where again eij is the (i; j)-th element of rotated loading matrix e  0T (Harman, 1976 - p.
282).
The quartimax criterion acheives its parsimony objective because a transformation, T , that





e2ije2ik, the sum of
within-variable (within-row) products of squared loadings. Minimizing the sume of these products
(e2ije2ik) within the ith row is equivalent to forcing many of variable is loadings lower towards
zero and is remaining loadings upwards towards one - i.e., maximizing the within-row variation
in squared loadings (variable is communality, mj=1
2
ij , is held constant under rotation, meaning a




conguration characterizes each variable primarily in terms of a single factor) but is
inconsistent with maximization of the varimax criterion: factors 2; :::;m tend not to
be strongly di¤erentiated from one another. In general, under the varimax rotation
a subset of loadings in column one of 0 will go down, and a subset of loadings in
columns 2; :::;m (a di¤erent subset for each column) will go up.17 This is a crude
characterization, but precise enough for my purposes.
Next, consider a 0 for which v = 

q. Suppose that 0 admits perfect simple
structure. Perfect simple structure means that each row of  contains exactly one
non-zero entry. Bernaards and Jennrich (2003) show that if there exists an orthogonal
rotation Tpss that can rotate 0 to a perfect simple structure, then  = 0Tpss will
be the unique argmax of both the quartimax and varimax criteria. Put simply, if
perfect simple structure exists, then both quartimax and varimax rotations will nd
it.18
Perfect simple structure represents the rare coincidence of factor simplicity and
variable simplicity; factors can be cleanly characterized by mutually exclusive subsets
of variables in X, and each variable is indicative of exactly one factor. In general,
however - and especially in datasets like ours where every variable is highly positively
correlated with almost every other variable - one is unlikely to encounter a factor
structure that admits orthogonal rotation to perfect simple structure. The reason is
straightforward. Under perfect simple structure, only a small fraction of the total
17For this reason, varimax is not an optimal rotation when one suspects a dataset of having a
single meaningful factor (Lawley and Maxwell, 1971).
18Perfect simple structure isnt the only set of su¢ cient conditions guaranteeing that v = 

q .
An alternative set of su¢ cient conditions is o¤ered by Jennrich (Psychometrika, 2004a). They are
slightly less intuitive and hinge on a characteristic of q . Whenever the sum of squared loadings in
each column of q is the same for all columns in 







number of pairwise combinations of variables in X are explained through a common
factor. This means the model must attribute most of the observed o¤-diagonal values
in V (X) to sampling variation, which becomes less and less tenable as the values
become large.
As further illustration of the e¤ects of varimax vs. quartimax, consider the rst
factor I extract from the governance data, f1. Under the quartimax rotation of
0, f1 emerges as a general factor. This means that nearly all 45 variables in the
dataset load heavily on it - including variables covering such diverse topics as civil
liberties, regulatory and bureaucratic quality, and political violence. However, under a
varimax rotation of 0, the loadings on f1 for civil liberties variables fall relative to the
loadings on f1 for regulatory and bureaucratic quality. Under varimax, the identity of
f1 becomes more clearly delineated, and factors 2 through 4 assume greater relative
importance in explaining V (X).
What has not been mentioned so far is the fact that rotating  can alter the deni-
tion of factors. These denitional changes may be drastic or they may be quite subtle.
In the data, it turns out that the four factors of governance are nearly equivalently
dened in the quartimax and varimax rotations (and in a number of other rotations
tried for robustness but not presented in this paper). For reasons outlined below,
however, I settle ultimately on varimax-rotated factors as my governance measures.
16
2.4 Estimating the model parameters
Assuming 	 10 diagonal and  = I just identies the parameters in (1) and (2).
Given the assumption of normality, one can then estimate the model (i.e., the pm+
1
2
m (m+ 1)+p unique parameters in ;;	) by maximum likelihood. One maximizes
the following (simplied) log-likelihood equation (Anderson, 2003; Wansbeek and
Meijer, 2000):










X 0X. The resulting estimate of  will correspond to the unrotated solution,
0. One is then free to impose rotations on 0.
The model presented in (1)-(2) assumes that the number of factors, m, is known.
Of course, in practice one has to estimate m. Call the estimate bm. Common tactics
for picking bm include a likelihood-ratio test, information criteria (e.g. - Schwarz,
1978; Akaike, 1987) parallel analysis (Horn, 1965), the scree test (Cattell, 1966)
and the eigenvalue > 1 rule (Kaiser, 1960). All methods have the same objective
of pinpointing the minimum number of common factors su¢ cient to replicate the
observed V (X) : Monte carlo studies (e.g. - Cattell and Vogelmann, 1977; Hakstian
et al., 1982; Zwick and Velicer, 1982 & 1986; Thompson, 2004) have documented
that the performance of any particular rule can vary signicantly with the factor
structure, number of variables and number of factors in the data-generating process.
Since di¤erent methods can produce di¤erent bm for a given dataset, it is therefore
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prudent to examine the robustness of factor identities by raising and lowering bm.
2.5 Predicting the factor scores
The preceding section does not address how to estimate the factor scores themselves
- i.e., the fs. Of course, since f is a random variate, one cannot estimate it per se.
Put simply, even if one knew population values of ;;	, there would still be no way
of separately identifying the levels of the us and the fs in (1).
The approach I take is to predict f using its conditional mean, given data vec-
tor X. Such a predictor is called the regression predictor and is due to Thomson
(1951). Anderson (2003) and Lawley and Maxwell (1971) provide full derivations of
the regression predictor. Here I only reproduce the nal result, noting that it follows
directly from the joint distribution of f and X implied by (1), (2) and accompanying
stochastic assumptions.
The m  1 population conditional mean vector of f , given observed data X can
be written:
E [f jX] = 0 1X (4)
In the orthogonal case ( = I), the predictor simplies to 0 1X. It will be helpful
at this point to present the population conditional variance formula as well:
V [f jX] =   0 1 (5)
which in the orthogonal factors case simplies to I   0 1.
As the term implies, the regression predictor conditions on an optimally weighted
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linear combination of the Xs when predicting f . The intuition is most easily appre-
ciated in the m = 1 case (the case of a single factor), where the matrix equation for


















and where  kk  V (uk) is the kth diagonal element of matrix 	. One can regard
the Xs as noisy signals of the underlying fs. The scalar expressions in (6) and (7)
then clearly demonstrate the factor models desirable features as a signal extraction
technique. Variables with greater sensitivity to the factor f (as measured by k =
Cov (Xk; f)) and/or smaller measurement error variance (as measured by  kk) are
weighted most heavily.
Since in practice the parameters ;;	 are unknown, their ML estimates are
used. Designate the estimated conditional mean and variance of f as:
bE [f jX] = bb0b 1X (8)
bV [f jX] = b  bb0b 1bb (9)
Finally, I note that when the parameters in (6) and (7) are translated into their
conceptual counterparts using the notation from Kaufmann et al. (e.g. - 1999a,
1999b), the resulting expression is precisely the governance predictor proposed by
19
those authors.19 This equivalence demonstrates that the unobserved components
model presented by Kaufmann et al. is identical to the random factor model pre-
sented here, with m = 1. In addition, because the Kaufmann et al. framework
always restricts m = 1, the question of rotational indeterminacy does not arise. This
does not mean, of course, that Kaufmann et al. have solved the underlying identica-
tion problem posed by rotation. Rather, they have implicitly imposed identication
conditions at an earlier stage, through an a priori categorization of the data.
3 Results
In this section I present and interpret ML estimates of , the loadings matrices em-
bodying the latent structure of governance data. I discuss at length the interpretation
of each governance factor and compare their varimax and quartimax-rotated versions.
I then argue that, despite the robustness of factor identities to rotation, nevertheless
a few characteristics of the varimax-rotated factors make them superior measures.
My argument rests on both a comparison of the respective loading matrices, q and
v, and on the the way the rotations di¤erentially rank particular countries. Finally,
I present a conceptual mapping between my new measures and the Kaufmann et al.
WGI and show that in a very real sense, my measures are more fundamental. I begin
with a discussion of my model specication and data.

















I estimate an orthogonal factor model on p = 45 variables. I specify the model
with bm = 5 factors, as recommended by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC).20
Extracting too many factors can reduce the precision of the loading estimates on the
most important factors, whereas extracting too few factors risks obscuring important
systematic forces of correlation in the data and clouding the identities of the factors
that are retained (Thompson, 2004; Hayton et al., 2004). In the end, my decision to
extract ve factors rests on a mixture of statistical evidence, the durability of factor
identities to values of bm greater than ve, and the fact that factors higher than the
fth have minimal explanatory power and are simply uninterpretable.21
Two orthogonal rotations of  are presented and analyzed - the quartimax and
varimax. The quartimax and varimax rotations were selected because each pursues
exclusively one of the two fundamental notions of simple structure put forth by by
20The BIC actually recommends six factors, but we reject the model with m = 6 because it
turns out to be a Heywood case. In a Heywood case, the ML estimate of at least one  kk is a
corner solution, i.e. - the constraint that  kk  0;8k is binding. A Heywood case can result from
i.) sampling variation (meaning that in the population, the o¤ending  kk is actually positive); ii.)
non-uniqueness of the solution ;;	; or iii.) non-existence of an admissable solution. See Van
Driel (1978), Anderson and Gerbing (1984), Gerbing and Anderson (1987), and Dillon, Kumar and
Mulani (1987) for discussions. The next-lowest value of the BIC is reached with m = 5, which -
combined with the fact that the sixth and higher factors are indecipherable - constitutes our grounds
for retaining ve factors.
21To be sure, the various number-of-factor rules do not all agree on m for our data. The Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC) and likelihood-ratio statistic (LR) recommend twelve and thirteen fac-
tors, respectively. Horns (1965) parrallel analysis (PA) and Kaisers eigenvalue >1 rule (K) both
seem to recommend 4-7 factors. Monte carlo studies have shown that the PA is one of the most
accurate rules under a broad variety of factor structure DGPs (with a slight tendency to extract too
many factors), while the K rule has a pervasive tendency to extract too many factors (Humphreys
and Montanelli, 1975; Zwick and Velicer, 1982, 1986; Hayton et al., 2004; Horn, 1965). The LR
test has been found to over and underextract, depending on the DGP (Hakstian et al., 1982;). It is
di¢ cult to extrapolate much from monte carlo results because so many of the conclusions depend
on features of the DGP which in practice are unknowable (although the tendency for the K rule to
overextract seems well documented). Perhaps the most important message from such studies is that
one must consider many pieces of evidence before settling on bm.
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Thurstone (1935, 1947). If any pair of rotations is likely to generate di¤ering inter-
pretations of the factors, it is this pair.
Quartimax and varimax are both orthogonal rotations. I prefer to look at only
orthogonal rotations because, on the conceptual level, orthogonality implies that the
factors I uncover are basic and irreducible. If two factors were allowed to be correlated,
this could indicate either a causal relationship between the two, or an omitted variable
a¤ecting both. In either case, I would want to dig deeper. Oblique rotations of 
produce largely the same ve factors of governance, but they can cause conceptual
di¤erences between factors to become less pronounced. Excessive intercorrelation
constitutes one of my main critiques of the WGI, which are so highly correlated that
they appear to be largely measuring the same latent forces.
3.2 Data
The dataset consists of 45 country-level variables assessing the quality of governance
in various economic, political and legal contexts, in 2005. The data were taken from
an online database of governance variables constructed by Kaufmann et al. and avail-
able at the World BanksWorldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) website. Detailed
documentation for each variable is taken directly from Governance Matters V: Ap-
pendices (Kaufmann et al., 2006). All variables represent subjective assessments -
primarily by country experts at for-prot risk consulting rms (e.g. - Economist
Intelligence Unit, Political Risk Services, Global Insight) but also by researchers at
NGOs, universities and think tanks (e.g. - Freedom House, Amnesty International,
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Brown University, Heritage Foundation).
All variables are standardized by Kaufmann et al. such that realizations fall within
the zero-one interval and such that higher scores correspond to better outcomes. This
makes scores comparable across sources while preserving the ordinal properties of the
original data.
While select variables in the dataset are observed for over 200 countries, the model
parameters were estimated using the largest balanced dataset available, 73 countries.22
I say more about missing data issues at the end of this Chapter.
3.3 Interpreting the Five Factors
I now interpret maximum likelihood estimates of  from the quartimax and varimax
rotations of 0. I refer to these loadings matrices as q and v, respectively. I extract
ve factors, and each factor has a straightforward denition derived from the concepts
common to the variables most closely associated with it.
A word about variable names is in order. There are 45 closely related variables in
the governance dataset, making it challenging to nd short, distinctive and descriptive
names for each. I have opted for the following convention. I label each variable with
its Kaufmann et al. governance category, followed by an acronym indicating the data
provider - e.g., corruptGRS (Global Insights Global Risk Service variable classied as
22Since the actual input required for estimating ;;	 of a factor model is just a correlation
matrix (and not the raw data, per se), it is theoretically possible to include all observations (com-
plete and incomplete) by substituting the matrix of pairwise correlations (based on all available
observations for all variables) in place of the complete-case correlation matrix thats based on the
73 observations of the balanced panel. We do not take this approach, however. Aside from its
questionable statistical properties (di¤erent cells of the pairwise correlation matrix will be based on
di¤erent numbers of observations), it turns out in our case to be impossible for another reason: the
matrix of pairwise correlations using all available observations is not positive denite.
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Control of Corruption by Kaufmann et al.), or voiceEIU (Economist Intelligence Unit
variable classied as Voice and Accountability).23 The Kaufmann et al. categories
are a way to communicate succinctly the putative content of a variable, but they in
no way inhibit my models determination of a variables factorial content.
To interpret or dene a factor, one looks to the variables with which that factor
is highly correlated - i.e., the variables that load most heavily on it. To that end, for
each factor, I list in descending order the ten variables that load most heavily on it
under the given rotation. For example, looking at Table 1 below, one sees that in the
quartimax rotation, variable gove¤ectBCRI loads more heavily on f1 than any other
variable in the dataset (k = 0:960); variable corruptBCRI has the second largest f1
loading (k = 0:956), etc. Examining the content of these two variables enables us
to begin characterizing f1 under the quartimax solution. These lists constitute the
primary input used to dene each factor. I create for each factor a label, based on
the ideas common to its highest-loading variables. One can quibble with the precise
wording of the labels, but the intent is simply to characterize succinctly the concepts
at the core of each factor.
3.3.1 Factor one
I begin with the rst factor, f1. This factor is a broad metric of the overall legal
and bureaucratic environment faced by rms and investors. It measures the states
23Data provider acronyms are deciphered in the appendix. We retain the Kaufmann et al. gov-
ernance categories as our variable descriptors even as we advocate against the a priori organizing
principle used to develop them. While at rst glance this may seem contradictory, the position taken
in this paper is not that a priori governance categories make no sense at all (on the contrary - they
can be quite intuitive), but that the approach behind them is open to certain shortcomings, laid out
in the introduction.
24
tendency to treat all investors and entrepreneurs equally under the law, to uphold
contracts, to discourage predation (including predation by its own agents), and to
minimize disruptive policy shifts. To the extent that f1 can be said to measure
the rule of law, the focus is on the protection of certain economic rights (primarily
property and contracting rights) and on the suppression of corruption.
Some common phrases in the documentation of variables that characterize f1
include "enforceability of contracts", "property rights", "corruption among public
o¢ cials", "nepotism", "intrusiveness of the countrys bureaucracy", "quality of the
countrys bureaucracy", "whether the necessary business laws are in place", "enforced
consistently", and "competence of public sector personnel".
MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE
Quartimax Varimax
variable k variable k
gove¤ectBCRI 0.960 rulelawQLM 0.892
corruptBCRI 0.956 corruptQLM 0.887
regulationBCRI 0.955 rulelawHER 0.811
rulelawEIU 0.953 corruptGCS 0.808
corruptEIU 0.946 rulelawGCS 0.803
rulelawHER 0.941 corruptEIU 0.792
corruptQLM 0.937 gove¤ectEIU 0.774
rulelawQLM 0.936 gove¤ectGCS 0.751
voiceBCRI 0.926 corruptBCRI 0.742
rulelawBCRI 0.919 corruptPRS 0.722
Table 1
The unifying theme in f1 is the states ability to reduce uncertainty and lubricate
exchange by providing a legal, regulatory and judicial infrastructure for markets.
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Based on this role, I refer to f1 as simply market infrastructure. The name is intended
to envelop the full scope of government intervention in markets - be it bureaucratic,
legislative, tax or judicial.
The quartimax and varimax rotations of f1 have much in common with each other.
They share ve variables in their respective lists of the ten most important, and the
conceptual similarities of the variables on which the lists di¤er allow us to apply
comfortably the label market infrastructure to both rotations.
Nevertheless, there are two ways in which the quartimax and varimax charac-
terizations of market infrastructure di¤er. First,market infrastructure emerges as a
general factor under the quartimax rotation, but not under varimax (to see this, com-
pare column one from the complete bq and bv matrices in the appendix). Second,
civil liberties play much less of a role in the varimax market infrastructure than in
the quartimax version. These two di¤erences are related. That is, varimax avoids
creating a general factor precisely because it allocates civil liberties content away from
market infrastructure and onto f2.24
3.3.2 Factor two
The second factor is a measure of democracy and civil liberties.
24There is a third di¤erence. The quartimax f1 is dominated by data from Global Insights Busi-
ness Conditions and Risk Indicators (BCRI), whereas the varimax f1 is not. Five of the quartimax
f1s top ten variables come from BCRI, but only one of the varimaxs top ten comes from that
source.This di¤erence may be rooted in the varimax f1s de-emphasis of civil liberties. BCRI vari-
ables tend to be more strongly correlated with civil liberties indicators in our datasets than QLM




variable k variable k
voiceHUM 0.695 voiceFRH 0.906
voiceFRH 0.670 voiceHUM 0.901
voiceRSF 0.553 voiceRSF 0.783
voicePRS 0.419 voiceEIU 0.740
voiceEIU 0.379 voicePRS 0.711
rulelawHUM 0.370 rulelawHUM 0.685
regulationHER 0.281 voiceBCRI 0.622
voiceBCRI 0.234 regulationHER 0.601
regulationEIU 0.166 regulationEIU 0.517
stabilityEIU 0.152 regulationBCRI 0.494
Table 2
Variables with the highest loadings on f2 come from rights-oriented organiza-
tions like Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders and Amnesty International.
These variables convey unequivocally their content in phrases such as: "restrictions
on domestic and foreign travel", "imprisonments because of ethnicity...", "freedom of
assembly", "protection from political terror", "press freedom index", "free and fair
elections", and "right to freely organize in di¤erent political parties".25
The interpretation of f2 is robust to rotation.26
25Other phrases characteristic of f2 include: "free religious institutions", "fair electoral laws",
"free from domination by the military", and "accountability of public o¢ cials".
26There is even greater across-rotation uniformity in the loading pattern for f2 than for f1. The
quartimax and varimax rotations of f2 share nine out of ten variables in their respective lists, and
they rank these common variables in a very similar order.
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3.3.3 Factors three and four
The factor I label downside governance risk emerges as f3 under the varimax rotation
and f4 under the quartimax rotation.27
DOWNSIDE GOVERNANCE RISK
Quartimax Varimax
variable k variable k
regulationGRS 0.558 gove¤ectGRS 0.742
gove¤ectGRS 0.448 regulationGRS 0.740
rulelawGRS 0.418 rulelawGRS 0.709
stabilityGRS 0.384 stabilityGRS 0.630
corruptGRS 0.294 corruptGRS 0.615
regulationPRS 0.288 regulationPRS 0.550
voicePRS 0.120 regulationBCRI 0.460
regulationBCRI 0.114 gove¤ectGCS 0.420
regulationGCS 0.090 regulationGCS 0.415
voiceGCS 0.086 voiceGCS 0.405
Table 3
Unlike market infrastructure (f1) or civil liberties (f2), the most obvious common
feature of variables associated with downside governance risk is their common data
source (Global Insights Global Risk Service (GRS)), not their common content. The
GRS variables in the dataset all forecast the likelihood of a deterioration in gover-
nance su¢ cient to cause economic contraction of a specied severity. For example,
stabilityGRS measures the likelihood that personnel problems within the government
cause a 1% decline in the GDP growth rate over any 12-month period. The variables
in Table 3 assess di¤erent areas of governance (e.g. - political stability, corruption,
27The reason for the reversal is that in our data the relative explanatory powers of f3 and f4 are
nearly equivalent. Explanatory power of a factor is proxied by its corresponding eigenvalue.
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regulatory burdens), but they share a focus on potential economic fallout of institu-
tional decay. I hypothesize that it is this focus on economic fallout which generates
systematic correlation among GRS variables that persists even after the e¤ects of the
other four factors have been controlled for.
Implicit in predictions made by GRS variables is a hypothesis concerning the
relationship between elements of governance and their e¤ects on macroeconomic per-
formance. But that hypothesis is not spelled out in the variable descriptions (see Ap-
pendix). As a result, a detailed interpretation of these variables is problematic. For
example, a 1% decline in GDP growth rate may require massive government turnover
in one country but only a small disruption in others. As a result, cross-country
variation in stabilityGRS may be measuring di¤erences in the fragility of governance,
di¤erences in the sensitivity of output growth to governance shocks, or both.
Given the uncertainty surrounding the precise meaning of GRS variables, it seems
prudent to infer only that they are broad measures of governance volatility. Countries
with high scores are less likely to experience abrupt, negative governance shocks over
the forecast horizon; countries with low scores are more likely to experience such
shocks. For this reason, I characterize the factor dominated by GRS variables as
downside governance risk.28
The next factor is a measure of political, social and ethnic turmoil, which I label
order. Order emerges as f4 under the varimax rotation and f3 under the quartimax
28The emergence of a data-source specic factor is interesting. Weve argued above in e¤ect that,
its not that GRS country assessments are inconsistent with those of other data providers but rather
that GRS simply measures a phenomenon (economic fallout) thats slightly unique. Strictly speaking,
this claim is not veriable statistically since the factor model cant tell us why certain groups of
variables covary in the ways they do. In any case, this phenomenon appears to be common. For





variable k variable k
stabilityGCS 0.649 stabilityBCRI 0.785
stabilityBCRI 0.621 stabilityGCS 0.732
stabilityPRS 0.505 stabilityPRS 0.615
stabilityMIG 0.497 stabilityHUM 0.613
stabilityHUM 0.428 stabilityMIG 0.603
stabilityGRS 0.296 stabilityGRS 0.458
stabilityEIU 0.252 stabilityEIU 0.446
regulationMIG 0.132 rulelawBCRI 0.345
rulelawGRS 0.124 rulelawPRS 0.337
rulelawPRS 0.123 rulelawGRS 0.317
Table 4
Characteristic phrases associated with order include: "cohesion of the government
and governing party or parties", "racial and nationality tensions", "political unrest",
"tribal conict", "government coups", "armed opposition", "frequency of political
killings", "foreign-supported insurgency", and "sustained terrorist threat".29
Broadly speaking, order captures the extent to which the political system mini-
mizes threats to stability and social cohesion. A wide variety of threats from a wide
variety of sources are addressed: military coups, foreign invasions, breakdowns of gov-
erning coalitions, civil unrest, violent popular demonstrations, violent ethnic clashes,
and terrorism. Impacts on the government and on businesses and investors are both
considered. Order is also robust to rotation: the quartimax and varimax versions
29Other characteristic phrases for the order include: "extremism", "arbitrary violence" by the
state, and "frequency of torture".
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share nine of ten top variables and rank these in a very similar order of importance.
Nothing in the variables that dene order distinguishes between the tranquil civil-
ity of a democracy and the cowed silence of a police state. Order displays a preference
for stability, however it may be accomplished. Stability may stem from cultural, ge-
ographic or demographic factors (e.g. - Mongolia or Samoa), or it may stem from a
repressive political regime (e.g. - North Korea, Belarus).
To understand orders content more, I look at how it ranks countries. In the
scatterplot below, each countrys horizontal coordinate equals its order score under the
quartimax rotation; a countrys vertical coordinate is its order score under varimax.
(The diagonal line is the 45-degree line.)
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Figure 1
At  = 0:96, the correlation between varimax and quartimax order is nearly
perfect. I will bring out some more subtle di¤erences between the rotations later in
the paper, but for now I focus exclusively on what their versions of order have in
common.
Order presents a curious but ultimately explainable juxtaposition of countries.
The highest-scoring countries contain a sizable number of authoritarian regimes. For
example, Cuba (CUB) and North Korea (PRK) rank second and third, respectively
under varimax. And countries such as Belarus (BLR), Turkmenistan (TKM), Bhutan
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(BTN), Lybia (LBY), and Myanmar (MMR) all fall within the top quintile. Typically
what places countries like these near the top is an above-average score in stabilityBCRI
(risk of civil unrest and terrorism), combined with very poor scores in three human
rights measures: voiceBCRI (representativeness of political system), voiceFRH (political
rights, civil liberties, freedom of the press), and voiceEIU (accountability of public
o¢ cials, human rights, freedom of association).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the very lowest-scoring countries contain
a sizable number of large, diverse democracies. Colombia (COL) and Israel (ISR)
score lowest and second-lowest, respectively under varimax. And the United States
(USA), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Nigeria (NGA), the Philippines (PHL), the
U.K. (GBR) and France (FRA) all score in the bottom quintile. Typically, what
places countries like these near the bottom is below-average scores in three stability
variables: stabilityBCRI (risk of civil unrest and terrorism), stabilityHUM (killings,
disappearances, torture), and stabilityGCS (business costs of terrorist threat). In the
case of the U.S. and U.K., high rankings in voiceFRH (political rights, civil liberties,
freedom of the press) and voiceEIU (accountability of public o¢ cials, human rights,
freedom of association) also worked against them.
What emerges from examination of the country rankings, variable denitions and
loading patterns is a factor that - while not denitively anti-democratic - nevertheless
tends to penalize the decentralization of political power. For all their potential virtues,
the enshrinement of certain civil liberties in a countrys political culture; the allocation
of government power from the federal to the state and local levels; and a more open
electoral system may also sew seeds of upheaval.
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Orders other dening characteristic is the strong penalty it puts on perceived
risks of civil unrest and/or terrorism. Since social instability can stem from a wide
variety of causes - ethnic, religious, political, cultural, historical - a great diversity of
countries can be found at any given level of order.
3.3.4 Factor ve
I label the fth factor MIG after Merchant International Group, the data provider
from which f5s most important variables are drawn. Its identity is robust to rotation,
as Table 5 below shows.
MERCHANT INTL. GROUP
Quartimax Varimax
variable k variable k
corruptMIG 0.459 corruptMIG 0.653
gove¤ectMIG 0.422 gove¤ectMIG 0.617
regulationMIG 0.406 regulationMIG 0.583
rulelawMIG 0.382 rulelawMIG 0.581
stabilityMIG 0.213 corruptPRS 0.375
corruptPRS 0.164 stabilityMIG 0.337
gove¤ectPRS 0.110 gove¤ectPRS 0.305
regulationHER 0.081 voiceGCS 0.292
stabilityHUM 0.077 rulelawHER 0.279
voiceGCS 0.077 regulationHER 0.271
Table 5
Like downside governance risk, MIG is another data-source-specic factor. How-
ever, unlike downside governance risk, very little is known about what makes MIGs
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country assessments unique.30 This factor accounts for a mere 8% of the explained
variation in X under the varimax rotation and for less than 3% under the quartimax
rotation. While I nd the emergence of a second provider-specic factor interesting,
its modest explanatory power combined with its inscrutability (these characteristics
are no doubt related) mean I will have littler more to say about f5.
3.3.5 Summing up
I have extracted ve orthogonal factors from a body of governance data. The identities
of all factors are robust to rotation. The rst four factors are readily interpretable
as governance concepts: market infrastructure, civil liberties, downside governance
risk and order. Although each of the rst four factors individually comprises a broad
range of ideas, each is also starkly delineated from all the others. Taken together,
they encompass most of the legal and political institutions commonly implied by the
term "governance", including business regulation, property and contracting rights,
judicial independence, bureaucratic e¢ ciency, corruption, political stability, and civil
liberties.
The fth factor appears not to measure a recognizable feature of governance but
is instead dened by a methodological or conceptual idiosyncrasy of data provider,
MIG. Whatever its origin, the fth factor is of negligible importance in explaining
V (X). The rst four factors alone account for 92% of explained variation under the
varimax rotation, and for over 97% under the quartimax rotation. For these reasons,
30World Bank documentation of MIGs Grey Area Dynamics (the MIG variables in our model)
are brief and lack detail. MIGs website does provide more detail about their assessments, but
nothing there suggests a unique analytical approach.
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I focus exclusively on factors one through four henceforth.
3.4 Varimax: the preferred rotation
In this section, I argue that the varimax rotation of 0 produces the most plausible
and intuitive factor structure, and that therefore the varimax-rotated factor scores
should serve as my governance indicators.
As mentioned earlier, simplicity is the traditional criterion for selecting a rotation.
The idea is that one should select whichever rotation yields the most plausible factor
interpretations. The complication in my case is that, for the most part, the broad
outlines of each factor have been found to be robust to rotation.
On the other hand, the objectives of each rotation are manifestly di¤erent, and
these di¤erences, for example, have been shown to cause civil liberties concepts to
play a much smaller role in the varimax version of market infrastructure than in the
quartimax version. Therefore, even when multiple rotations produce broadly similar
interpretations of the data, potential grounds for preferring a particular rotation may
still exist.
Along these lines, I believe there are some compelling reasons to prefer varimax.
First, I believe varimaxs factor simplicity objective is the most appealing approach,
given that a main purpose of my inquiry is to dene the factors of governance. Factor
simplicity is the ideal rotational objective for bringing out the unique essence of each
factor. Although factors - linear combinations of the variables in X - can be made
orthogonal in an innity of ways, some ways are more intuitive than others.
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Figure 2 below is a scatter plot of country scores in my market infrastructure fac-
tor. Each countrys horizontal coordinate again equals its score under the quartimax
rotation, and its vertical coordinate is its score under varimax.
Figure 2
One can see that on the whole, scores under the two rotations are highly corre-
lated, at  = 0:74. However, there is also a sizable number of countries that score
substantially better under one rotation than the other. These discrepancies are at-
tributable to the way in which quartimax and varimax dene market infrastructure
di¤erently.
37
Consider countries lying farthest above the 45-degree line, e.g. - Eritrea (ERI),
Saudi Arabia (SAU), United Arab Emirates (ARE),Nepal (NPL), Zimbabone (ZWE),
Iran (IRN), Syria (SYR), Yemen (YEM), Cuba (CUB) and Uzbekistan (UZB). The
market infrastructure scores for these countries are one standard deviation or more
higher under varimax than under quartimax. This is exactly what one would expect
for countries that have poor human rights records (as these do) because civil liberties
concepts are relatively less important to varimaxs market infrastructure than to the
quartimax version. In e¤ect, when ranked under varimax, human rights abuses do
not count against these countries, whereas when ranked under quartimax, they do.
Conversely, countries lying farthest below the 45-degree line are more highly
ranked under the quartimax version of market infrastructure than under the varimax
version. This group is dominated by Eastern European countries like Latvia (LVA),
Lithuania (LTU), Ukraine (UKR), Bulgaria (BGR), the Slovak Republic (SVK) and
Slovenia (SVN). Just as one would expect given the distinctions pointed out earlier,
these are countries that score relatively well in human rights (i.e. - own scores in
human rights-related variables are high compared to own scores in other governance
variables). When scored according to varimaxs market infrastructure, their virtu-
ous human rights records do not benet these countries, but under the quartimax
measure, they do.31
I prefer the varimax rendering of market infrastructure on the grounds that it
puts relatively little emphasis on civil liberties content. Both a priori ideas about
31Civil liberties information is not lost under varimax; it simply shows up in f2 instead of f1 and
f2.
38
governance, as well as the results of this factor model, suggest that notions of civil
liberty (electoral democracy, protection of human rights, etc.) are su¢ ciently distinct
from the other content in f1 that they constitute a separate factor. The emergence
of f2 is proof of this.
By including civil liberties content, the quartimax rotation casts f1 as a general
factor rather than a sharply dened facet of governance. A general factor goes against
the spirit of this analysis. I am not trying to condense all of governance into a single
number. Such an approach carries data reduction too far, glossing over important
fundamental distinctions between governance concepts.
Next I examine how the two rotations render civil liberties. Factor scores are
plotted in Figure 3 below.
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Figure 3
I concluded in an earlier section that quartimax and varimax rotations characterize
civil liberties in a nearly identical manner, positioning the same set of variables as
the most important. Figure 3 above bears this out; the quartimax and varimax civil
liberties scores are very highly correlated ( = 0:88).
On the other hand, the varimax rendering of civil liberties bears a much closer




variable varimax f2 quartimax f2 N
voiceEIU 0.741 0.379 119
voiceFRH 0.915 0.667 194
voiceGCS 0.269 -0.205 114
voiceHUM 0.902 0.718 182
voicePRS 0.695 0.375 134
voiceRSF 0.810 0.632 158
voiceBCRI 0.596 0.179 192
Table 6
Table 6 above shows pairwise correlations between f2 scores (i.e. - bE [f2jX]) and
the key civil liberties / human rights variables in the dataset. By a wide margin,
the varimax-rotated scores are more strongly correlated with every such variable.
Although one ought not to expect factors (especially orthogonal ones) to correspond
neatly with preconceived governance notions in this way, one also shouldnt be afraid
to embrace those factors that do. In weighing competing measures of civil liberties like
the quartimax and varimax versions of f2, concordance with observable civil liberties
benchmarks (such as the variables in Table 6) should count as an attribute, all else
equal.
A similar argument can also be made using order. Quartimax and varimax scores
in order were seen to be tightly correlated ( = 0:96).32 However - as with civil liber-
ties (f2) - it is the varimax version thats noticeably more congruent with benchmark
32When the two rotations do assess a country di¤erently in order, it is generally not by much.
Only sixteen of 215 observations have quartimax and varimax scores that di¤er by more than one-half
a standard deviation. And the maximum discrepancy (Singapore) is just 0:7 standard deviations.
The largest discrepancies are frequently cases where the varimax order ranks a Western European
nation more favorably than quartimax.
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measures of political and social stability, as Table 7 shows.
Pairwise correlations
variable varimax f4 quartimax f3 N
stabilityGRS 0.462 0.293 120
stabilityEIU 0.443 0.252 118
stabilityGCS 0.740 0.631 117
stabilityHUM 0.616 0.470 190
stabilityIJT 0.475 0.258 180
stabilityMIG 0.609 0.506 152
stabilityPRS 0.602 0.471 138
stabilityBCRI 0.815 0.650 198
Table 7
The correlations in the varimax column are larger than those in the quartimax
column because the variables in the table load more heavily on order under the
varimax rotation than under the quartimax. This di¤erence in loadings is a direct
consequence of the fact that varimax denes market infrastructure more narrowly
than quartimax does.33
The nal two factors, downside governance risk and MIG, provide no compelling
evidence that favors one rotation over another. They are therefore not reviewed here.
In summary, I have shown that, to the extent that the two rotations di¤er in their
denition of individual factors f1; :::; f4, the varimax perspective weakly dominates
the quartimax for all factors. I believe that the primary reason for the varimaxs
superiority is its penchant for resisting a general factor. I advocate using governance
scores from the varimax rotation.
33To see this, compare quartimax and varimax-rotated loadings on Factor 1 for stability variables
using the complete  tables in the appendix.
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3.5 A comparison to Kaufmann et al.s WGI
I now compare my governance indicators directly to the WGI of Kaufmann et al. I
perform a simple exercise aimed at demonstrating how well they can explain each
other. First, I run OLS regressions of each of the six WGI on all ve of my factors.
I then reverse the specications and regress each of my ve factors on all six WGI.
Table 8 below shows the results.
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Comparison with Kaufmann et al.s WGI - OLS Regressions
(DEPENDENT VARIABLES)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
CC RL RQ GE VA PS mrkt. infr. civ. libs. d-side. gov. risk order MIG
CC 1.025*** -0.0649 -0.975*** -0.0341 -0.122
(0.0858) (0.0507) (0.161) (0.101) (0.206)
RL 0.577*** -0.322*** -0.220 -0.0373 0.291
(0.0941) (0.0556) (0.177) (0.110) (0.226)
RQ -0.263*** 0.0679 1.139*** -0.336*** -0.0464
(0.0850) (0.0502) (0.160) (0.0996) (0.204)
GE -0.0235 -0.218*** 0.838*** -0.329** 0.0170
(0.121) (0.0713) (0.227) (0.141) (0.290)
VA -0.462*** 1.323*** -0.484*** -0.189*** 0.107
(0.0405) (0.0239) (0.0760) (0.0474) (0.0972)
PS -0.322*** -0.142*** 0.165** 1.332*** 0.0620
(0.0412) (0.0244) (0.0775) (0.0483) (0.0990)
mrkt. infr. 0.766*** 0.690*** 0.528*** 0.642*** 0.303*** 0.380***
(0.0151) (0.0158) (0.0190) (0.0166) (0.00883) (0.0154)
civil libs. 0.368*** 0.379*** 0.465*** 0.417*** 0.846*** 0.332***
(0.0149) (0.0157) (0.0189) (0.0165) (0.00875) (0.0153)
d-side. gov. risk 0.250*** 0.311*** 0.493*** 0.419*** 0.213*** 0.305***
(0.0151) (0.0158) (0.0190) (0.0166) (0.00883) (0.0154)
order 0.194*** 0.277*** 0.110*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.681***
(0.0148) (0.0156) (0.0187) (0.0163) (0.00869) (0.0152)
MIG 0.188*** 0.216*** 0.186*** 0.199*** 0.160*** 0.172***
(0.0150) (0.0157) (0.0189) (0.0165) (0.00878) (0.0153)
Constant 0.00943 -4.13e-05 0.00469 0.0206 -0.0117 -0.0408*** -0.0552** 0.0456*** -0.104** 0.0404 0.152***
(0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0186) (0.0162) (0.00863) (0.0151) (0.0231) (0.0137) (0.0434) (0.0271) (0.0555)
Observations 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202
R-squared 0.957 0.953 0.932 0.949 0.985 0.953 0.872 0.957 0.602 0.840 0.127
F-stat. 878.9 796.9 536.6 733.1 2618 795.6 221.3 726.7 49.09 170.8 4.741
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 8
The point of the exercise is to take two sets of indicators, project each onto
the other, and use what is known about each sets construction to draw inferences
about the other set.34 All regressors have been standardized to have zero mean, unit
34Standard errors for coe¢ cient estimates have not been adjusted (e.g. - see Wooldridge, 2002,
Ch. 6) to account for the fact that all regressors are estimated quantitites. On the other hand, its
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standard deviation to facilitate comparison.
Consider rst columns (1)-(6), where the dependent variable in each specication
is one of the Kaufmann et al. WGIs. The explanatory variables (1)-(6) are my ve
varimax-rotated governance factors.
A rst observation is that the R2s are all very high - 0:93 and above. Clearly,
my ve factors can replicate the variation in the WGI very well. Of course, it would
be strange if this were not the case given that all the underlying data used to con-
struct the dependent variable (and much more) are also used to construct each of the
regressors.
A second observation is that every one of my ve factors enters positively and
highly signicant (1% level) in all six regressions. This indicates that each Kaufmann
et al. measure is itself a hybrid of ve sharply delineated (i.e. - orthogonal) inuences.
This evidence supports (though it doesnt prove) the claim that my measures are
deeper, more fundamental than the Kaufmann et al. WGI. To reiterate, my claim is
not that my measures cause the Kaufmann et al. gures; rather, I simply claim to
produce a more illuminating categorization of the governance data.
A third observation is that the size and pattern of coe¢ cient estimates are ex-
tremely similar for columns (1)-(4). All four columns have much in common, with
market infrastructure and civil liberties generally dominant, followed next by down-
side governance risk. Order and MIG are generally least important. Thus, loosely
speaking, not only do these four Kaufmann et al. measures (CC, RL, RQ and GE)
not clear such an adjustment is necessary in this exercise, if one views the regressions as modeling
the relationships between two sets of estimates
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contain the same ingredients (my ve factors), they contain them in the roughly the
same proportions.
It was clear from the high intercorrelation of CC, RL, RQ and GE in sample that
they assess highly collinear phenomena. However distinctly these four concepts may
have been dened by Kaufmann et al., in the data they are barely distinguishable.
What one gains from columns (1)-(6), however, is a rigorous decomposition of that
correlation: CC, RL, RQ and GE contain equal measures of market infrastructure,
civil liberties, downside governance risk and order (and little else, as the high R2
attests).
Not all the WGI are equivalent mixtures of my factors. Columns (5) and (6)
(dependent variables are VA and PS, respectively) stand apart from the rst four.
Market infrastructure is no longer the dominant explanatory variable, displaced by
civil liberties in column (5) and by order in column (6). However, just as with CC,
RL, RQ and GE, each of my ve factors has a nontrivial inuence on the dependent
variables VA and PS. Columns (5) and (6) again demonstrate that a single WGI
category is actually a complicated hybrid of orthogonal concepts.
I now move to columns (7)-(11), where the dependent variable in each specication
is now one of my ve governance factors. The explanatory variables in columns (7)-
(11) are the six Kaufmann et al. WGI measures.
Regressors enter highly signicant (1% level) roughly half as often in columns
(7)-(11) as they do in columns (1)-(6). Not surprisingly then, one sees that the R2s
are generally lower compared with specications (1)-(6). The R2 is lowest in (9)
and (11), where the dependent variable is one of my data-source-specic governance
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factors. There is no parallel to data-source-specic factors in the WGI because the
Kaufmann et al. approach never estimates a model with more than one variable from
each source. The lower R2 values in (7)-(11) generally reect the fact the WGI are
more similar to one another than my measures are.
Another contrast with columns (1)-(6) is that more than half the coe¢ cient es-
timates in (7)-(11) are negative; of the 18 negative coe¢ cient estimates, ten are
signicant at the 1% level. What explains the abundance of negative and signicant
estimates? Evidently, the variation unique to each of the explanatory variables is
often negatively correlated with my governance factors.
A further di¤erence evident in (7)-(11) compared to (1)-(6) is that the coe¢ cient
patterns found in (7)-(11) are unique; no two columns in (7)-(11) look remotely alike.
This is not surprising given the mutual orthogonality of the dependent variables in
(7)-(11).
In summary, four general ndings emerge. First, my governance factors explain
the Kaufmann et al. WGI better than the latter explain my governance factors.
Second, each Kaufmann et al. WGI category is a composite of ve very di¤erent
(i.e. - orthogonal) components. Third, the makeup of four of the WGI categories
(CC, RL, RQ, GE) is virtually identical in terms of these ve components. Fourth,
my governance factors are deeper, or more fundamental, than the WGI in the sense
that each of my measures exerts a signicant marginal impact on all WGI categories,
whereas each WGI category is found to exert a small and statistically insignicant
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impact on at least one of my factors.35
4 Other Issues
4.1 Factors or Components?
The factor model employed in this paper implicitly assumes a causal relationship
between f andX: an observations scores in the factors (f) cause observable variables
(X) to take on certain values. I have also spoken about the factors I uncover as
latent capacities, further emphasizing their role as causal forces behind the observable
governance data.
This approach is open to question. The factor model, after all, was developed by
psychologists to model cognitive capacities of human beings. Can countries be said
to possess capacities in a way thats at all analogous to the ways humans possess
intelligence? If so, where do these capacities reside, and how are they determined?
Crucially for policymakers, is a countrys governance capacity xed forever in the
same way that an individuals intelligence is xed by her genetic inheritance? If it is
xed, how does one reconcile that conclusion with the widespread belief that countries
can, through reforms and hard work, improve their governance?
At its core, the issue is whether it is valid to interpret the linear combinations
of governance variables produced by my factor model as anything more meaningful
than complicated averages satisfying certain statistical properties. Consider, for com-
35Four of the Kaufmann et al. WGI (CC, RL, RQ and GE) are insignicant for two or more of
our governance factors.
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parison, factor model applications in macroeconomics, where hundreds of time series
variables are reduced to, say, a half-dozen factors. Such factors have proven useful for
forecasting other time series, for dating recessions and expansions, etc. But in that
research, authors do not maintain that the factors so extracted exist on their own,
somewhere beyond the data, exerting a causal e¤ect on the data. The factors are
simply a lower-dimensional version of the data - indices of economic activity. Should
factors extracted from governance data be interpreted any di¤erently? Are they really
more than the sum of their parts?
From a philosophical point of view, I believe that causal factors at the country
level are just as defensible as causal factors at the individual person level. A persons
core intellectual and psychological attributes are forged by her genetic inheritance and
by her environment. Psychometricians factor analyze the correlation of test items to
uncover those core attributes. Similarly, a countrys tendency to govern well or govern
poorly is shaped by its history - conquest, colonialism, religious upheaval - and its
environment - climate, natural resources, coastlines, etc. Why is it not equally valid
to factor analyze correlations of expert assessments to uncover those tendencies?
From a practical point of view, this debate matters for my results only if the
two approaches dene governance dimensions and/or rank countries in substantially
di¤erent ways. To embody the alternative view that governance dimensions are prop-
erly regarded as indexes rather than causal factors, one should use the principal
components (PC) model. The components are linear combinations of the variables,
constructed such that each successive component explains the maximum possible
amount of the datas variation, subject to being orthogonal to all other components.
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A standard distinction that is drawn between the two models is to say that the PC
model explains variance whereas the factor model explains covariances. There is no
hypothesis that components cause the data, nor is there any partitioning of the datas
variation into systematic and idiosyncratic parts. The PC model is data reduction,
pure and simple.
To test the practical import of the factors vs. components distinction, I estimate a
PCmodel on the governance data and compare component loadings to factor loadings.
I specify a ve-component model and rotate to the varimax solution for comparabil-
ity with earlier results. The ten largest-loading variables for each component are
displayed in Table 9 below.
Principal Components Model Loadings Estimates (varimax rotation) - Dominant Variables for Each Component
component 1 component 2 component 3 component 4 component 5
rulelawGCS 0.2879 voiceHUM 0.4136 regulationMIG 0.4108 regulationGRS 0.5567 stabilityGCS 0.5161
rulelawQLM 0.2877 voiceFRH 0.3942 corruptMIG 0.3941 gove¤ectGRS 0.3597 stabilityBCRI 0.3933
corruptGCS 0.2769 voiceRSF 0.3608 gove¤ectMIG 0.3818 rulelawGRS 0.3369 stabilityPRS 0.3708
corruptQLM 0.2727 voicePRS 0.2945 rulelawMIG 0.3591 regulationPRS 0.3103 stabilityMIG 0.3111
regulationGCS 0.272 rulelawHUM 0.2938 stabilityMIG 0.2654 stabilityGRS 0.3024 stabilityHUM 0.2741
gove¤ectGCS 0.2449 voiceEIU 0.2557 gove¤ectEGV 0.2305 corruptGRS 0.2325 stabilityGRS 0.2168
gove¤ectEIU 0.2311 regulationHER 0.1836 corruptPRS 0.2182 regulationBCRI 0.1358 stabilityEIU 0.1762
rulelawHER 0.218 voiceBCRI 0.1776 gove¤ectPRS 0.1736 regulationGCS 0.1055 rulelawPRS 0.1102
corruptEIU 0.2175 regulationEIU 0.1354 regulationHER 0.1678 regulationHER 0.1002 rulelawGRS 0.0897
rulelawBCRI 0.2099 stabilityEIU 0.1188 stabilityHUM 0.1386 gove¤ectEGV 0.0993 gove¤ectGRS 0.0851
Table 9
Each governance factor has a clear parralel component in the PC model. Factors
one and two (market infrastructure, civil liberties) correspond to components one and
two, respectively. Factor three (downside governance risk) corresponds to component
four. Factor four (order) corresponds to component ve. Finally, factor ve (MIG
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factor) corresponds to component three. At least eight of the ten variables with
highest loadings on each factor are also among the ten variables with highest loadings
on the corresponding component. Evidently, the PC model and the factor model
dene the dimensions of governance very similarly.
For that reason, countries are ranked in very similar ways, whether I use their
component scores or factor scores. Table 10 below displays correlations of each factor
with its corresponding component in the balanced dataset sample (n = 73).
Correlation of Factor Scores with Component Scores - Balanced Dataset (n=73)
factor/component denition (factor score, component score)
market infrastructure 0.824
civil liberties 0.886




I conclude based on the high correlation of factor and component scores for gov-
ernance data that inferences based on the factor model will not be seriously altered
by switching to the PC model. My results are robust to the method of extraction.
4.2 Reliability: Factor Scores as Scales
The particular linear combination of theXs used to construct each factor score can be
looked upon as a test or a rating scale, comprising 45 items. The items in this case are
not the raw variables in X, but rather the variables multiplied by their corresponding
score coe¢ cients. Let these modied versions of the variables be denoted eX. Note
there are ve versions of eX - one version corresponding to each factor (since each
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factor has a unique vector of score coe¢ cients). Cronbachs alpha estimated on the
45 variables in the ith version of eX measures the reliability, or internal consistency,
of the ith factor. Table 11 below displays Cronbachs alpha for my ve factors:








A common rule of thumb is that Cronbachs alpha should be at least 0:7 if a
scale is truly measuring a single construct. All my factors have values well above ,
indicating good reliability.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have applied an established statistical technique to the problem
of measuring governance. While the technique itself (factor analysis) is not new, it
has not, to my knowledge, been applied in this way to such an exhaustive dataset
of governance variables. The result of my analysis is a new set of governance indi-
cators that have a number of advantages over both individual expert assessments of
governance, and the widely used WGI of Kaufmann et al., which aggregate multiple
expert assessments.
By changing the way governance is dened and measured, this chapter also nec-
essarily changes the way one views individual countries. In particular, I contend that
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my approach denes the strengths and weaknesses of a countrys governance capac-
ities more sharply than the WGI of Kaufmann et al. A simple indication of this is
the variation in a single countrys scores across governance categories.
For example, consider the U.K., which ranks highly in ve of six Kaufmann et al.
measures. The U.K.s scores across the six Kaufmann et al. governance categories
range from a minimum of 0:34 (Political Stability/No Violence) to a maximum of 1:94
(control of corruption). This compares to a minimum in my rankings of  1:4 (order)
and a maximum in my rankings of 2:14 (market infrastructure).36 Or, consider Colom-
bia. Its Kaufmann et al. scores range from  1:79 (political stability/no violence) to
0:05 (regulatory quality); under my measures, Colombias minimum and maximum
scores are  3:14 (order) and 0:54 (downside governance risk). Wide within-country
variation in scores is in fact a general characteristic of my measures, and it stems
from my decision to characterize each of the four governance measures exclusively in
terms of what makes it unique from all the others.
My growth regression results (Chapter 2) demonstrate one practical advantage of
this approach, but it is natural to wonder also about the drawbacks. Moving from
a framework of highly correlated governance indicators to a framework of orthogonal
governance indicators entails a tradeo¤. What I gain in terms of a sharper delin-
eation between concepts has to be weighed against what I give up in terms of the
interpretability of country rankings. Some country scores in some of my governance
factors will seem surprising in light of pre-existing beliefs about those countries.
36Recall that the marginal density of each Kaufmann et al. governance indciator is N (0; 1), just
like our governance factors.
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On the other hand, I regard this power to surprise as another benet of my ap-
proach. I have taken pains to motivate mymethodology and contend that the rankings
that emerge should not be dismissed because they clash in some instances with ex-
isting measures. Rather, my measures should serve as inputs into the renement of
the very governance concepts under examination.
One practical next step in my research is to explore ways of incorporating gover-
nance data on countries with incomplete observations. my factor model is estimated
on the largest possible balanced dataset of 73 countries, thereby excluding the incom-
plete observations of 142 countries. Another direction for future research is to look
for external sources of validation for my governance measures. I demonstrate their
explanatory power for the cross-country variation in income in Chapter 2, but more
work needs to be done in evaluating my measures through their relationships with
other, independent economic and governance benchmarks. It would also be helpful
to compare the content of my four factors with the output of factor models estimated
on entirely di¤erent sets of data - either di¤erent governance variables, or the same




In this chapter, I use four of the governance measures developed in Chapter 1 (f1 f4)
to assess the relative economic importance of governance, trade and geography - three
potentially primal ingredients of long-run prosperity. Because my four governance
measures are su¢ ciently distinct from one another, I can characterize the contribution
of governance to growth at an unprecedented level of detail.
I know of no previous work that has used multiple governance measures jointly
in a growth regression, along with trade and geography controls. I suspect that the
reason may be that no one has gone to the lengths that I have to develop conceptually
distinct measures. The struggle to nd appropriate instruments may have been an
obstacle as well.
Besides the use of multiple governance controls as explanatory variables, what
sets my growth regressions apart from earlier work is the breadth of information
contained in each measure. While Kaufmann et al.s Rule of Law measure - the
preferred governance indicator in Rodrik et al. (2004) - is comprised of nine of the
variables in the governance dataset, market infrastructure, civil liberties, downside
governance risk, and order measures are each linear combinations of 45 underlying
variables. I do not contend that more inputs necessarily equate to better governance
measures, but it does seem important to understand how the incorporation of a wider
variety of governance perceptions validates or contradicts existing results.
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To preview my results, I nd that trade and geography have no statistically signif-
icant direct e¤ect on growth once governance is accounted for. I nd furthermore that
from the perspective of growth, the most important components of governance are
market infrastructure, civil liberties and order. The impact of downside governance
risk is never statistically signicant.
My presentation is modeled on that of Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbis "Institu-
tions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic
Development" (2004). Here, as in that paper, I perform instrumental variables re-
gressions of per capita income on measures of governance, trade and geography. I
adopt Rodrik et al.s notation to make my results as comparable as possible to theirs,
and many of the variables used here were acquired through personal correspondence
with those authors. However, many of my specications have no direct parallel in
Rodrik et al. - either because I employ di¤erent governance measure(s), di¤erent
instrument(s), or slightly di¤erent samples. At the end of this section, I compare and
contrast the implications of my results with those of other authors.
For robustness, I estimate all specications on four di¤erent samples. The con-
stitution of each sample is motivated by a di¤erent concern. The smallest sample
comprises the 64 countries for which all 45 variables in the governance dataset are
observed; 73 countries actually satisfy this requirement, but nine are missing at least
one other variable required in the growth regression, such as the Frankel-Romer pre-
dicted trade share (see below). The rationale for this sample is simply that factor
score predictions for these countries are based on the fullest possible set of data.
The second sample comprises the 79 countries for which Acemoglu et al.s (2001)
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colonial settler mortality variable is available .37 The settler mortality variable has
proven to work well in instrumenting for perceptions-based governance measures such
as Kaufmann et al.s Rule of Law (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al, 2004). The
third sample mirrors the "large sample" of Rodrik et al. (2004) and comprises 138
countries.38 I utilize this sample for its broad country coverage and for the sake of
comparability to Rodrik et al.s results. My nal and largest sample comprises 155
countries and is the largest possible sample, given the constraints of the data. My
qualitative results are very similar across samples. I o¤er explanations where they
di¤er.
2 Model
I begin the formal analysis by presenting the equation of interest,
log y = +0GOV + INT + GEO + " (10)
where y is per capita output,GOV is governance, INT is integration (trade/GDP),
and GEO is a geography measure (distance from the equator).39 Rodrik et al. mea-
sureGOV with Rule of Law, whereas I measureGOV with one, two, three or all four
of my varimax-rotated governance factors (f1 f4). VariableGOV = [GOV1; :::; GOVK ]0
37Settler mortality actually exists for 81 countries, but Myanmar lacks income data and Ivory
Coast lacks governance data.
38Rodrik et al.s published results (2004) are for 137 countries, but data provided by personal
correspondence with those authors enables estimation for 138 countries. We have not been able to
ascertain which single country was excluded from the 137-ctry. sample used in the published results.
39Variable y is measured using real (PPP-adjusted) 2005 per capita output and integration, INT ,
is a countrys 2005 trade-to-GDP ratio (in logs) - both are taken from Penn World Tables, Mark
6.3. Variable GEO is (the absolute value of) the countrys latitude (measured at the capital city).
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can therefore be vector-valued (correspondingly,  = [1; :::; K ]
0).
Table 12 below presents summary statistics for all the variables in (1), by sample.
Standard deviations are in parentheses beneath the means.
Summary statistics - OLS regressions
Balanced dataset (N=64) Settler mortality sample (N=79) Rodrik et al. large sample (N=138) Full sample (N=155)
log y 9.318 8.356 8.839 8.788
(1.039) (1.157) (1.213) (1.259)
GEO 29.531 15.582 23.783 22.884
(17.52) (11.363) (16.34) (16.01)
INT 4.349 4.322 4.409 4.407
(0.513) (0.534) (0.499) (0.577)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.317 -0.357 -0.057 -0.037
(1.009) (0.811) (0.97) (0.945)
civil liberties 0.21 0.072 0.088 0.048
(0.905) (0.809) (0.894) (0.926)
d-side. gov. risk 0.258 -0.273 -0.081 -0.138
(0.905) (0.903) (0.916) (0.974)
order -0.427 -0.303 -0.095 -0.068
(0.912) (0.877) (0.909) (0.940)
log y = natural log of 2005 real (PPP-adjusted) per capita output (Penn World Tables, Mark 6.3)
INT = natural log of [(imports+exports)/GDP] (Penn World Tables, Mark 6.3)
GEO = absolute value of capital citys latitude
Table 12
I seek estimates of the causal impact of each of the right-hand-side variables on
income. Equation (1) represents a horse race of sorts - an experiment to nd out
which deep determinant matters most for long-run prosperity. It is a parsimonious
specication, and no estimates of ; ;  will settle denitively the debate over the
complex process of economic development. But estimating (1) can lend support to
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one hypothesis or another, helping to guide policy discussions, foreign aid strategies,
and future research.
For reasons discussed below, OLS estimates of; ;  in (1) are unlikely to measure
causal impacts. I nevertheless begin my analysis by presenting the OLS results in
Table 13 as a benchmark.
OLS Results (Dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.)
Balanced dataset (N=64) Settler mortality sample (N=79) Rodrik et al. large sample (N=138) Full sample (N=155)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GEO 0.00395 0.00947 0.00901* 0.0102**
(0.00528) (0.00840) (0.00482) (0.00453)
INT 0.0738 0.375** 0.235* 0.205*
(0.160) (0.175) (0.129) (0.110)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.715*** 0.718*** 0.738*** 0.720***
(0.0819) (0.118) (0.0763) (0.0732)
civil liberties 0.380*** 0.582*** 0.326*** 0.289***
(0.0792) (0.101) (0.0681) (0.0645)
d-side. gov. risk 0.272*** 0.377*** 0.343*** 0.409***
(0.0787) (0.0924) (0.0672) (0.0630)
order 0.216** 0.0738 0.224*** 0.241***
(0.0888) (0.103) (0.0710) (0.0655)
Constant 8.595*** 6.928*** 7.651*** 7.738***
(0.772) (0.841) (0.612) (0.515)
Observations 64 79 138 155
R-squared 0.784 0.673 0.706 0.700
F-stat. 34.41 24.64 52.54 57.48
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 13
The OLS estimates suggest that all the explanatory variables play a direct role in
determining income. Estimates reect the fact that the simple and partial correlation
of income with all the covariates is positive. Trade and geography, in particular,
always enter positively, frequently at a 10% or lower signicance level.
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If one were to rely solely on the OLS estimates, one would have to conclude
from Table 10 that each and every deep determinant makes an important marginal
contribution to growth. However, as discussed at length in Rodrik et al. (2004) and
elsewhere in the literature, the OLS estimates of ; ;  in (1) are unlikely to capture
causal impacts because there is good reason to expect that governance and integration
measures are correlated with the disturbance, ".40 For this reason, I estimate an IV
model using two-stage least squares. I instrument for GOV and INT using a variety
of variables, to which I now turn.
3 Instrumental Variables Specication
My instrument for endogenous regressor INT is the Frankel-Romer (1999) con-
structed trade share measure (denoted TRADESHARE), computed based on a
gravity model of trade. Vector GOV represents up to four endogenous regressors,
and so I review my instrument choice for each component of GOV individually.
For market infrastructure, one instrument I employ is colonial settler mortality,
from Acemoglu et al. (2001) (denoted SETMORT). Variable SETMORT has been
used numerous times in the literature, provides solid rst-stage t for its intended
regressor, and has an intuitive story motivating its use. I forego a detailed justication
40For instance, higher incomes may purchase better governance (reverse causality); or, shocks to
income may simultaneously a¤ect the quality of governance (omitted variable). Either e¤ect would
cause the OLS estimate of  to overstate the causal impact of GOV on log y (OLS estimates of ; 
will also be inconsistent, though in unknown directions). Alternatively, measurement error in our
proxy variable for governance (measurement error = f   bE [f jX]) would cause bols to understate
GOVs causal impact.
Similar problems likely a­ ict our measure of integration. Richer countries may on average prefer
to trade relatively more than poorer countries (reverse causality); or, countries that are rich for some
reason not accounted for by (10) may also naturally trade more for that reason (omitted variable).
(Frankel and Romer (1999) nd evidence against the latter possibility.)
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of this instrument and refer readers to Acemoglu et al. (2001) or Rodrik et al. (2004)
for a more in-depth discussion. SETMORTs availability (79 countries) denes my
second-smallest sample.
For the balanced dataset sample (N=64) and for the two larger samples - Rodrik et
al.s large sample (N=138) and the full sample of (N=155) - SETMORT is unavailable;
I replace it with U.K., German and Scandinavian legal origin dummies (denoted
LEGORE, LEGORGE, and LEGORSC , respectively), taken from La Porta et al.
(1999).41
The use of legal origin to explain the quality of governance is not new in the
economics literature. In La Porta et al. (1999), the authors regress measures of
governance on legal origin and cultural and economic controls to test competing
theories of the determinants of good government.42 Legal origin has good explanatory
power for market infrastructure in all the samples and may be regarded as exogenous
in this context so long as it is not correlated with todays level of income through
some channel other than trade, geography and the included measures of governance.
I move ahead under the assumption that legal origin is a valid instrument.
Civil liberties is the second potential component of GOV. I instrument for civil
liberties using the variable EURFRAC, the fraction of a countrys population speaking
one of ve major European languages as their rst language.43 EURFRAC has been
41The left-out groups are French and socialist legal origins.
42The basic premise for using legal origin in that paper, and in this one, is that legal origin proxies
for "the relative power of the State vis-a-vis property owners." (La Porta et al., 1999). Governments
in common law countries (U.K. legal origin) are generally regarded as less inclined to, or less capable
of, impinging on the rights of private property than governments in civil law countries (German,
French, Scandanavian legal origin).
43English, French, German, Portuguese, Spanish; see Hall and Jones (QJE, 1999) for another
example of this use of eurfrac. Our source for the eurfrac variable is Rodrik et al. (2004).
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used an instrument for governance in circumstances similar to ours (Hall and Jones,
1999; Rodrik et al. 2004). A countrys value of EURFRAC may be considered
exogenous in this context so long as it is not correlated with todays level of income
through some channel other than trade, geography and the included measures of
governance.
For the remaining two potential components of GOV - downside governance risk,
and order - I rely on the legal origin dummies introduced above and two measures
of religious a¢ liation: CATHO80 and MUSLIM80, measuring the fraction of the
population that is Roman Catholic and Muslim, respectively. Both religious variables
are taken from La Porta et al. (1999), which used them to test the power of culture (as
proxied by religion) to explain government quality. I operate under the assumption
that a countrys religious composition can be considered exogenous.44
The general form of the rst-stage equations is thus,
INT =  + TRADESHARE + !GEO +  0Z+  (11)




GOVK = K + KTRADESHARE + KGEO + 
0
KZ+ K (12)
where Z  [Z1; :::; ZM ]0 ;M  K is the instrument vector for GOV. Vector Z com-
44Endogeneity of religion by reverse causality or omitted variables both seem implausible. The
only other possibility is that religion a¤ects income through some channel other than trade, geogra-
phy and governance, which also seems unlikely.
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prises one or more of the excluded instruments for governance, as described above.
Finally, GOV  [GOV1; :::; GOVK ]0 ; K 2 f1; :::; 4g is made up of one or more
of my governance factors: GOV1 =market infrastructure; GOV2 =civil liberties;
GOV3 =downside governance risk; and GOV4 =order.
Table 14 below presents summary statistics, by sample, for the excluded instru-
ments. Standard deviations are in parentheses beneath the means.45
Summary statistics - excluded instruments
Balanced dataset (N=64) Settler mortality sample (N=79) Rodrik et al. large sample (N=138) Full sample (N=155)
EURFRAC 0.337 0.304 0.251 0.25
(0.43) (0.413) (0.392) (0.395)
TRADESHARE 2.615 2.76 2.945 3.004
(0.809) (0.765) (0.818) (0.816)
SETMORT - 4.647 - -
(-) (1.201) (-) (-)
LEGORE 0.375 0.354 0.319 0.355
(0.488) (0.481) (0.468) (0.48)
LEGORGE 0.063 0 0.043 0.039
(0.244) (0) (0.205) (0.194)
LEGORSC 0.047 0 0.036 0.032
(0.213) (0) (0.188) (0.177)
CATHO80 0.364 0.376 0.341 0.33
(0.383) (0.364) (0.363) (0.363)
MUSLIM80 0.194 0.241 0.212 0.239
(0.341) (0.345) (0.343) (0.367)
TRADESHARE = natural log of Frankel-Romer (1999) constructed trade share; SETMORT = natural log of Acemoglu et al. (2001) settler mortality
EURFRAC = fraction of pop. speaking one of ve major European languages as rst language
LEGORE, LEGORGE, LEGORSC = English, German and Scandinavian legal origin dummies, respectively
CATHO80, MUSLIM80 = fraction of pop. that is Roman Catholic and Muslim, respectively
Table 14
4 Estimation
I now present my main results - two-stage least squares estimates of ; ;  from
(1). I begin with a few observations on the rst-stage results presented in Panel B of
45The zeros for LEGORGE and LEGORSC in the N=79 column reect the fact that no country
in the 79-country settler mortality sample has German or Scandinavian legal origin.
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Tables 15-18.
IV (2SLS) Results - balanced dataset
Panel A: second-stage results (Dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GEO 0.0188*** 0.0316*** 0.0152*** 0.0117* 0.00237 -0.0235
(0.00593) (0.00576) (0.00546) (0.00693) (0.0110) (0.0238)
INT 0.162 0.539** 0.284 0.211 -0.195 -0.921
(0.209) (0.255) (0.192) (0.205) (0.402) (0.750)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.603*** 0.567*** 0.604*** 0.654*** 0.883***
(0.135) (0.122) (0.125) (0.166) (0.277)
civil liberties 0.358** 0.311*** 0.378*** 0.229 0.424*
(0.143) (0.104) (0.132) (0.144) (0.238)




Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64
R-squared 0.662 0.478 0.727 0.755 0.553 0.210
Sargan p-val 0.00404 0.00317 0.0143 0.00412 0.150 0.573
Cragg-Donald Wald p-val 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1285 0.3858 0.3961
Panel B: rst-stage results - regressing INT and governance on the instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INT mrkt. infrastructure civil liberties d-side. gov. risk order
GEO -0.00417 0.0279*** 0.0143*** 0.01000 0.00736
(0.00330) (0.00603) (0.00520) (0.00734) (0.00762)
TRADESHARE 0.460*** 0.342*** 0.0566 0.123 0.320**
(0.0650) (0.119) (0.102) (0.144) (0.150)
EURFRAC -0.171 1.015*** 0.0740 -0.0271 -0.000132
(0.164) (0.300) (0.259) (0.366) (0.379)
LEGORE -0.0408 0.836*** 0.223 -0.353 -0.393
(0.123) (0.225) (0.194) (0.273) (0.284)
LEGORGE -0.0777 0.415 -0.0743 -0.292 -0.0286
(0.219) (0.401) (0.346) (0.488) (0.506)
LEGORSC -0.271 0.988** 0.157 -1.675*** 0.392
(0.264) (0.482) (0.416) (0.587) (0.609)
CATHO80 -0.210 -0.119 0.911*** -1.210** -0.134
(0.214) (0.391) (0.337) (0.475) (0.493)
MUSLIM80 -0.326* 0.426 -1.280*** -0.274 -0.303
(0.179) (0.326) (0.281) (0.397) (0.412)
R-squared 0.536 0.599 0.629 0.261 0.218
F-stat. 7.937 10.28 11.67 2.431 1.912
Constants suppressed; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 15
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IV (2SLS) Results - settler mortality sample
Panel A: second-stage results (Dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GEO 0.00618 0.0395*** 0.00674 0.0123 0.0341 0.0326
(0.0141) (0.0110) (0.0128) (0.0248) (0.0278) (0.0299)
INT 0.389 1.026*** 0.504 0.367 1.995 1.757
(0.351) (0.361) (0.320) (0.621) (1.215) (1.564)
mrkt. infrastructure 1.217*** 0.946*** 1.464* 0.388 0.642
(0.295) (0.273) (0.871) (0.579) (1.134)
civil liberties 1.129*** 1.008*** 0.973*** 1.160*** 1.128***
(0.237) (0.188) (0.352) (0.298) (0.336)




Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79
R-squared 0.360 0.134 0.471
Sargan p-val 0.0000 0.0208 0.1392 0.4333 0.7790 NA
Cragg-Donald Wald p-val 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.5078 0.1429 0.3601
Panel B: rst-stage results - regressing INT and governance on the instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INT mrkt. infrastructure civil liberties d-side. gov. risk order
GEO -0.00176 0.0154* 0.00386 0.0134 0.0259**
(0.00558) (0.00809) (0.00837) (0.0115) (0.00981)
TRADESHARE 0.405*** 0.0140 0.0177 -0.0133 0.628***
(0.0670) (0.0970) (0.100) (0.138) (0.118)
SETMORT -0.129** -0.271*** 0.0148 -0.0374 0.0857
(0.0498) (0.0721) (0.0746) (0.102) (0.0874)
EURFRAC -0.0663 0.371 0.981*** 0.398 -0.167
(0.160) (0.232) (0.240) (0.329) (0.281)
CATHO80 -0.201 -0.917*** 0.0696 -0.697* -0.268
(0.187) (0.270) (0.280) (0.384) (0.328)
MUSLIM80 -0.236 -0.294 -0.475 -0.0963 -0.907**
(0.200) (0.289) (0.299) (0.411) (0.351)
R-squared 0.405 0.463 0.416 0.127 0.317
F-stat. 8.171 10.06 8.294 1.701 5.409
Constants suppressed; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 16
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IV (2SLS) Results - Rodrik et al.s large sample
Panel A: second-stage results (Dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GEO 0.0220*** 0.0372*** 0.0160** 0.0152* 0.0102 0.00739
(0.00670) (0.00547) (0.00674) (0.00898) (0.00786) (0.0101)
INT 0.522** 0.572** 0.451** 0.446** 0.00869 -0.0293
(0.212) (0.263) (0.210) (0.210) (0.364) (0.359)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.688*** 0.643*** 0.642*** 0.759*** 0.760***
(0.159) (0.157) (0.156) (0.177) (0.169)
civil liberties 0.584*** 0.553*** 0.561*** 0.530*** 0.554***
(0.152) (0.120) (0.132) (0.123) (0.130)




Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138
R-squared 0.590 0.356 0.600 0.612 0.589 0.625
Sargan p-val 0.0001 0.0128 0.1551 0.0773 0.2366 0.1068
Cragg-Donald Wald p-val 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1482 0.0194 0.0797
Panel B: rst-stage results - regressing INT and governance on the instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INT mrkt. infrastructure civil liberties d-side. gov. risk order
GEO .0018 0.0287*** 0.0121*** 0.0199*** 0.00186
(0.00241) (0.00429) (0.00423) (0.00534) (0.00506)
TRADESHARE 0.363*** 0.130* 0.0380 0.0415 0.436***
(0.0424) (0.0751) (0.0741) (0.0934) (0.0885)
EURFRAC -0.187* 0.660*** 0.483** 0.0198 0.0150
(0.110) (0.195) (0.192) (0.243) (0.230)
LEGORE 0.1458 0.616*** 0.161 -0.00886 -0.470**
(0.0873) (0.155) (0.153) (0.193) (0.183)
LEGORGE -0.0578 0.893*** 0.0691 0.134 -0.115
(0.181) (0.320) (0.315) (0.398) (0.377)
LEGORSC -0.240 1.080*** 0.168 -1.036** -0.126
(0.218) (0.385) (0.380) (0.479) (0.454)
CATHO80 -0.0045 0.0501 0.431* -0.458 -0.540*
(0.147) (0.261) (0.257) (0.324) (0.307)
MUSLIM80 -0.2642** 0.693*** -0.956*** -0.0697 -0.705***
(0.128) (0.227) (0.224) (0.282) (0.267)
R-squared 0.40 0.506 0.434 0.142 0.218
F-stat. 10.77 16.49 12.34 2.669 4.504
Constants suppressed; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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IV (2SLS) Results - full sample
Panel A: second-stage results (Dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GEO 0.0215*** 0.0367*** 0.0166*** 0.0156* 0.0152** 0.0122
(0.00625) (0.00555) (0.00642) (0.00892) (0.00656) (0.00917)
INT 0.597*** 0.626** 0.477** 0.466** 0.120 0.0318
(0.212) (0.266) (0.216) (0.221) (0.496) (0.505)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.714*** 0.672*** 0.668*** 0.707*** 0.700***
(0.153) (0.154) (0.153) (0.159) (0.149)
civil liberties 0.542*** 0.511*** 0.515*** 0.501*** 0.513***
(0.146) (0.118) (0.119) (0.117) (0.112)




Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155
R-squared 0.565 0.312 0.556 0.578 0.567 0.622
Sargan p-val 0.0001 0.00478 0.127 0.0570 0.0809 0.0234
Cragg-Donald Wald p-val 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2425 0.2069 0.2035
Panel B: rst-stage results - regressing INT and governance on the instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INT mrkt. infrastructure civil liberties d-side. gov. risk order
GEO 0.005* 0.0283*** 0.0107** 0.0215*** 0.00173
(0.00289) (0.00407) (0.00422) (0.00554) (0.00505)
TRADESHARE 0.373*** 0.146** 0.0219 0.0695 0.500***
(0.0500) (0.0701) (0.0725) (0.0952) (0.0868)
EURFRAC -0.159 0.632*** 0.515*** 0.0819 -0.0211
(0.132) (0.185) (0.192) (0.252) (0.230)
LEGORE 0.054 0.655*** 0.110 0.0482 -0.310*
(0.0999) (0.141) (0.146) (0.191) (0.174)
LEGORGE -0.161 0.900*** 0.0774 0.167 -0.0713
(0.222) (0.311) (0.322) (0.423) (0.386)
LEGORSC -0.401 1.080*** 0.223 -0.971* -0.110
(0.266) (0.372) (0.385) (0.506) (0.461)
CATHO80 -0.054 0.0563 0.427 -0.313 -0.517*
(0.178) (0.250) (0.258) (0.339) (0.309)
MUSLIM80 -0.345** 0.621*** -0.944*** -0.0832 -0.709***
(0.142) (0.199) (0.206) (0.270) (0.246)
R-squared 0.307 0.495 0.437 0.122 0.217
F-stat. 8.10 17.87 14.14 2.545 5.052
Constants suppressed; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 18
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Across the four samples, R2s are reasonable, and a di¤erent set of instruments
is dominant in each of columns (1)-(5), suggesting the instruments do a good job at
bringing out the unique variation in each endogenous regressor (Shea, 1997). Where
I had strong priors, the instruments generally enter as expected, but there are also
a couple of interesting surprises. The negative coe¢ cient on LEGORE in the or-
der equations (column (5), Panel B of Tables 15, 17, 18) may stem from the more
decentralized political and legal landscape in common law countries. The negative co-
e¢ cients on CATHO80 and MUSLIM80 in those same equations may reect a higher
perceived risk of terrorism in predominantly Catholic or Muslim countries, relative
to Protestant countries.
It is somewhat surprising that settler mortality is so strongly predictive of market
infrastructure (column (2), Panel B, Table 13) but insignicant for civil liberties
(column (3), Panel B, Table 13). The implication from comparing columns (2) and (3)
is that countries with disease environments less hostile to early European colonizers
could expect to better regulation and less corruption, but not stronger protections of
human rights. The importance of EURFRAC for civil liberties (columns (3), Panel
B, Tables 13-15) suggests that it is the extent of Europeanization over centuries - not
the survival rates of the earliest European colonists - that ultimately has determined
civil liberties protections.
Finally, MUSLIM80s e¤ect on market infrastructure (column (2), Panel B, Tables
15,17,18) is positive and signicant in all but the settler mortality sample, where it
enters negative. The predominantly Muslim Gulf states (e.g. - Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Kuwait) are not included in the 79-country settler mortality sample. The Gulf states
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tend to be much wealthier, and score much better in market infrastructure, than
the predominantly Muslim states in the settler mortality sample (e.g. - Bangladesh,
Indonesia and Pakistan).
I now address the second-stage results, presented in Panel A of Tables 15-18. The
dependent variable in all specications is the log of 2005 per capita income. I make
some general observations about the 2SLS results, focusing rst on the broad area of
agreement between the two samples.
First, broadly speaking, my ndings support the "institutions rule" result of Ro-
drik et al. (2004): controlling for the quality of governance, trade and geography
have no statistically signicant direct e¤ect on income. INT and GEO generally lose
their signicance once market infrastructure, civil liberties and order are included in
the specication (i.e. - columns (5) and (6) of Panel A).46
Second, within the realm of governance, market infrastructure and civil liberties
consistently exhibit the largest and most precisely measured e¤ects on income. One
or the other (usually both) enters highly signicant in every specication, for every
sample. In my two largest samples, market infrastructure and civil liberties both enter
highly signicant under every specication, and their coe¢ cient magnitudes change
minimally as additional explanatory variables are included.
Third, in all but one instance (market infrastructure in the full sample) IV esti-
mates of the coe¢ cients on market infrastructure and civil liberties exceed the OLS
46INT, especially, is neutralized by the introduction of order. The ability of order to displace INT
so thoroughly points to a shared source of variation between the two. The most likely candidate,
given our rst-stage results, is population. Both INT and order are strongly negatively correlated
with population, and their mutual reliance on the instrument TRADESHARE in the rst-stage
causes this population-related component of their variation to be passed on to the second stage.
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estimates, suggesting that measurement error rather than simultaneity or omitted
variables is the source of the inconsistency of OLS.47 This result is consistent with
the ndings of earlier authors, e.g. - Rodrik et al., and Hall and Jones (1999).
Failure of the overidentication tests in columns (1)-(4) of Panel A is frequent and
stems from my decision to use a xed set of instruments irrespective of the number of
endogenous regressors. These failures would be more troubling if I thought that each
specication needed to stand on its own. However, I interpret the failures, where
they occur, as evidence of omitted variables in the structural equation, a problem
that disappears when I include all four of my governance factors in column (6).48
To test for the potential impact of weak instruments on my IV estimates, I re-
estimate the specications in Tables 15-18 using the limited-information maximum
likelihood (LIML) IV estimator. I present the LIML results in the Appendix. 49
5 Conclusion
My results show for the rst time which areas of governance are the most important
for long-term prosperity. Market infrastructure and civil liberties are the sine qua non
of economic growth. While the proposition that both of these areas of governance are
vital for long-term prosperity may not come as a great surprise, nevertheless precise,
47Orderss IV coe¢ cient estimate exceeds its OLS estimate in all but the settler mortality sample.
48The one exception is column (6), Panel A of Table 15. Here the failure of the overidentication
restrictions appears to stem from the explanatory power of MUSLIM80 in the full sample. Judging
from the full sample, MUSLIM80 belongs in the structural equation. When included, MUSLIM80
has a positive and signicant (10%) impact on per capita income. This is not true for any of the the
three samples. The nding suggests a role for culture alongside governance, trade and geography.
49In each of the four samples, LIML estimates are qualitatively very similar to the 2SLS estimates.
One exception is in the fullest (n = 155) sample, where the LIML coe¢ cient estimates for market
infrastructure and civil liberties have similar magnitudes as the 2SLS estimates but are insignicant.
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robust estimates of their marginal economic impacts are a novel contribution of this
paper.
I also note that I could not have carried out this exercise without su¢ ciently
independent measures of governance. For example, running the equivalent to (6) using
the six highly intercorrelated Kaufmann et al. WGI in place of my four governance
factors produces statistical insignicance for every regressor - trade, geography and
all components of governance! There is su¢ cient independent evidence from the
literature to reject the substantive implication of that result. Rather, the cause of the
insignicance result is the fact that the tted values of the six WGI variables from the
rst-stage are so highly correlated with one another50 that the resulting collinearity
in the second stage makes it impossible to precisely estimate the marginal e¤ects of
each variable.51
50The mean correlation between the tted values of two WGI variables (e.g., between dRL anddCC) is  = 0:93 in our full sample of 155 countries.




In chapters one and two, I rely on a particular orthogonal rotation of 0 to conduct
inference on governance and growth. In this section, I check the sensitivity of those
results to allowing governance factors to be correlated. I examine factor content,
factor score predictions, and growth regression results under three oblique rotations
of 0, and I nd very little di¤erence from the varimax results of chapters one and
two. The di¤erences that do emerge are discussed, as are the costs and benets of
forcing orthogonality on the factors.
Results are presented in Tables 19-21 below. Each table shows results for one
oblique rotation. The three rotations presented below were selected because they are
widely used in the psychometric literature and because they each pursue the goals
of simple structure in a straightforward way (Harman, 1976). Three other oblique
rotations were tried in addition to these (two oblimin rotations, and the biquartimin
rotation) and they yielded very similar results. For the sake of brevity, they are not
presented.
Table 19 presents results from the quartimin rotation. The quartimin is equivalent
to the orthogonal quartimax but without the orthogonality constraint on the rotation
matrix. Like the quartimax criterion, quartimin seeks to maximize the variation in
squared loadings across factors for each variable. The aim is to summarize each vari-




Factor loadings (ten variables with highest loadings on each factor):
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
variable loading variable loading variable loading variable loading variable loading
rulelawqlm 0.949 corruptmig 0.823 regulatigrs 0.870 voicehum 0.908 stabilitybcri 0.791
corruptqlm 0.924 gove¤ectmig 0.768 gove¤ectgrs 0.773 voicefrh 0.888 stabilitygcs 0.790
corruptgcs 0.738 rulelawmig 0.725 rulelawgrs 0.719 voicersf 0.740 stabilityprs 0.625
corrupteiu 0.727 regulationmig 0.724 stabilitygrs 0.623 voiceprs 0.627 stabilitymig 0.575
rulelawher 0.700 corruptprs 0.423 corruptgrs 0.580 voiceeiu 0.610 stabilityhum 0.569
rulelawgcs 0.700 stabilitymig 0.377 regulationprs 0.542 rulelawhum 0.595 stabilitygrs 0.386
gove¤ecteiu 0.698 gove¤ectprs 0.324 regulationbcri 0.360 regulationher 0.454 stabilityeiu 0.370
corruptbcri 0.643 voicegcs 0.287 regulationgcs 0.349 voicebcri 0.453 rulelawprs 0.239
regulationgcs 0.627 rulelawher 0.268 voicegcs 0.315 regulationeiu 0.352 rulelawbcri 0.237
rulelawbcri 0.603 regulationher 0.256 voicebcri 0.299 gove¤ectprs 0.315 rulelawgrs 0.194
Factor covariance matrix (Phi):
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
F1 1.000
F2 0.689 1.000
F3 0.620 0.533 1.000
F4 0.466 0.457 0.397 1.000
F5 0.423 0.456 0.433 0.348 1.000








IV (2SLS) Results using quartimin factor scores - Rodrik et al.s large sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second-stage results; dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.
GEO 0.0113* 0.0250*** 0.00691 0.00812 0.00255 0.00399
(0.00620) (0.00658) (0.00659) (0.00794) (0.00810) (0.00925)
INT 0.232 0.418* 0.186 0.145 -0.0682 -0.132
(0.192) (0.247) (0.200) (0.250) (0.338) (0.391)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.857*** 0.658*** 0.578* 0.647*** 0.541
(0.130) (0.150) (0.326) (0.151) (0.336)
civil liberties 0.799*** 0.486*** 0.332 0.472*** 0.268
(0.186) (0.162) (0.579) (0.163) (0.597)




Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138
R-squared 0.693 0.460 0.670 0.664 0.667 0.648
Sargan p-val. 0.00345 0.00606 0.117 0.0663 0.0911 0.0503
Cragg-Donald Wald p-val 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5967 0.0082 0.4456
Constants not shown; standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table 19
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Table 20 presents results from the covarimin rotation. The covarimin rotation is
the oblique analogue to the orthogonal varimax rotation. Like the varimax, the co-
varimin seeks to maximize the variation in squared loadings across variables for each
factor, but without restricting the rotation matrix to be orthogonal. The aim is to




Factor loadings (ten variables with highest loadings on each factor):
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
variable loading variable loading variable loading variable loading variable loading
corruptmig 0.855 rulelawqlm 0.761 regulatigrs 0.879 voicehum 0.908 stabilitybcri 0.847
gove¤ectmig 0.798 corruptqlm 0.738 gove¤ectgrs 0.799 voicefrh 0.885 stabilitygcs 0.830
rulelawmig 0.783 corruptgcs 0.574 rulelawgrs 0.739 voicersf 0.738 stabilityprs 0.665
regulationmig 0.740 corrupteiu 0.566 stabilitygrs 0.625 voiceprs 0.633 stabilityhum 0.621
corruptprs 0.515 gove¤ecteiu 0.544 corruptgrs 0.612 voiceeiu 0.628 stabilitymig 0.603
gove¤ectprs 0.400 rulelawher 0.541 regulationprs 0.564 rulelawhum 0.619 stabilitygrs 0.421
rulelawher 0.371 rulelawgcs 0.541 regulationgcs 0.414 voicebcri 0.472 stabilityeiu 0.417
voicegcs 0.353 corruptbcri 0.495 regulationbcri 0.403 regulationher 0.461 rulelawbcri 0.297
stabilitymig 0.337 regulationgcs 0.492 voicegcs 0.359 regulationeiu 0.371 rulelawprs 0.291
regulationher 0.286 rulelawbcri 0.460 gove¤ectgcs 0.351 gove¤ectprs 0.341 rulelawgrs 0.230
Factor covariance matrix (Phi):
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
F1 1.000
F2 0.606 1.000
F3 0.559 0.536 1.000
F4 0.466 0.372 0.414 1.000
F5 0.512 0.372 0.478 0.380 1.000








IV (2SLS) Results using covarimin factor scores - Rodrik et al.s large sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second-stage results; dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.
GEO 0.0139** 0.0297*** 0.0129* 0.0111 0.00809 0.00764
(0.00680) (0.00580) (0.00688) (0.00996) (0.00787) (0.0104)
INT 0.432** 0.434* 0.345* 0.313 -0.0162 -0.0215
(0.201) (0.251) (0.204) (0.236) (0.358) (0.365)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.849*** 0.573*** 0.519* 0.551*** 0.537*
(0.154) (0.172) (0.274) (0.171) (0.275)
civil liberties 0.673*** 0.488*** 0.480*** 0.406*** 0.404***
(0.145) (0.130) (0.130) (0.145) (0.145)




Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138
R-squared 0.637 0.432 0.630 0.644 0.636 0.640
Sargan p-val. 0.000728 0.0408 0.155 0.0765 0.152 0.0694
Cragg-Donald Wald p-val 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3378 0.0057 0.2125
Constants not shown; standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table 20
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Table 21 presents results from the promax rotation. The promax criterion rotates
0 until it resembles as closely as possible the loading pattern in a target matrix (in
this case, the orthogonal varimax loadings matrix) that has had each of its elements
raised to a power (in this case, three).
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ROTATION NAME: promax
PARAMETERS: power = 3
Factor loadings (ten variables with highest loadings on each factor):
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
variable loading variable loading variable loading variable loading variable loading
rulelawqlm 1.052 regulationgrs 0.907 voicehum 0.985 corruptmig 0.676 stabilitygcs 0.805
corruptqlm 1.038 gove¤ectgrs 0.797 voicefrh 0.962 gove¤ectmig 0.628 stabilitybcri 0.794
corruptgcs 0.857 rulelawgrs 0.738 voicersf 0.802 regulationmig 0.596 stabilityprs 0.648
rulelawher 0.835 stabilitygrs 0.644 voiceprs 0.677 rulelawmig 0.580 stabilitymig 0.591
rulelawgcs 0.828 corruptgrs 0.578 voiceeiu 0.666 stabilitymig 0.304 stabilityhum 0.571
corrupteiu 0.824 regulationprs 0.537 rulelawhum 0.650 corruptprs 0.302 stabilitygrs 0.359
gove¤ecteiu 0.800 regulationgcs 0.333 regulationher 0.496 gove¤ectprs 0.224 stabilityeiu 0.348
regulationgcs 0.717 regulationbcri 0.329 voicebcri 0.493 voicegcs 0.189 rulelawprs 0.230
corruptbcri 0.715 voicegcs 0.287 regulationeiu 0.386 regulationher 0.174 rulelawbcri 0.208
gove¤ectgcs 0.707 gove¤ectgcs 0.267 gove¤ectprs 0.352 rulelawher 0.154 regulationmig 0.162
Factor covariance matrix (Phi):
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
F1 1.000
F2 0.688 1.000
F3 0.562 0.505 1.000
F4 0.619 0.506 0.471 1.000
F5 0.495 0.486 0.435 0.433 1.000








IV (2SLS) Results using promax factor scores - Rodrik et al.s large sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second-stage results; dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.
GEO 0.00971 0.0181*** 0.00676 0.00735 0.00398 0.00463
(0.00649) (0.00685) (0.00674) (0.00716) (0.00800) (0.00861)
INT 0.0746 0.445* 0.154 0.0527 -0.0309 -0.0742
(0.207) (0.231) (0.214) (0.339) (0.356) (0.406)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.940*** 0.624*** 0.521 0.607*** 0.545*
(0.143) (0.191) (0.327) (0.194) (0.325)
civil liberties 0.846*** 0.466** 0.274 0.450** 0.333
(0.165) (0.181) (0.521) (0.184) (0.525)




Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138
R-squared 0.673 0.517 0.658 0.630 0.655 0.640
Sargan p-val. 0.0130 0.0270 0.125 0.0886 0.0807 0.0406
Cragg-Donald Wald p-val 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5642 0.0094 0.4141
Constants not shown; standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table 21
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The rst general observation is that all three oblique rotations identify more or
less the same set of concepts in the rst ve factors that the varimax rotation nds -
although oblique rotations often extract the factors in a di¤erent sequence.52 Thus,
every oblique rotation nds a "market infrastructure" factor, a "civil liberties" factor,
etc. This result is demonstrated by the high degree of similarity in the composition of
top-ten variable lists across rotations. For example, in all three oblique rotations, the
same three variables (rulelawQLM , corruptQLM and corruptGCS) emerge as the rst-,
second-, and third-most important variables for each rotations version of "market
infrastructure" (two of these are also in the top three of the varimaxs market in-
frastructure). Likewise, the same three variables (voiceHUM , voiceFRH and voiceRSF )
emerge in the same order as top three for each rotations civil liberties factor (exactly
as in the varimax version of civil liberties). Finally, the same seven variables (and in
very similar order) show up at the top of each oblique rotations "order" factor (also
mirroring the pattern in varimax).
Another general result is that the ve factors within any single oblique rotation
are strongly intercorrelated with one another. While the oblique rotations tried here
do not force factors to be correlated, they do relax the constraint that imposes or-
thogonality, resulting in oblique congurations whenever such congurations increase
the value of the rotations maximand (i.e., whenever an oblique conguration can
produce a "simpler" loading pattern). The pairwise correlation of any two factors
within a given oblique rotation is generally in the neighborhood of 0:5.
52In oblique rotations, the explanatory powers of the factors (i.e. - their associated eigenvalues)
tend to be much closer in magnitude to one another than in orthogonal rotations. Therefore, f1 does
not play the dominant explanatory role that it does under orthogonal rotations; likewise, f2  f5 do
not play as insignicant a role in explaining  as they did under orthogonal rotations.
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A third general observation about Tables 19-21 is that factor score predictions
from oblique rotations are highly correlated with score predictions from the varimax
rotation. The tables show the sample pairwise correlations between varimax and
oblique predictions of corresponding factors for the Rodrik et al. (2004) sample of 138
countries. The minimum correlation for any pairing is 0.746, but the vast majority of
correlations are 0.85 and above. Clearly, scoring countries based on oblique factors will
yield very similar conclusions to scoring countries based on the orthogonal varimax
factors. It is no surprise, then, that results of 2SLS growth regressions from Chapter
2 also change very little when I replace varimax factor scores with oblique-rotation
factor scores. Both coe¢ cient magnitudes and signicances are preserved following
the replacement. As with the 2SLS varimax results, market infrastructure and civil
liberties enter highly signicantly in nearly all specications, and trade (INT) and
geography (GEO) drop in magnitude and signicance once three or more governance
factors are controlled for. The second-stage results are shown in the tables.
In toto, the oblique rotation results present a bit of a puzzle. On the one hand, or-
thogonality evidently imposes a nontrivial constraint on the makeup of  for our data,
since maximizing unconstrained objective functions similar to the varimax criterion
produces highly correlated factors. This outcome seems to amount to a rejection of
orthogonality. On the other hand, oblique rotations of 0 do very little to alter either
the varimaxs matching of variables to factors or its ranking of countries in the factor
scores. This outcome suggests that the practical impacts of imposing orthogonality
on our data are small to inconsequential.53
53In the aggregate, the varimax and the oblique rotations rank countries in a highly correlated
79
Given these results, the choice between an oblique or an orthogonal orientation
of the factors ought to hinge on the aims of the researcher. For some situations,
orthogonality per se may be desirable, simply because the researcher believes the
latent constructs are truly independent, or because a follow-on application requires a
maximally distinct set of scores. In datasets like this one, however - where each vari-
able is strongly correlated with nearly all others - orthogonal factors pose an added
interpretive challenge. Essentially, the data are saying that market-infrastructure-like
characteristics tend not to vary independently from civil-liberties-like characteristics.
Therefore, in labeling orthogonal factors based on this kind of data, one must stress
their residual nature ("civil liberties, after controlling for market infrastructure, or-
der...etc.") so as to avoid equating the factors with the terms used to label them.
If the researchers prior suggests the latent concepts under scrutiny are actually
correlated, then an oblique rotations may be superior. With an oblique rotation, one
no longer needs to qualify factor labels with "...controlling for the other factors"-
type statements. But as the factors become highly correlated with one another, their
distinguishing characteristics become harder to appreciate.
Implicitly in this dissertation, I have taken the stand that an orthogonal rotation
is preferable for my purposes, but I also recognize the very reasonable arguments for
using an oblique rotation. However, the invariance of many of my results to allowing
order. But there are individual countries for which the impacts of switching rotations is nontriv-
ial. For example, some countries with poor human rights records have signicantly better market
infrastructure scores under varimax than under oblique rotations. The reason is similar to the expla-
nation of deviations in quartimax and varimax scores in Chapter 1. The oblique versions of market
infrastrucure are correlated with human rights variables, whereas the orthogonal varimax version of
market infrastructure is not. Therefore, poor human rights records dont count against countries
under varimax, but they do count against countries under oblique rotations.
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factors to be correlated suggests that such arguments, stimulating though they may
be, hold little consequence for ranking countries in governance.
2 Missing Data
2.1 Extent
There are a great many observations missing from the governance dataset. If one
considers all the countries for which at least one governance variable is observed,
then 32% of the cells in this 215  45 governance data matrix are missing. Such a
high percentage of data missing means that any approach I take to deal with the
missing data is likely to have a nontrivial impact on my estimation results.
The missing data pattern is such that the complete 45 1 data vector is observed
for only 73 countries. Therefore, complete-case analysis - estimation based on only
the complete observations - discards 142 partial observations (some missing as few as
a single variable), amounting to a two-thirds reduction in the number of countries in
my sample!
I estimate the factor model in this paper using complete-case analysis, so at a very
minimum I need to contemplate the potential biases introduced by this decision.
2.2 Mechanism
To understand the potential impact of using complete-case analysis one must rst
assess the reason(s) that the data are missing, i.e. - identify the missing data mech-
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anism. Complete-case analysis yields consistent (but ine¢ cient) estimates under one
type of missingness mechanism, but inconsistent estimates under all others.
Little and Rubin (2002) classify missing data mechanisms into three types, de-
pending on how the property of missingness is related to values taken by the data.
The rst type, called missing completely at random (MCAR), is the most innoc-
cous. Data are said to be MCAR if the likelihood that a value is missing is independent
of the value of that or any other variable in the data set (missing or observed).54 If
my data were MCAR, then the sample of 73 countries with no missing variables (the
"complete-case sample") would in fact be a random sample of the population. MCAR
therefore would mean factor model estimates based on the complete-case sample are
unbiased (though not e¢ cient).
The second type, called missing at random (MAR), requires more attention. Data
are said to be MAR if the likelihood that a value is missing depends on observed but
not unobserved values in the dataset. For instance, it may be that missingness for one
corruption variable c1 is negatively correlated with the overall level of corruption, but
that after conditioning on another fully observed corruption measure c2, missingness
for c1 is random.
The nal type, called not missing at random (NMAR), is the most pernicious of
all and requires the greatest amount of a priori information to treat properly. If data
are NMAR, then the likelihood that a value is missing depends on both observed
and unobserved values for that observation. Extending the corruption example given
54Formally, Little and Rubin (2002) characterize missingness mechanisms in terms of conditional
distributions of the missingness pattern, given the data. When data are MCAR, the conditional
distribution of the missingness pattern given the data is just the marginal density of the missingness
pattern.
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above, one would say that c1 is NMAR if the likelihood that c1 is missing for a
given country depends on unobserved attributes of that country (such as the value of
c1 itself), even after conditioning on the value of c2. If one knew the nature of the
dependence on unobserved variables, then that information could be factored into the
estimation process and perhaps produce consistent estimates. However in my case,
without some kind of forensic evidence (e.g. - discussions with a data provider reveal
an idiosyncratic sample selection procedure) it will generally be di¢ cult to ascertain
the nature of this dependence.
Which type of missingness mechanism is at work in the governance dataset? Con-
sider that missingness in this case is a by-product of the aggregation of variables from
a dozen independent data sources that did not coordinate their country-coverage deci-
sions. What it literally means to say that the governance dataset has "missing" values
is that di¤erent variables cover di¤erent (though overlapping) samples of countries.
This situation di¤ers from the more standard scenario in which multivariate data
comes from a single survey, a single battery of test questions, or a set of instrument
readings on a sample of observations. However, the theoretical issue remains the
same: what is the relationship between the property of missingness and the values
that the data take? In the context of expert opinion data, the answer to that question
hinges on whether data providers decide whether to cover a country based on reasons
that are correlated with the governance attributes being measured. If the answer to
this question is no, then the data can be considered MCAR, and the complete-case
sample will yield consistent estimates.
One might think that, since values in the governance dataset are missing de-
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liberately (i.e. - because a data provider intentionally excluded a country) rather
than by chance, missingness cannot be MCAR. But this is not so. Data can still be
MCAR even though missingness has a systematic explanation. In our case, MCAR
only requires that the rule generating missing values, whatever it may be, operates
orthogonally to governance quality. So, for example, if a data provider excluded all
countries in which the capital city was founded in an odd-numbered year, missingness
would be systematic but (presumably) MCAR.
Is it possible that the governance data are MCAR? Consider that the majority of
governance variables are scores published by prot-maximizing risk-consulting rms.
In equilibrium one expects these rms to publish scores on a particular country only if
demand for information on that country is su¢ ciently strong. Demand for information
in turn depends largely on the interests of clients - chiey investors and multinational
corporations. Under this rationale, one should be willing to assume the data are
MCAR if it can reasonably be expected that (across clients, and across countries) the
basis for client interest in a country is independent of the quality of governance.
Prima facie, the complete-case sample does appear to be a diverse cross-section of
countries, so I cannot reject MCAR out of hand. But on closer inspection the data
suggest that client interest is in fact not independent of the quality of governance
and thus that the data are not MCAR. Let missi 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; 45g be the number of
values missing for country i. If the missingness mechanism is the same across data
providers, then missi measures the propensity for country i to be excluded under
that mechanism. One then might ask: how is this propensity related to the quality of
governance, as measured by the observed data? To answer that question, I calculate
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the pairwise correlations between miss and each of the 45 variables. I nd that miss
is negatively correlated with 3555 out of 45 variables.56 In other words, a countrys
propensity to be excluded by data providers is decreasing in its quality of governance;
missingness conveys negative information about a country.57
The above exercise tells us something about the di¤erence between more-complete
and less-complete observations. Another way to shed light on the missingness mecha-
nism is to directly compare the complete-case group of countries with the incomplete-
case group of countries in terms of governance and non-governance variables. If
systematic di¤erences emerge, then these will constitute further evidence that the
complete-case group is not a representative sample, forcing us to reject MCAR.
I run 45 independent t-tests on the equality of variable means across the two groups
and nd striking results. For 37 of the 45 governance variables, I can reject H0 :
complete = incomplete in favor of Ha : complete > incomplete at the 1% level.
58 For only
one of the remaining eight variables can I reject equality in the oppositte direction,
namely Hea : complete < incomplete - and then, only at the 10% level. Evidently,
complete-case countries on average have higher scores than incomplete-case countries,
55Pairwise correlations for 31 of the 35 are signicant at the 5% level.
56For variable j, the sample upon which the pairwise correlation withmiss is estimated comprises
the countries for which variable j is observed. These samples di¤er across variables.
57An alternative interpretation of the negative correlations would be that countries with fewer
observed values appear to possess relatively poor governance because the data providers that do
cover them are more pessimistic than other data providers. But given that all 45 variables in our
dataset are highly positively correlated, it seems unlikely that providers who assess "poorly covered"
countries are evaluating those countries in a way not representative of the way that all data providers
would have assessed them.
58Interestingly, six of the eight variables for which we cannot reject H0 : complete = incomplete
fall into the Political Stability/No Violence (PSNV) category of Kaufmann et al. Evidently, the
complete-data sample of 73 countries is closer to being a random sample in the dimensions measured
by PSNV variables.
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suggesting again that missingness conveys negative information about governance.59
In the Table 22 below I present more t-test results - this time for covariates
outside the area of governance. The results show still more systematic di¤erences
between complete-case and incomplete-case countries. Complete-case countries are
richer, farther from the equator, more populous, and more linguistically Europeanized
than incomplete-case countries.
Two-sample t-tests for di¤erence in means - selected covariates
real per capita income (2005) population (2005) distance from equator eurfrac tropics
mean, complete obs. 16,530.37 72,565.12 31.93 0.30 0.36
mean, incomplete obs. 9,801.38 9,516.94 20.80 0.17 0.76
std. dev., complete obs. 12,750.18 199,353.30 17.74 0.42 0.46
std. dev., incomplete obs. 13,274.33 17,767.12 14.38 0.35 0.40
n, complete obs. 73 73 73 73 61
n, incomplete obs. 113 113 128 110 80
t statistic (incomplete - complete) -3.46 -2.70 -4.57 -2.11 5.30
upper one-sided p-value 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.00
lower one-sided p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00
two-sided p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00
Note: unequal variances assumed.
Table 22
The behavior of miss and the t-test results strongly suggest that complete-case
countries di¤er systematically from incomplete-case countries in level of governance,
an observation inconsistent with the MCAR hypothesis. I therefore reject MCAR.60
59Two potential explanations for the observed pattern of missingness that are presumably inde-
pendent of governance are population and geographic remoteness. 2005 population and miss are
correlated at  =  0:2, and interestingly, the countries with the most missing data (35 or more
missing values) are almost exclusively sparsely populated island nations.
60The Little-Rubin test of MCAR is a formal tool for assessing whether data are MCAR. It is
available in SPSS but not in any of the statistical software packages on computers in the Economics
Department Graduate Student Computer Lab. For that reason, I have not been able to implement
this test yet.
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If my factor model estimates are based on countries with above-average gover-
nance, then clearly my parameter estimates must be biased to some degree. The
di¢ cult questions are: how much, and in what direction(s)? The evidence pre-
sented so far indicates only that complete-case countries have higher mean scores
than incomplete-case countries. But the covariance structure is what matters for fac-
tor model estimation, and I have not ruled out that the two samples, though they
di¤er in means, share the same covariance structure. If they did, then my reliance on
the complete-case sample would not seem to be that problematic. There are formal
tests of the homogeneity of covariance structures (Kim and Bentler, 2002) that could
shed more light on this question.
Clearly the complete-case analysis approach has risks. My data do not appear to
be MCAR. The magnitude and direction of biases introduced by the complete-case
approach however are hard to predict because they depend on the representativeness
of the covariance structure found in the complete-case sample, which I have not as-
sessed. To gain further insight into the possible biases of the complete-case approach,
two alternative missing data treatments - variable reduction, and multiple imputation
- are tried in the next section.
2.3 Treatments
In this section, I undertake two alternative treatments of the missing data problem
and compare the corresponding results with those from complete-case analysis. Both
of the alternative approaches have the e¤ect of expanding (beyond 73) the number of
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countries used to estimate the factor model parameters ;;	. The rst approach
drops variables from the model so as to maximally increase the complese-case sam-
ple size. The second approach (multiple imputation) rectangularizes the incomplete
dataset by imputing missing values with draws from the conditional distribution of
the missing values (Xmiss) given the observed values (Xobs). Inferences from both
approaches align quite closely with those of complete-case analysis, suggesting that
the exclusion of countries with incomplete data has not distorted my interpretation
of the factor structure or my analysis of governance and growth in any substantial
way.
2.3.1 Expanding the sample by dropping variables.
One common technique for dealing with missing multivariate data is to consider drop-
ping variables from an analysis when: i.) those variables are highly correlated with
others in the dataset, and ii.) doing so would add nontrivially to the number of
cases with complete data (Hair et al., 2005). Many of the variables in my governance
dataset purport to measure very similar concepts and are in fact highly positively
correlated. In addition, by dropping carefully chosen subsets of these variables, it
is possible to increase the number of complete cases substantially. Therefore, as a
simple robustness check on the complete-case analysis utilized in Chapters one and
two, I re-estimated the original varimax-rotated ve-factor model on a reduced set
of governance variables for which a larger number of countries had complete obser-
vations. I chose which of the 45 variables to drop from my analysis based primarily
on which variablesdeletion could expand the complete-case sample size the most. I
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tried a number of congurations, and I present below results from the most extreme
version, in which I drop 20 of the 45 governance variables.
Denote the original 45-variable governance dataset by X and denote the reduced
dataset of 45   20 = 25 retained variables by Xsmall. The reduction from X to
Xsmall expands the complete-case sample from n = 73 to nsmall = 110 countries.61 I
estimate an orthogonal ve-factor model on Xsmall and rotate loadings to the varimax
criterion. Four of the ve factors that emerge from this model closely resemble factors
from Chapter ones model estimated on X: factor one is a close analogue to market
infrastructure; factor two resembles civil liberties; factor three resembles the MIG
factor; and factor four resembles order. Factor ve from the Xsmall model is a hodge-
podge of stability and rulelaw variables.62 Below, I present scatterplots comparing
factor score predictions from the models based on X and Xsmall: The plots show
that with respect to market infrastructure, civil liberties and order, the factor model
based on Xsmall ranks countries in almost exactly the same way as the model based
on X. This concordance provides a measure of condence that the inferences based
on complete-case analysis in Chapters one and two are robust to the inclusion of
countries with incomplete data.
61Whenever one variable from provider A was dropped fromX, all variables from A were dropped.
This is because all variables from a given provider tended to omit the same subsample of countries.
Thus, dropping only one variable from, say, Global Risk Service, would not expand the number of
countries with complete cases. The 20 variables dropped from X to create Xsmall comprised all
variables from the following data providers (see appendix for acronyms): GRS, QLM, EIU, GCS
and RSF.








I take the robustness check a step further by replicating the 2SLS growth regres-
sions of Chapter two. The table below presents results like those of Table 17 but
with the score predictions for market infrastructure, civil liberties and order taken
from the Xsmall model. Not surprisingly given the close correlation between factor
score predictions the two models, the results below closely resemble those of Table 17.
From the second-stage results in Panel A, we see that market infrastructure and civil
liberties again emerge as the dominant explanatory variables for per capita income;
trade and geography are insignicant after controlling for three governance factors.
Overall, coe¢ cient magnitudes and signicances are highly similar to the varimax re-
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sults of Table 17. Note that the factor "downside governance risk" is not included as a
regressor in Table 23 because dataset Xsmall contains no Global Risk Service variables
(the variables that dene downside governance risk under the full model). First-stage
results from the Xsmall model are also very similar to those of the full model: distance
from the equator (GEO), EURFRAC and English legal origin are most important for
market infrastructure; GEO and % Muslim population are again most important for
civil liberties; and Frankel-Romer tradeshare and % Muslim population best explain
order.
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IV (2SLS) results using limited models factor score predictions - Rodrik et al.s large sample
Panel A: second-stage results (Dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GEO 0.0280*** 0.0380*** 0.0179** 0.00953
(0.00818) (0.00548) (0.00871) (0.0100)
INT 0.717*** 0.550** 0.617*** 0.0430
(0.210) (0.269) (0.219) (0.409)
mrkt. infrastructure1 0.484** 0.562*** 0.706***
(0.202) (0.210) (0.225)




Observations 138 138 138 138
R-squared 0.592 0.331 0.562 0.570
Sargan p-val 1.28E-07 0.0237 0.0132 0.0173
Cragg-Donald Wald p-val 0.0002 0 0.0001 0.0288
Panel B: rst-stage results - regressing INT and governance on the instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INT mrkt. infrastructure civil liberties order
GEO 0.00184 0.0373*** 0.00930** 0.00379
(0.00243) (0.00458) (0.00459) (0.00468)
TRADESHARE 0.363*** -0.0187 0.0446 0.475***
(0.0425) (0.0802) (0.0802) (0.0818)
EURFRAC -0.187* 0.434** 0.457** 0.0977
(0.110) (0.208) (0.208) (0.212)
LEGORE 0.146* 0.379** 0.221 -0.323*
(0.0879) (0.166) (0.166) (0.169)
LEGORGE -0.0578 0.579* 0.302 0.0789
(0.181) (0.341) (0.341) (0.348)
LEGORSC -0.240 -0.553 0.248 -0.111
(0.218) (0.411) (0.411) (0.419)
CATHO80 -0.00452 -0.243 0.417 -0.514*
(0.148) (0.278) (0.278) (0.284)
MUSLIM80 -0.264** 0.427* -0.923*** -0.698***
(0.128) (0.242) (0.242) (0.247)
Observations 138 138 138 138
R-squared 0.400 0.453 0.377 0.259
F-stat. 10.77 13.38 9.739 5.645
Constants not shown; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Multiple imputation (MI) is the second tactic I employ to check robustness of the
complete-case analysis. Little and Rubin (2002) and Schafer (1997) provide exhaus-
tive derivations and background on the theory and application of multiple imputation.
In short, MI entails lling in the values missing from multivariate data with draws
from their conditional distribution, given the observed values. The completed dataset
(observed+imputed) is rectangular and suitable for standard (complete-data) estima-
tion techniques. Of course, point estimates using imputed data would vary from one
iteration of imputation to the next, since the imputed values are random draws. Such
variation simply represents the uncertainty due to the missing data. To increase the
precision of point estimates and to properly account for the estimate uncertainty
caused by the missing data, M > 1 rounds of imputation are performed, yielding M
completed datasets. The model of interest is estimated separately on each completed
dataset and the results are then combined to yield a single, averaged, point estimate.
Standard errors for the point estimate are constructed in a way that captures both
the within- and across-imputation variability (Schafer, 1997).
MI is a valid approach only if the data are, at worst, MAR (Little and Rubin,
2002). While my analysis of the governance variables suggests they may not meet
the threshhold of MAR, what makes MI nevertheless a potentially valid approach is
the breadth of predictor variables I include in my imputation model. The role of a
predictor variable in the imputation model is simply to enrich the information set
upon which the conditional distribution of Xmiss is constructed. So, while it may
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be that the property of missingness is still correlated the missing values themselves
if one conditions only on Xobs, missingness may become independent of the missing
values once one conditions on the wider information set [Xobs; Z].
My predictor variables are strongly associated with governance and include dis-
tance from equator, legal origin, linguistic and ethnic fractionalization, % speaking
European languages, GDP per capita, population, and trade openness. I leverage
the fact that the predictors are observed completely on a wider sample of countries
than is Xobs (n = 154 vs. n = 73). In essence, the strong association of Z with
governance, plus the wide availability of Z mean that the relationships from the true
joint distribution of X that would have been apparent had Xmiss been observed can
be better approximated by drawing imputations of Xmiss from P (XmissjZ;Xobs) than
from P (XmissjXobs) :
The benecial e¤ect of MI is to allow data from more countries to be incorporated
into the estimation of the factor model of governance that is presented in Chapter one.
The purpose of incorporating more countries, of course, is to examine the robustness
of complete-case inferences presented in Chapters one and two. There are three stages
of inference upon which the e¤ects of MI will have an impact: i.) estimates of the
factor structure itself (i.e., ;;	, and the interpretation of governance factors); ii.)
predictions of the factor scores; and, iii.) 2SLS growth regression results using factor
scores as regressors. One could analyze the e¤ects of MI on each stage of results, but
the results are so sequentially dependent that examining only the nal stage (the 2SLS
regressions) seems reasonable, and this is what I do. Clearly, if the application of MI
alters the factor structure implied by ;;	 substantively, then the e¤ects should
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ripple through to the factor score predictions, and thereby to the growth regressions.
However, if the growth regressions are basically unchanged, then it is probably safe
to assume that the e¤ects of MI on estimates of the factor structure and the factor
scores has been minimal.63
The practical importance of this decision is that it dictates the stage of my analysis
at which theM di¤erent point estimates and standard errors are to be aggregated. For
instance, one could aggregate at the factor model stage, averaging the b(t); b(t); b	(t)
over t for t = f1; 2; :::;Mg. Or one could could aggregate at the factor score prediction
stage, averaging bF (t) = bE hf jX(t)completed; b(t); b(t); b	(t)i over t. Instead, my decision to
make the nal stage of analysis (the growth regressions) the focus of this robustness
check implies that I should hold o¤ combining parameter estimates and standard
errors until the growth regressions stage. In other words, I carry out M factor model
estimations onM completed datasets; I produce the correspondingM separate nm
matrices of factor score predictions (i.e. - each bF (t) is based onX(t)completed; b(t); b(t); b	(t)
for t = f1; 2; :::;Mg) ; and I carry out the 2SLS growth regressionsM di¤erent times,
using a di¤erent bF (t) in the regressor matrix each time. Finally, I aggregate the M
point estimates of the 2SLS second-stage regression coe¢ cents and their standard
errors according to Rubins rules for combining completed-data estimates64 (Rubin,
63Analysis of multiply imputed data entails aggregating results from M di¤erent estimates, each
of which was based on a di¤erent completed dataset. In my case, analysis has three distinct stages
(factor model, factor prediction, growth regression). One advantage to aggregating results at the
nal stage (the growth-regression stage) is that estimates of the 2SLS coe¢ cient standard errors will
explicitly account for the uncertainty resulting from between-imputation variation.
64The formula presented for V C (2sls) reects a small-sample (smallM) adjustment as presented
in Schafer (1997), pg. 114.
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2002 p. 86):
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As can be seen in the expressions above, the MI point estimate vector is sim-
ply the average of the M completed-data point estimates. The MI standard errors
(square roots of the diagonal of V C (2sls)) are more complicated but are in essence
a combination of within- and between-imputation variation in the point estimates.
Matrix B captures the between-imputation variation, while matrix U averages the
within-imputation variation.
The imputation model I use is a multivariate normal regression model. For in-
complete observation i, missing values are lled in with draws from the conditional
distribution of is missing variables, given is scores in the observed variables and in
the predictors. Under the assumption that all the data, [X;Z] are jointly normal,
this conditional distribution is also normal and is derived in a straightforward way
from the estimated full joint distribution of [X;Z]. See Anderson (2003) p. 35 for a
derivation of the conditional distribution of A given B when A and B are jointly nor-
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mal. I set the number of imputations,M , to 25, which should be more than adequate
(Schafer, 1997) to obtain reliable estimates.
The parameter estimates for the full joint distribution of [X;Z] are arrived at
iteratively, through a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique known as data
augmentation (DA). The roles of MCMC and DA techniques in MI are covered
extensively in Schafer (1997) and Rubin and Little (2002). DA consists of two
steps, carried out each iteration s - an imputation step and a posterior step. In
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completed,..., etc. ) is saved until M completed datasets have
been compiled. For more detail see Schafer (1997), Chs. 3-6; Rubin and Little
(2002), Ch. 10; and STATA v. 11 documentation for command mi.
I present my MI results in Table 24 below. The format of the table mirrors that
of Table 17 in Chapter 2, but the results below come from multiple imputation, not
complete-case analysis. They were derived as follows. A a total ofM = 25 completed
datasets were produced using MI. The method of impuation was a multivariate nor-
mal regression model using DA. An orthogonal factor model with ve factors was
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then estimated on each completed dataset. Loadings from each model were rotated
according to the varimax rotation. These steps resulted in 25 sets of factor model
parameter estimates - one set corresponding to each completed dataset. For the tth
data/parameter combination, a 215  5 matrix of factor score predictions was then
generated using the Thomson predictor: bF (t) = bE hf jX(t)completed; b(t); b(t); b	(t)i, for t
= f1; 2; :::; 25g. Finally, the 2SLS regression specications from Table 17 were each
estimated 25 times - once with bF (1)as right-hand side variables, once with bF (2), once
with bF (3); :::; bF (25). This procedure produced 25 conditionally independent estimates
of each scalar coe¢ cient in each specication. The estimates for each coe¢ cient were
averaged and reported in the table below. Standard errors in parentheses below each
point estimate were derived from matrix V C (2sls), as described above.
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IV (2SLS) Results with multiply imputed governance scores - Rodrik et al.s large sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second-stage results; dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.
GEO 0.0197*** 0.0368*** 0.0153** 0.0023 0.0151** 0.0004
(0.007) (0.0056) (0.0072) (0.0093) (0.0072) (0.0101)
INT 0.452** 0.5691** 0.393* 0.2461 0.4203 0.0612
(0.2096) (0.2615) (0.2133) (0.2011) (0.327) (0.3439)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.676*** 0.5997*** 0.7568*** 0.6026*** 0.7702***
(0.1544) (0.158) (0.1588) (0.159) (0.1666)
civil liberties 0.5123*** 0.46*** 0.5003*** 0.4627*** 0.4989***
(0.1425) (0.1141) (0.0998) (0.1146) (0.1038)




Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138
1. Constants not shown; standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
2. Multiple imputation regression estimates based on 25 imputations of governance variables;
point estimates (̂
mi
) and standard errors (̂mi ) constucted according)
to Rubins rules for combining completed data estimates (see Rubin and
Little (2002), Schafer (1997)). Reference distribution for signicance levels is standard normal;
z-statistic constructed with ̂
mi
/̂mi .
3. Instruments = GEO, TRADESHARE, EURFRAC, LEGORE, LEGORGE, LEGORSC , CATHO80,
MUSLIM80
Table 24
Coe¢ cient magnitudes and patterns of signicance are generally unchanged from
the corresponding complete-case results in Table 17 of Chapter two. Market in-
frastructure and civil liberties again show the most strength in explaining cross-
country income variation, while GEO and INT lose signicance once three or more
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governance variables are included on the right-hand side. The coe¢ cient on downside
governance risk is larger and more signicant than in Table 17, suggesting a more
inuential role for this variable than implied by complete-case analysis. The R2, and
p-values for Sargan and Cragg-Donald Wald statistics are not reported becuase it is
unclear how these values should be combined from the individual imputation results.
Signicance levels were arrived at by constructing a z-statistic for each 2SLS scalar
coe¢ cient k using its MI point estimate and standard error estimate (zk = bmik =bmik )
and comparing this value to the standard normal distribution. Normality is an as-
ymptotic approximation. In my case, this approximation may overstate the actual
signicance levels since the true distribution of zk under the null may have fatter tails
than a normal distribution. The reason to suspect fat tails stems from noise in the
estimate of B in (17). WhenM is small, the sampling variation of B (i.e., its variation
across di¤erent sets of M imputations) could be be very high, causing the sampling
distribution of bmik to be more di¤use than expected. In these circumstances, extreme
values of zk would be observed under the null more frequently than the standard nor-
mal suggests, meaning nominal signicance levels would overstate actual levels. The
potential severity of this distortion in my data depends on M (larger is better), the
variability in b(t)2sls about its mean 2sls across imputations (less is better), and the
relative magnitudes of U and B (B "small" relative to U is better). If the potential
distortion from the normality assumption appears large, one could alternatively try to
approximate the sampling distribution of zk directly by using a bootstrap approach.
102
2.4 Conclusion on Missing Data
The two exercises above shed light on the robustness of complete-case analysis pre-
sented in Chapters one and two. Expanding the sample of complete cases by dropping
variables, and using multiple imputation to incorporate data from incomplete obser-
vations both produce very similar pictures of the governance landscape. Both missing
data techniques nd the same factors that complete-case estimation found, and both
techniques rank countries in those factors in a highly correlated order. Not surpris-
ingly, 2SLS regressions of per capita income on the factor scores resulting from either
missing data technique generate inferences that are almost identical to complete-case
analysis.
The concordance of results from complete-case analysis and MI is reassuring. MI
allows the use of all available data, greatly increasing the amount of information
entering the factor model estimation. 65 But the concordance is not a denitive con-
rmation of my complete-case results. It could be that even controlling for the wide
assortment of predictor variables in the imputation model (i.e., the Z), missingness is
still dependent on the missing values themselves (i.e. - the data are not MAR). If the
data are not MAR even after controlling for Z, then MI su¤ers from the same prob-
lem that a­ icts complete-case analysis because imputed values will be based on an
inconsistent estimate of the joint distribution of X. Estimates from the two methods
65In addition to the 73 complete cases, MI incorporates all observed data from the 142 countries
that are incomplete in at least one of the 45 governance variables. This has the e¤ect of doubling
the number of country-variable observations to 6585 from 3285. This should lead to more e¢ cient
estimation compared to complete-case analysis. Of course, the imputation of missing values with
random draws increases the level of uncertainty surrounding point estimates, but this increase is
accounted for explicitly in the construction of MI standard errors.
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will align, and both will be inconsistent.
Still it should be pointed out that nothing in the robustness checks performed
above contradicts the hypothesis that complete-case inferences are basically sound.
And one would need evidence of a particularly pernicious missingness mechanism to
presume that, even after conditioning on Z and Xobs (the latter often coming from
data providers in a similar line of work and with similar skills and incentives as the
providers of the variables to be imputed), missing data are still not MAR.
3 Conclusion
The exercises performed in this chapter demonstrate that interpretation of the datas
factor structure, the prediction of country factor scores, and growth-governance in-
ferences are quite robust to alternative rotations and radically di¤erent treatments of




In this paper I provide evidence on the robustness of factor score predictions con-
structed in Chapter 1 and applied in Chapter 2. I developed factor score predictions
in Chapter 1 by applying ML factor model estimation to 45 governance variables, the
distributions of which take on a variety of shapes and degrees of discretization. To
the extent that the individual variables depart from continuity and normality, they
violate the explicit assumptions behind by the ML estimator. This paper uses Monte
Carlo simulations to study the e¤ects of discretization on the quality of factor score
predictions.
Social science researchers frequently encounter polytomous data that measure con-
cepts plausibly thought of as varying continuously. One example is Likert scale data,
where respondents rate their concurrence with a statement on a scale of, say, 1 to 5
(where 1 signies "strongly disagree", and 5 signies "strongly agree"). Other exam-
ples include categorical survey questions on age (e.g. - 20-30, 40-50, over 65), income
(< $10; 000; $40; 000-$50; 000; > $100; 000) or frequency of engaging in an activity
(e.g. - 1-2 times a month, weekly, daily, etc.). Survival data from medical trials
may exist only in coarse increments (patient was alive at 3, 6, 9, 12, or >12 months
post-treatment).
The 45 governance variables on which Chapter 1s factor model is estimated also
t this template. For example, one measure of "independence of the judiciary" covers
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191 countries but takes on only three distinct values. It seems reasonable to interpret
this polytomous variable as an approximation of a continuum rather than a depiction
of the true distribution of "independence of the judiciary". Even when the number of
categories in governance variables is higher than three, there is little reason to believe
that the concepts being assessed (e.g. - "corruption", "unfair competitive practices",
"property rights") truly take on only a small number of discrete levels. The unique
historical, cultural and political forces at work in each country seem destined to
produce governance variation of a ner level than can be described by a handful of
categories.
In this paper, I assess the extent to which the discrete nature of polytomous data
confounds prediction of common factors generating the underlying continuous data. I
want to know, for example, the correlation between predictions of "market infrastruc-
ture" based on three-category polytomous variables and predictions of "market in-
frastructure" based on the continuous versions of the same variables. To estimate
these correlations, I conduct Monte Carlo experiments in which normally distributed
continuous random variables, generated by a standard factor-model data-generating
process (DGP), undergo a transformation to polytomous variables. The transformed
variables are then factor analyzed using ML, and the parameter estimates so derived
are used to construct predictions of the factor scores that gave rise to the original
(untransformed) data. These score predictions are then compared to the (infeasible)
predictions based on the original (untransformed) data.
I expect the two sets of predictions to di¤er for two reasons. First, a polytomous
variable distinguishes true performance coarsely and unevenly; countries with insu¢ -
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ciently large di¤erences in true performance are assigned the same score (unless they
happen to fall on opposite sides of a cuto¤). Second, depending on the placement
of the category cuto¤s, the distribution of the polytomous variable can be highly
non-normal even if the underlying continuous variable is normal. For example, if the
upper cuto¤ for the lowest score category is near the mean of the continuous variables
distribution, then the polytomous variable may exhibit large positive skew.
The psychometric and statistical literatures have extensively studied factor model
estimation in the presence of both polytomous data (e.g. - Bartholomew, 1980; Mis-
levy, 1986; Dolan, 1994) and censored data (e.g. - Muthen, 1989; Waller and Muthen,
1991; Kamakura and Wedel, 2001). A common mode of inquiry is to examine the
relative performance of di¤erent factor model estimators (e.g. - ML, weighted least-
squares (WLS) and generalized least-squares (GLS)) in terms of: i.) variability and
bias in parameter estimates (factor loadings, uniqueness variances), and ii.) devi-
ations in the actual distribution of the likelihood-ratio t statistic, which follows a
2 distribution under conforming data. Less attention, however, has been paid to
the impact of censoring and discretization on factor score prediction (which involves
complicated functions of the parameter estimates) - the focus of this paper. I study
only the normal-theory ML factor model estimator because that is the estimator used
in Chapter 1, and it is specically the robustness of Chapter 1s predictions that I
wish to assess.
Shi and Lee (1997) use Monte Carlo experiments to examine the performance of a
Bayesian factor score predictor with censored, truncated and polytomous data. Their
simulated datasets consist of a mix of continuous and polytomous variables. Accuracy
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of the Bayesian factor predictor was found to increase in the number of categories (for
polytomous variables), and in the proportion of all variables that were continuous.
The pattern of censoring (symmetric vs. asymmetric thresholds) was found to have
little impact.
This paper departs from Shi and Lee in a number of ways. First, I study a
more common approach to factor model prediction: Thomsons (1951) regression
predictor using ML parameter estimates. Second, I vary independently the pattern
of censoring (location and symmetry of upper and lower cuto¤s), and the coarseness
of discretization for polytomous variables. These two design features were linked in
the experimental setup of Shi and Lee, so the independent e¤ects of censoring and
discretization were not directly assessed. Third, I examine factor score prediction
under a wider variety of DGPs. Shi and Lee used the same simple oblique two-factor
DGP for all experiments. In this paper, however, I examine prediction performance
under one-, two- and three-factor models with simple and complex loading patterns.
2 Interpreting Polytomous Governance Data
The specic motivation of this paper is the use of factor models to analyze expert
opinion assessments of country governance. In Chapter 1, I estimate an orthogonal
multi-factor model on a dataset of 45 such variables using ML and uncover four
strongly dened factors of governance - market infrastructure, civil liberties, downside
governance risk, and order. I then estimate each countrys score in each of the four
factors using the regression predictor (Thomson, 1951).
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Many of the 45 variables used in that estimation are polytomous in nature.66 Many
variables also exhibit distributions with distinctly non-normal shapes - including bi-
modal, negative skew, positive skew and U-shaped. I present empirical histograms of
these variables in the Appendix. The concern taken up by this paper is the extent
to which a countrys predicted factor scores based on this data may deviate from its
true factor score.
Before taking up that question though, I need to motivate my basic assumptions
about the nature of the data. How do I know governance actually varies continu-
ously across countries? And if it does, what explains the polytomous, non-normal
distributions of observed governance variables?
I cannot prove that the governance dimensions assessed by the data vary contin-
uously, but I can try to show why this assumption is the most plausible. First, some
governance variables are literally probability assessments, and the natural range of
these is the continuous interval from 0 to 1. Second, other variables assess attributes
such as the quality of the bureaucracy, freedom of expression, or the impartiality of
the legal system. Given the complexity of cultural, economic and political inuences
shaping these outcomes, it seems implausible that no detail is lost by representing
their cross-country variation with a small number of categories. For the same reason,
Likert scale variables in the dataset (e.g. - agree/disagree on a scale of 1-7 with: "The
threat of terrorism ...imposes signicant costs on business") can probably be regarded
as simplications of the true variation in the attribute they measure.
66The coarseness of discretization varies widely across the 45 variables. Six variables take on nine
or fewer values (3,5,5,7,8,9), while the remaining 39 each take on at least ten. Eighteen variables
take on 30 or more unique values.
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Why are governance data polytomous if the concepts they assess are continuous?
The explanation I propose is limited powers of discernment. I suggest that country
experts have constrained abilities to discern a countrys actual level of performance.
Experts are able to group countries into ordered categories, but thats all. One could
think of experts as only observing the integer portion of a countrys true score. I could
also draw an analogy to a scale that registers increments no ner than a kilogram and
which has an upper limit of, say M kg. The scale is incapable of precisely ranking
objects by mass, although it can order them approximately so. And for objects
weighing M kg or more, the scale provides only a lower bound on the objects mass.
This is the type of mechanism I have in mind.
Depending on the coarseness of the discretization, and on the placement of the
cuto¤s for the lower-most and upper-most score categories, the resulting cross-country
distribution of an experts assessments could take a wide variety of shapes. For exam-
ple, an expert who can distinguish equally well between countries at the bottom, the
middle and the top of the governance distribution would transform a symmetrically
distributed unimodal continuous variable into a symmetrically distributed, unimodal
polytomous variable. On the other hand, an expert who is capable of making ner
distinctions between countries at the top of the governance distribution than at the
bottom would transform a symmetrically distributed continuous variable into a poly-
tomous variable with positive skew (long right tail). Finally, an expert incapable of
making ne distinctions at either extreme could generate a polytomous variable with
a U-shaped distribution.
While I think Ive identied a plausible explanation for the observed data, there
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is no way to prove that it is the correct explanation. Other reasons may explain
why one observes skewed, polytomous distributions even though the underlying gov-
ernance concepts are normal and continuous. For instance, non-normality could have
arisen because disturbances in the underlying factor model follow a skewed or bimodal
distribution. And polytomous data may reect the preferences of clients rather than
the cognitive limitations of country experts.
But its important to point out which assumptions matter, and which do not
matter for my results. The assumptions that do matter are that polytomous variables
reect continuous variables; that the continuous variables are normally distributed;
and that the covariance structure of the continuous variables exhibit a factor structure.
If these assumptions are not met by the DGP behind the governance data, then
the results from this papers simulation exercises do not o¤er valid insights into the
estimates of Chapter 1.
On the other hand, assumptions about how the continuous variables are trans-
formed into polytomous variables do not matter for inference because nothing in the
ML estimation procedure presumes knowledge of this process. The crucial thing is
that the proposed explanation generate data with similar observable properties as




I now turn to the formal model of expert assessment data. I review the standard factor
model briey, reproducing the exposition rst presented in Chapter 1 for convenience.
I then introduce some new notation to describe the polytomous nature of the data.
Let X = [X1; X2; :::Xk; :::Xp]
0 represent a vector of normally distributed random











Matrix  is called the loadings matrix; in an orthogonal factor model its (i; j)-th
entry is the covariance between the i-th variable in X and the j-th common factor.
When ij is large and positive, variable Xi is said to load heavily on factor fj. Vector
f is the vector of m < p (unobserved) common factors, modeled as a random vector
with density f  N (0;). Random disturbance vector u is iid with density N (0;	),
	 diagonal.
For clarity, I assume all elements of X have been centered and scaled such that
E (Xk) = 0 and sd (Xk) = 1;8k 2 f1; 2; :::; pg. It is assumed that all m factors
are independent of all p disturbances (otherwise, disturbance uk would not represent
variable Xks idiosyncratic variation).
Given equation (1) and the stochastic assumptions stated above, one can write ,
the VC matrix of X, as follows:
 = 0 +	 (19)
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Equation (2) is the fundamental hypothesis of the factor model. The factor model
posits that  can be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric, positive denite matrix
of rank m < p (i.e. - 0), and a diagonal, positive denite matrix of rank p (i.e. -
	). Matrix 0 represents the variation in X that is due to factors common to all
elements of X, while matrix 	 captures the variation in each Xk 2 fX1; :::; Xpg that
is idiosyncratic.
To predict f; one constructs its conditional mean, given data vector X. Such a
predictor is called the regression predictor and is due to Thomson (1951). Ander-
son (2003) and Lawley and Maxwell (1971) provide full derivations of the regression
predictor. Here I only reproduce the nal result, noting that it follows directly from
the joint distribution of f and X implied by (1), (2) and accompanying stochastic
assumptions.
The m  1 population conditional mean vector of f , given observed data X can
be written:
E [f jX] = 0 1X (20)
Since in practice the parameters ;;	 are unknown, their ML estimates are
used. Designate the estimated conditional mean and of f as:
bE [f jX] = bb0b 1X (21)
Unfortunately, X is not observed. Rather, a polytomous version of X that I
designate X is observed:A realization of scalar variable Xk 2







one of T discrete values, f1; 2; :::; Tg, according to the following rule:
Xk = t, if ct 1 < Xk  ct for t 2 f1; 2; :::; Tg (22)
where the c are cuto¤s for the score categories and where I dene c0 =  1, and
cT =1. To simplify things, I will assume that c1; :::; cT 1 are all equally spaced and
that all p variables in X have the same cuto¤ points c0; :::; cT .67
4 Monte Carlo Design
In this section I describe the design of my Monte Carlo experiments. The basic pro-
cedure involves estimating identically specied factor models on two parallel samples
- a continuous-data sample and a polytomous version of that sample - and comparing
the factor predictions from each. My experimental design draws on numerous papers
in the psychometric literature (e.g. - Hakstian et al., 1982; Muthen, 1989; Dolan,
1994; Shi and Lee, 1997).
The ideal design for any Monte Carlo study depends on the nature of the question
being investigated and on the desired generality of the results. Fundamental elements
to consider in any factor model simulation include the number of factors, the correla-
tion of factors, the complexity of loading patterns, magnitude of communalities (the
proportion of each Xks variation attributable to the common factors), the number
of variables, and the sample size. Further design elements that seem important for
67The latter assumption is contradicted by our data. Both the number and (evidently) the
location of cuto¤s di¤er across variables. However we can extrapolate from our results based on
homogeneous cuto¤s to datasets with mixed cuto¤s.
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my specic question include the number of discrete values that polytomous variables
may take on, and the proportion of the underlying continuous distribution censored
by the discretization process.
Varying all of these elements independently in one experiment would yield a com-
prehensive but also unwieldy body of results. I pursue a narrower design tailored
to assess factor prediction accuracy under conditions resembling those of Chapter
1. My study is not designed to uncover in full generality the impact of polytomous
data on the ML-based factor score predictor. Rather, my goal is to be able to say
something informative about the sensitivity of factor score predictions from estima-
tions like those of Chapter 1. My tactic is to simplify and extrapolate; I experiment
on smaller-dimensional models and use stylized loading patterns and homogeneous
patterns of discretization to gain a clear sense of how these model attributes a¤ect
factor prediction.
I now describe the Monte Carlo procedure in detail. The procedure begins by
specifying the DGP. The DGP comprises the factor model parameters (;;	) as
well as the number of polytomous categories (T ) and the pattern of upper and lower
category cuto¤s ((a; b)).
I look exclusively at orthogonal-factor models and therefore restrict  = I in all
simulations. I examine one-,two-,three- and ve-factor models. For two- and three-
factor models, I experiment with three di¤erent loading patterns. The three patterns
di¤er in complexity, i.e. - in the number of factors on which each variable has a non-
zero loading, or in the frequency of negative loadings. In the rst loading pattern (the
"simple" pattern), each variable inX has a nonzero loading on exactly one factor, and
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every factor has exactly seven variables that load on it. In the second loading pattern
(the "complex" pattern), each variable in X has nonzero loadings on all factors but
loads most heavily on one dominant factor. Every factor has exactly seven variables
for which it is the dominant factor. In the third loading pattern (the "complex and
negative" patterns), each variable in X loads heavily on a dominant factor but also
exhibits small positive, zero or negative loadings on the remaining factors.
In my ve-factor model, I consider a single loading pattern specially constructed to
mimic characteristics of the varimax-rotated estimate of  from the actual governance
data. The characteristics I attempt to match with my constructed  are: 45 vari-
ables and ve factors; factor communalities for f1; ::; f5 of 0:41; 0:24; 0:15; 0:12; 0:08,
respectively; and 83% of total variation explained by all factors. All variants of ;	
used in my simulations are displayed in the appendix.
With the DGP specied, I draw n observations on f and u from N (0; Im) and
N (0;	), respectively and use them to construct n observations on X in accordance
with (1). I x n at 75 in all experiments to mimic the size of the complete-case
sample in Chapter 1 (where n = 73). Continuous data, X, are then transformed into
T -category polytomous data, X, using the transformation rule in (5). I let T take
values in f2; 3; 7; 15; 25; 50; 250; 500g.
The exact placement of the category cuto¤s, c, in (5) is determined by the pa-
rameters (a; b), which denote percentiles of the marginal densities of the Xk. For
example, the values T = 3, and (a; b) = (0:1; 0:9) establish the following cuto¤s
for polytomous variable Xk : [c0; c1; c2; c3] = [ 1; z0:1; z0:9;1] where z is the value
corresponding to the -th percentile of Xks marginal density (the standard normal
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density, in all my simulations). Thus, I would have Xk = "1" for Xk   1:28;
Xk = "2" for  1:28 < Xk  1:28; and nally, Xk = "3" for Xk > 1:28. I allow (a; b)
to take on values in f(0:1; 1) ; (0:5; 1) ; (0:75; 1) ; (0:4; 0:6) ; (0:1; 0:9)g. Each pair (a; b)
implies a certain manifestation of an experts limited powers of discernment. The pair
(0:75; 1) ; for example, induces the extreme left-censoring of Xk one would expect to
see if expert k perceived all countries in the lower 75% of the true governance dis-
tribution as having equivalent governance. Likewise, the pair (0:1; 0:9) induces mild
right- and left-censoring of Xk consistent with an expert incapable of discriminat-
ing between countries within the bottom 10% of the true governance distribution or
between countries within the top 10% of that distribution.
Let the full n p datasets of continuous and polytomous observations be denoted
X and X I estimate identically specied factor models on X and X using maximum
likelihood.68 (For multi-factor models, I rotate to the varimax solution.) Denote the
parameter estimates based on X as b = b; b	 and the parameter estimates based
X as b = b; b	. I then compare factor score predictions based on b with those
based on b.For a particular pair of observations X and X, the predictions being







I look at two related measures of correspondence between (6) and (7): mean-
68The presumed number of factors in the estimated model is always set equal to the actual number
of factors in the DGP.
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squared di¤erence and correlation. The mean-squared di¤erence in predictors for the






 bE fjjX(i)  bE fjjX(i)2 , j 2 f1; :::;mg (25)
where X(i) and X(i) are the ith observations on X and X
, respectively. The






 bE fjjX(i)  bE fjjX(i) , j 2 f1; :::;mg (26)
A DGP is dened by specic values for ;;	; T;and (a; b). For each DGP,
I repeat the above steps 100 times, using 100 independently drawn samples. I
save the msdj and the j resulting from each sample. I then average the val-







i=1 j(i) where i indexes the sample) in Tables
1-8.
The values of mse and  measure the average loss in precision attributable to
discretization. Literally, they measure the correspondence between factor predictions
from a model that uses conforming data and a model that uses coarse approximations
of that data.
It might seem more logical to compare factor predictors to the true factor scores
(i.e. - compare bE [fjjX] and bE [fjjX] to f) rather than to each other. For two rea-
sons, I dont report those results here. First, the goal of my simulations is to quantify
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the loss in predictive accuracy due to a specic deviation from the ML estimator
assumptions. The predictions based on data conforming to those assumptions (i.e.
- bE [f jX]) therefore constitute a natural benchmark. Second, I have examined the
pairwise correlations between predictors and true factor scores and have found, not
surprisingly, that 
 bE [fjjX] ; fj >  bE [fjjX] ; fj ;8j always. That is, in no case
does the polytomous-data factor predictor outperform the continuous-data predictor.
Therefore, a low correlation between the two predictors will in general reect the
polytomous-data predictors low correlation with the true factor scores.
5 Simulation Results




Simulation Results - Simple One-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂) E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂)
(a,b) f1 f1 (a,b) f1 f1
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.55 0.67 (0.1,1) 0.08 0.95
(0.5,1) 0.15 0.91 (0.5,1) 0.10 0.94
(0.75,1) 0.24 0.85 (0.75,1) 0.29 0.83
(0.4,0.6) - - (0.4,0.6) 0.11 0.94
(0.1,0.9) - - (0.1,0.9) 0.16 0.90
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.02 0.99 (0.1,1) 0.02 0.99
(0.5,1) 0.12 0.93 (0.5,1) 0.15 0.91
(0.75,1) 0.35 0.79 (0.75,1) 0.40 0.76
(0.4,0.6) 0.11 0.94 (0.4,0.6) 0.11 0.93
(0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.99 (0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.99
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.02 0.99 (0.1,1) 0.02 0.99
(0.5,1) 0.15 0.91 (0.5,1) 0.17 0.90
(0.75,1) 0.40 0.76 (0.75,1) 0.40 0.76
(0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.93 (0.4,0.6) 0.11 0.93
(0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.99 (0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.99
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.02 0.99 (0.1,1) 0.02 0.99
(0.5,1) 0.17 0.90 (0.5,1) 0.18 0.89
(0.75,1) 0.42 0.75 (0.75,1) 0.41 0.75
(0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.93 (0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.93
(0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.99 (0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.99
Design parameters: p=7, n=75, lambda=0.7, psi=0.51, 100 samples per DGP
Table 25
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Simulation Results - Simple Two-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂) E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂)
(a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2 (a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.60 0.58 0.64 0.65 (0.1,1) 0.08 0.08 0.95 0.95
(0.5,1) 0.16 0.16 0.90 0.90 (0.5,1) 0.11 0.11 0.94 0.94
(0.75,1) 0.27 0.28 0.84 0.83 (0.75,1) 0.27 0.28 0.84 0.84
(0.4,0.6) - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.11 0.11 0.94 0.94
(0.1,0.9) - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.17 0.17 0.90 0.90
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.03 0.02 0.99 0.99 (0.1,1) 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99
(0.5,1) 0.14 0.13 0.92 0.92 (0.5,1) 0.15 0.15 0.91 0.91
(0.75,1) 0.35 0.35 0.79 0.79 (0.75,1) 0.40 0.38 0.77 0.78
(0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.12 0.93 0.93 (0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.11 0.93 0.93
(0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99 (0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.03 0.02 0.99 0.99 (0.1,1) 0.02 0.03 0.99 0.98
(0.5,1) 0.17 0.17 0.90 0.90 (0.5,1) 0.17 0.17 0.90 0.90
(0.75,1) 0.40 0.41 0.76 0.76 (0.75,1) 0.43 0.40 0.75 0.76
(0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.12 0.93 0.93 (0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.12 0.93 0.93
(0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99 (0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99 (0.1,1) 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99
(0.5,1) 0.17 0.18 0.90 0.90 (0.5,1) 0.17 0.17 0.90 0.90
(0.75,1) 0.43 0.43 0.75 0.75 (0.75,1) 0.43 0.42 0.75 0.75
(0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.12 0.93 0.93 (0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.12 0.93 0.93
(0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99 (0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99
p=14, n=75, lambda=0.7 or 0, psi=0.51, 100 samples per DGP
Table 26
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Simulation Results - Simple Three-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂) E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂)
(a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3 (a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.64 0.62 0.68 0.62 0.63 0.60 (0.1,1) 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.95 0.95 0.95
(0.5,1) 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.90 0.90 0.90 (0.5,1) 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.93 0.94 0.94
(0.75,1) 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.83 0.83 0.83 (0.75,1) 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.83 0.84 0.84
(0.4,0.6) - - - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.94 0.93 0.93
(0.1,0.9) - - - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.89 0.89 0.89
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.98 0.98 0.98 (0.1,1) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.5,1) 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.92 0.92 0.92 (0.5,1) 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.91 0.91 0.91
(0.75,1) 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.78 0.79 0.79 (0.75,1) 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.76 0.76 0.75
(0.4,0.6) 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.93 0.93 0.93 (0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.93 0.93 0.93
(0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.99 0.99 0.99 (0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99 0.99
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.98 0.99 0.98 (0.1,1) 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.98 0.99 0.99
(0.5,1) 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.90 0.90 0.90 (0.5,1) 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.90 0.90 0.90
(0.75,1) 0.41 0.45 0.42 0.76 0.74 0.75 (0.75,1) 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.75 0.74 0.74
(0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.93 0.93 0.93 (0.4,0.6) 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.93 0.92 0.93
(0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99 0.99 (0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99 0.99
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99 0.99 (0.1,1) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.5,1) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.89 0.90 0.90 (0.5,1) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.89 0.90 0.89
(0.75,1) 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.74 0.74 0.74 (0.75,1) 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.74 0.73 0.75
(0.4,0.6) 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.93 0.93 0.93 (0.4,0.6) 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.92 0.93 0.92
(0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.99 0.99 0.99 (0.1,0.9) 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.99 0.99 0.99
p=21, n=75, lambda=0.7 or 0, psi=0.51, 100 samples per DGP
Table 27
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Simulation Results - Complex Two-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂) E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂)
(a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2 (a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.79 0.83 0.54 0.52 (0.1,1) 0.24 0.22 0.85 0.86
(0.5,1) 0.37 0.36 0.78 0.78 (0.5,1) 0.23 0.24 0.86 0.85
(0.75,1) 0.52 0.52 0.69 0.69 (0.75,1) 0.50 0.51 0.70 0.69
(0.4,0.6) - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.26 0.26 0.84 0.84
(0.1,0.9) - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.43 0.44 0.74 0.74
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.07 0.08 0.95 0.95 (0.1,1) 0.07 0.06 0.96 0.96
(0.5,1) 0.25 0.26 0.85 0.84 (0.5,1) 0.30 0.28 0.82 0.83
(0.75,1) 0.58 0.55 0.66 0.67 (0.75,1) 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.64
(0.4,0.6) 0.28 0.29 0.83 0.83 (0.4,0.6) 0.28 0.27 0.83 0.84
(0.1,0.9) 0.04 0.05 0.97 0.97 (0.1,0.9) 0.06 0.05 0.96 0.97
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.08 0.07 0.95 0.96 (0.1,1) 0.08 0.08 0.95 0.95
(0.5,1) 0.29 0.29 0.83 0.83 (0.5,1) 0.30 0.30 0.82 0.82
(0.75,1) 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.62 (0.75,1) 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.62
(0.4,0.6) 0.29 0.29 0.82 0.82 (0.4,0.6) 0.28 0.31 0.83 0.81
(0.1,0.9) 0.05 0.06 0.97 0.96 (0.1,0.9) 0.05 0.06 0.97 0.96
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.05 0.04 0.97 0.97 (0.1,1) 0.06 0.06 0.96 0.96
(0.5,1) 0.29 0.29 0.83 0.82 (0.5,1) 0.30 0.30 0.82 0.82
(0.75,1) 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.62 (0.75,1) 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.62
(0.4,0.6) 0.30 0.30 0.82 0.82 (0.4,0.6) 0.30 0.32 0.82 0.81
(0.1,0.9) 0.05 0.05 0.97 0.97 (0.1,0.9) 0.07 0.06 0.96 0.97
p=14, n=75, lambda=0.7 or 0.4, psi=0.4, 100 samples per DGP
Table 28
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Simulation Results - Complex Three-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂) E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂)
(a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3 (a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.48 0.48 0.48 (0.1,1) 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.85 0.84 0.86
(0.5,1) 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.75 0.75 0.75 (0.5,1) 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.84 0.85 0.85
(0.75,1) 0.57 0.60 0.57 0.66 0.65 0.66 (0.75,1) 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.69 0.69 0.69
(0.4,0.6) - - - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.84 0.83 0.84
(0.1,0.9) - - - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.69 0.72 0.73
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.96 0.96 0.96 (0.1,1) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.97 0.97 0.96
(0.5,1) 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.85 0.85 0.86 (0.5,1) 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.83 0.82 0.83
(0.75,1) 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.63 0.64 0.66 (0.75,1) 0.68 0.68 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.63
(0.4,0.6) 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.83 0.82 0.83 (0.4,0.6) 0.32 0.29 0.33 0.81 0.83 0.80
(0.1,0.9) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.97 0.97 0.97 (0.1,0.9) 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.97 0.97 0.97
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.95 0.96 0.96 (0.1,1) 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.96 0.95 0.95
(0.5,1) 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.81 0.82 0.83 (0.5,1) 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.82 0.82 0.82
(0.75,1) 0.67 0.65 0.71 0.62 0.63 0.59 (0.75,1) 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.58 0.59 0.60
(0.4,0.6) 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.81 0.81 0.82 (0.4,0.6) 0.32 0.31 0.34 0.81 0.81 0.80
(0.1,0.9) 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.97 0.97 0.97 (0.1,0.9) 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.96 0.96 0.96
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.96 0.97 0.97 (0.1,1) 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.97 0.96 0.96
(0.5,1) 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.82 0.82 0.81 (0.5,1) 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.81 0.81 0.80
(0.75,1) 0.71 0.69 0.71 0.59 0.60 0.59 (0.75,1) 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.59
(0.4,0.6) 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.81 0.82 0.80 (0.4,0.6) 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.81 0.82 0.82
(0.1,0.9) 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.96 0.96 0.96 (0.1,0.9) 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.97 0.97 0.96
p=21, n=75, lambda=0.7,0.4 or 0.3, psi=0.51, 100 samples per DGP
Table 29
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Simulation Results - Complex Five-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂) E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂)
(a,b) f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 (a,b) f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.87 0.80 0.68 0.92 0.89 0.54 0.59 0.64 0.48 0.49 (0.1,1) 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.54 0.85 0.82 0.83 0.80 0.68
(0.5,1) 0.47 0.53 0.51 0.58 0.93 0.75 0.72 0.73 0.67 0.46 (0.5,1) 0.28 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.48 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.71
(0.75,1) 0.60 0.66 0.63 0.75 1.07 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.58 0.39 (0.75,1) 0.54 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.88 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.49
(0.4,0.6) - - - - - - - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.48 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.76 0.71
(0.1,0.9) - - - - - - - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.50 0.56 0.58 0.66 0.91 0.74 0.71 0.69 0.63 0.47
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.46 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.74 (0.1,1) 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.54 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.70
(0.5,1) 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.79 (0.5,1) 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.40 0.41 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.78 0.76
(0.75,1) 0.64 0.68 0.70 0.76 0.93 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.58 0.47 (0.75,1) 0.68 0.69 0.77 0.81 0.99 0.65 0.64 0.60 0.56 0.43
(0.4,0.6) 0.38 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.60 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.65 (0.4,0.6) 0.40 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.64 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.63
(0.1,0.9) 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 (0.1,0.9) 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.48 (0.1,1) 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.71 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.60
(0.5,1) 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.47 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.79 0.72 (0.5,1) 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.74
(0.75,1) 0.68 0.73 0.75 0.84 0.94 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.54 0.46 (0.75,1) 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.87 1.04 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.52 0.41
(0.4,0.6) 0.40 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.68 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.61 (0.4,0.6) 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.56 0.80 0.77 0.77 0.74 0.67
(0.1,0.9) 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 (0.1,0.9) 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.44 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.75 (0.1,1) 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.48 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.73
(0.5,1) 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.74 (0.5,1) 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.81 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.77
(0.75,1) 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.87 1.06 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.52 0.40 (0.75,1) 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.83 0.98 0.63 0.62 0.58 0.54 0.44
(0.4,0.6) 0.39 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.53 0.80 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.68 (0.4,0.6) 0.41 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.65 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.62
(0.1,0.9) 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 (0.1,0.9) 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
p=45, n=75, lambda, psi - see Appendix, 100 samples per DGP
Table 30
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Simulation Results - Complex, Negative Two-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂) E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂)
(a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2 (a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.79 0.78 0.53 0.54 (0.1,1) 0.13 0.18 0.92 0.90
(0.5,1) 0.31 0.31 0.81 0.81 (0.5,1) 0.16 0.17 0.91 0.90
(0.75,1) 0.38 0.44 0.77 0.74 (0.75,1) 0.39 0.41 0.77 0.76
(0.4,0.6) - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.16 0.16 0.91 0.90
(0.1,0.9) - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.31 0.33 0.81 0.80
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.05 0.04 0.97 0.97 (0.1,1) 0.03 0.05 0.98 0.97
(0.5,1) 0.18 0.20 0.89 0.88 (0.5,1) 0.20 0.21 0.88 0.88
(0.75,1) 0.49 0.53 0.71 0.69 (0.75,1) 0.52 0.54 0.69 0.69
(0.4,0.6) 0.17 0.18 0.90 0.89 (0.4,0.6) 0.19 0.24 0.89 0.86
(0.1,0.9) 0.03 0.05 0.98 0.97 (0.1,0.9) 0.03 0.04 0.98 0.98
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.04 0.04 0.98 0.98 (0.1,1) 0.03 0.04 0.98 0.98
(0.5,1) 0.22 0.25 0.87 0.86 (0.5,1) 0.23 0.27 0.86 0.84
(0.75,1) 0.57 0.57 0.66 0.67 (0.75,1) 0.56 0.62 0.67 0.64
(0.4,0.6) 0.18 0.19 0.89 0.88 (0.4,0.6) 0.19 0.23 0.88 0.87
(0.1,0.9) 0.03 0.04 0.98 0.98 (0.1,0.9) 0.03 0.03 0.98 0.98
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.03 0.03 0.98 0.98 (0.1,1) 0.03 0.03 0.98 0.98
(0.5,1) 0.22 0.28 0.87 0.84 (0.5,1) 0.24 0.25 0.86 0.86
(0.75,1) 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.63 (0.75,1) 0.58 0.57 0.66 0.67
(0.4,0.6) 0.17 0.20 0.90 0.88 (0.4,0.6) 0.20 0.24 0.88 0.86
(0.1,0.9) 0.03 0.04 0.98 0.98 (0.1,0.9) 0.04 0.04 0.98 0.98
p=14, n=75, lambda=0.7, 0.4, 0 or -0.3; psi = various; 100 samples per DGP
Table 31
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Simulation Results - Complex, Negative Three-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂) E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂)
(a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3 (a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.96 0.72 1.04 0.43 0.60 0.41 (0.1,1) 0.44 0.12 0.58 0.74 0.93 0.65
(0.5,1) 0.63 0.24 0.80 0.62 0.87 0.53 (0.5,1) 0.44 0.16 0.72 0.73 0.91 0.57
(0.75,1) 0.54 0.39 0.90 0.67 0.78 0.47 (0.75,1) 0.59 0.41 0.92 0.65 0.77 0.47
(0.4,0.6) - - - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.50 0.15 0.78 0.70 0.91 0.54
(0.1,0.9) - - - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.64 0.26 0.86 0.63 0.85 0.49
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.28 0.04 0.45 0.83 0.98 0.73 (0.1,1) 0.27 0.03 0.35 0.84 0.98 0.79
(0.5,1) 0.37 0.23 0.89 0.78 0.87 0.48 (0.5,1) 0.41 0.24 0.91 0.76 0.87 0.47
(0.75,1) 0.67 0.49 1.05 0.60 0.73 0.41 (0.75,1) 0.63 0.55 1.02 0.63 0.69 0.43
(0.4,0.6) 0.54 0.17 0.78 0.68 0.90 0.54 (0.4,0.6) 0.62 0.18 0.82 0.62 0.90 0.52
(0.1,0.9) 0.29 0.03 0.34 0.82 0.98 0.80 (0.1,0.9) 0.23 0.03 0.46 0.86 0.98 0.73
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.37 0.04 0.50 0.78 0.98 0.71 (0.1,1) 0.31 0.04 0.46 0.80 0.98 0.73
(0.5,1) 0.42 0.26 0.95 0.74 0.86 0.46 (0.5,1) 0.47 0.28 0.90 0.72 0.84 0.49
(0.75,1) 0.68 0.55 1.05 0.60 0.69 0.41 (0.75,1) 0.57 0.58 1.04 0.67 0.68 0.41
(0.4,0.6) 0.49 0.19 0.85 0.71 0.90 0.50 (0.4,0.6) 0.56 0.18 0.86 0.66 0.90 0.50
(0.1,0.9) 0.20 0.03 0.36 0.88 0.98 0.79 (0.1,0.9) 0.24 0.04 0.38 0.86 0.98 0.78
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.25 0.04 0.38 0.85 0.98 0.78 (0.1,1) 0.31 0.04 0.52 0.81 0.98 0.70
(0.5,1) 0.54 0.28 0.91 0.68 0.85 0.48 (0.5,1) 0.58 0.27 0.91 0.65 0.85 0.48
(0.75,1) 0.65 0.56 1.04 0.62 0.69 0.42 (0.75,1) 0.75 0.56 1.05 0.55 0.69 0.41
(0.4,0.6) 0.56 0.18 0.73 0.65 0.90 0.58 (0.4,0.6) 0.43 0.18 0.76 0.75 0.90 0.55
(0.1,0.9) 0.23 0.04 0.40 0.86 0.98 0.77 (0.1,0.9) 0.34 0.05 0.46 0.79 0.98 0.73




Tables 25-32 present my simulation results. Each table presents results from sim-
ulations using a xed loading matrix, . All loadings matrices are shown in the
appendix. For example, Table 26s "Simple Two-Factor Models" refer to DGPs using
the loadings matrix simple shown in the "Two-factor models" section of the Appen-
dix. For indicated values of (a; b) and T , and for each factor fj of the given model, the
tables display two statistics: msdj and j. Note that in all tables, cells corresponding
to T = 2, (a; b) 2 [(0:4; 0:6) ; (0:1; 0:9)] are blank because imposing two nite-valued
cuto¤s (e.g. - at the 40th and 60th percentiles) implies at least three score categories.
Tables25-32 hold a massive amount of gures, but a few patterns stand out. First,
j is increasing in T only for very small values of T . After the number categories for
polytomous variables in X reaches 7, the polytomous nature of the data per se no
longer constrains the accuracy of factor score prediction. What does constrain j,
even at high values of T is censoring induced by the value of (a; b). Looking across
the eight tables, one can see that for any given  and any given value of T , the lowest
value of j almost always occurs at (a; b) = (0:75; 1), where the discretization assigns
the same score (a "1") to all countries in the bottom 75% of the true distribution
of governance. Such an extreme form of left-censoring so greatly distorts the actual
variation in governance that it is no surprise to nd the factor predictors weakly
correlated (it is more surprising that their correlation isnt even weaker!). Even
though the value (0:4; 0:6) actually censors a greater portion of Xs density than does
(0:75; 1), the value of j increases when (a; b) changes to (0:4; 0:6). This observation
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suggests that the censorings asymmetry, not just its extent, matters for j.
Remarkably, even with T as low as 2 or 3, the polytomous datas predictor,
E [f jX], performs relatively well (a high j) under the simple and the complex
models and even performs decently for some scenarios in the complex and negative
models.
Complexity of the loading pattern reduces the relative accuracy of the polytomous-
data predictor.69 Regardless of T ,m or (a; b), moving from a simple model to a com-
plex or complex and negative model with the same number of factors (e.g., from Table
26 to Table 28 or Table 29) causes j to fall. Thus, one should expect polytomous
data to cause bigger problems for factor prediction whenever invividual variables tend
to load nontrivially on multiple common factors.
Tables 7 and 8 show some surprising results. I had expected that the complex,
negative loading patterns in these models to induce the poorest relative performance
of the polytomous-data predictor, but the results contradict this hypothesis. Adding
negative loadings to an already complex loading pattern can either raise or lower j
, depending on the particular characteristics of the DGP.
I focus nally on Table 30, which presents results for a model equal in size (same
number of factors) and similar in loading pattern to the estimated model  used
to generate score predictions in Chapter 1. Of all the models weve experimented
with in this paper, I believe the ve-factor complex model in Table 6 is the one most
closely resembling the DGP that gave rise to my governance data. In designing the
69The correlation of the continuous-data predictor, E [f jX], with f also falls with more complex
loading patterns, but not nearly as much as does the correlation of E [f jX] with f . Thus the drop
in j reects a fall in the relative accuracy of E [f jX] compared with E [f jX].
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ve-factor model, I have tried to match the observable attributes of Chapter 1s es-
timated model (same number of factors, same number of variables, same proportion
of variation explained by common factors ( 83%), and same communality attribut-
able to each factor). Of course, since Chapter 1s estimated model was itself derived
from polytomous data, that model may contain biased parameter estimates. But it
is currently the best benchmark I have.
I take encouragement from Table 30. It shows that, under a factor model with
characteristics similar to the one estimated from the governance variables in Chap-
ter 1, the factor score predictions one will produce using polytomous data will be
very highly correlated with the predictions one would have generated using the
underlying continuous variables. Except under the most extreme censoring (when
(a; b) = (0:75; 1)), Table 6 shows that j  0:75 for the rst four factors - even with
T as low as 3! 70 In short, the ML factor prediction strategy used in Chapter 1,
though formally not suited for polytomous data, is nevertheless quite robust to even
the coarsest discretization of information from continuous variables.
Overall, my results suggest that governance inference based on polytomous vari-
ables will not di¤er substantially from (and in many circumstances, will coincide
closely with) governance inference based on a richer, continuous dataset of variables
that measure the same concepts.
Of course, the meaning of "di¤er substantially" is contextual. Conclusions from
one study relying on factor score predictions may not be seriously altered if E [f jX]
70The values of j are noticeably lower for f5 compared to f1 f4. The fth factor, not surprisingly,
is the factor with the smallest explanatory power in our simulations ( 8:4% of explained variation
is attributable to f5). The equivalent of f5 in our data is the MIG factor, which we do not use in
our regression analysis in Chapter 2.
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is replaced with E [f jX], while conclusions from another study may be.
How might the conclusions from my growth regressions in Chapter 2 be a¤ected
by such a substitution? In that situation, E [f jX] was an explanatory variable for
per capita income. Assuming that E [f jX] = E [f jX] + e - where e is white noise,
and thus E [f jX] a noisy but unbiased proxy for E [f jX] - I face measurement error
in a regressor. Under OLS, the estimate of the coe¢ cient on governance is attenuated
to zero, meaing the use of E [f jX] instead of E [f jX] causes us to understate the
impact of governance on growth. However, the regressions in Chapter 2 are estimated
using instrumental variables, and so the e¤ect of measurement error in an endogenous
regressor is less clear.
6 Bimodal Discrete Distributions
In the results of Tables 25-32, continuous variables were transformed into polytomous
variables by dividing up the continous variables support using (T   1) equally spaced
cuto¤ values. For example, I generate a seven-category polytomous variable from a
continuous standard normal variable by placing cuto¤s at [z0:1; z0:26; z0:42; z0:58; z0:74; z0:9].
The highest (lowest) categorical score can constitute a mode of the resulting discrete
distribution whenever zmax (zmin) is located su¢ ciently close to the mean.
Equally spaced bins however cannot generate a discrete distribution with multiple
interior modes - i.e. with two or more modes at categorical scores other than the
highest or lowest. A discrete distribution with two interior modes could arise in a
perceptions-based governance data if, for example, the data provider tends to lump
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countries into one of two middling categories. For instance, on a discrete scale of 1 to
5, we may observe modes at scores "2" and "4" if the analyst views most countries
as either "somewhat below average" or "somewhat above average".
I carry out a second set of Monte Carlo exercises to assess the impact of such a
distortion on factor score prediction. These simulations are much less extensive than
those presented in Tables 25-32 but they nevertheless provide a sense of the robustness
of factor score prediction based on polytomous data with two interior modes.
Results are presented in Tables 34-37 below. Each table presents the results for
all models of a particular size (a particular # of factors). I focus on a much narrower
variety of discretization schemes than in Tables 25-32, looking only at polytomous
data with T = 5; 7 and 15, and considering only a single placement of cuto¤ values
per value of T . Otherwise, the simulation procedures and parameter values are all
identical to the procedures and parameters used in Tables 25-32. The placement of
cuto¤ values and the resulting location of interior modes is presented in Table 33
below.
Cuto¤ Locations (z) for Polytomous Data with Interior Modes
number of categories cuto¤ locations modal score categories
5 [z0:05; z0:45; z0:55; z0:95] "2", "4"
7 [z0:02; z0:40; z0:45; z0:55; z0:60; z0:98] "2", "6"
15 [z0:01; z0:04; z0:10; z0:25; z0:40; z0:46; z0:49; z0:51; z0:54; z0:60; z0:75; z0:90; z0:96; z0:99] "4" and "5"; "11" and "12"
F (z) =  under the standard normal distribution. So, e.g. - when the rst cuto¤ location is z0:05, all continuous
values less than -1.649 receive discrete score "1".
Table 33
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Thus, cuto¤s for the ve-category data generate modes at scores "2" and "4";
cuto¤s for the seven-category data create modes at "2" and "6"; and cuto¤s for the
fteen-category data produce modes at score clusters 4 and 5, and 11 and 12.
Table 34 presents results for one-factor models.
One-Factor Models





*n=75, p=7, 100 samples per DGP
Table 34
Next, Table 35 presents results from simple, complex, and complex and negative
two-factor models.
Two-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂)
categories f1 f2 f1 f2
Simple two-factor models*
5 0.06 0.06 0.96 0.97
7 0.08 0.09 0.95 0.95
15 0.04 0.04 0.98 0.98
Complex two-factor models*
5 0.17 0.17 0.90 0.90
7 0.24 0.25 0.86 0.85
15 0.10 0.10 0.94 0.94
Complex, negative two-factor models*
5 0.09 0.09 0.95 0.95
7 0.13 0.15 0.92 0.91
15 0.07 0.06 0.96 0.97
*n=75, p=14, 100 samples per DGP;
Table 35
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Table 36 presents results from the three-factor models.
Three-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂)
categories f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
Simple three-factor models*
5 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.96 0.96 0.96
7 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.95 0.95 0.95
15 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.98 0.98 0.98
Complex three-factor models*
5 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.89 0.90 0.88
7 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.86 0.86 0.86
15 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.94 0.93 0.93
Complex, negative three-factor models*
5 0.54 0.08 0.65 0.67 0.96 0.62
7 0.43 0.13 0.64 0.74 0.93 0.62
15 0.35 0.06 0.47 0.79 0.97 0.73
*n=75, p=21, 100 samples per DGP
Table 36
And nally, Table 37 presents results from a complex ve-factor model similar to
the model estimated from the actual governance data.
Five-Factor Models*
E[(f̂    f̂)2] (f̂ ; f̂)
categories f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
5 0.22 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.81
7 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.41 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.80 0.75
15 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.88
*n=75, p=45, 100 samples per DGP
Table 37
The results of these Monte Carlo exercises using bimodal polytomous data are
largely consistent with the results of Tables 25-32. Factor score predictions based on
bimodal polytomous variables are highly correlated with score predictions based on
the underlying continous variables. Indeed, often   0:90. As before, this correla-
tion increases with the number of score categories in the polytomous variable. The
correlation is generally decreasing in loading complexity, as is especially apparent in
the three-factor models (see Table 36).
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In summary, the results of Tables 34-37 produce further evidence that even radical
discretizations of continuous normal data with a factor structure will not substantively
distort the prediction of factor scores.
7 Conclusion
This paper has conducted a targeted set of Monte Carlo exercises to assess the im-
pact on factor score prediction of using polytomous versions of continuous variables.
I have found that the correlation (j) between the polytomous-data-based prediction
of a factor (i.e., E [fjjX]), and the continous-data-based prediction (i.e., E [fjjX])
is increasing in i.) the number of categories in the polytomous variables (but only
when the initial number of categories is very small), and ii.) the share of communality
attributable to the factor, fj, being predicted. However, j is decreasing in i.) loading
pattern complexity, and ii.) the extent of censoring induced by the polytomous vari-
able (especially asymmetrical censoring). Over the range of model sizes with which
I experimented, the number of factors per se has no discernible e¤ect on j, but this
result is probably connected with the fact that I kept the ratio of variables to factors
constant in my one-,two- and three-factor models.
On the whole, my simulation results demonstrate that in many circumstances, the
standard ML factor model estimator can be employed with polytomous data without
sacricing a great deal of predictive accuracy for factor scores. However, this does not
imply that in estimating factor models, one should always simply treat polytomous
data as if it were continuous - especially if the number of categories is very small, or
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the degree of censoring imposed by the categorization is known to be extreme. Other
models, estimators and methods exist (e.g. - the Tobit factor model; GLS and WLS
estimators; the use of polychoric correlations in place of Pearson product-moment
correlations), which try to explicitly account for the polytomous and/or non-normal




Measuring governance is frought with both practical and conceptual complications,
even though most observers can agree on the broad outlines of good and bad practices.
To get anywhere, one needs rst to impose some basic assumptions on what is to be
measured and on the relationship between those objects of measurement and the
observable data. This paper has o¤ered a cohesive and transparent approach that
addresses both imperatives and also generates intuitive new ndings on growth and
governance.
By design, my new governance measures explain the intercorrelation of expert
opinions, but substantively they assess fundamental dimensions of a nations political,
legal and civic order: are citizens equal before the law.? is the bureaucracy e¢ cient
and accountable? are contracting and property rights upheld? does the state respect
and defend human rights? are there pervasive threats to peace and societal cohesion?
That the scope and dynamism of markets might hinge on the anwers to these questions
seems uncontroversial. But establishing such assertions empirically requires reliable
governance measures.
In Chapter 1, I applied factor model techniques to construct such measures. Chap-
ter 2 applied these assessments to explain observed cross-country variation in per
capita income. Finally, Chapter 3 produced evidence suggesting that potential dis-
tortion in the factor score predictions due to my reliance on polytomous data is
unlikely to be substantial.
While my results suggest a major (perhaps dominant) role for governance in eco-
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nomic performance, clearly much more work needs to be done in this area. From
information aggregation techniques, to the econometrics of governance and growth,
to the theoretical modeling of governance reform - scholars and policymakers have
much to learn about how to measure governance, how to improve it, and what eco-
nomic impacts to expect from those improvements. I hope that my investigation has
shed some new light on these topics.
Appendices
1 Appendix to Chapter 1
1.1 Factor Model Parameter Estimates
Here I provide i.) the full b; b	 matrices from three rotations of the m = 5 orthog-
onal factor model estimated on the 45 governance variables, ii.) a key to variable
names, and iii.) summary statistics for all the variables in the governance dataset,
for balanced and unbalanced panels
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UNROTATED ,	
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Uniqueness
corruptGRS 0.902 0.078 0.274 -0.155 0.079 0.075
corruptEIU 0.948 -0.134 -0.054 -0.004 -0.072 0.076
corruptGCS 0.892 -0.266 0.023 -0.011 0.007 0.132
corruptMIG 0.834 -0.022 0.105 0.439 0.176 0.068
corruptPRS 0.881 -0.071 -0.209 0.160 0.123 0.134
corruptQLM 0.941 -0.229 -0.193 -0.024 -0.060 0.021
corruptBCRI 0.959 -0.049 -0.007 -0.059 -0.063 0.071
stabilityGRS 0.775 0.207 0.445 -0.109 -0.062 0.144
stabilityEIU 0.835 0.174 0.128 0.053 -0.173 0.223
stabilityGCS 0.443 0.186 0.285 0.251 -0.501 0.374
stabilityHUM 0.779 0.065 0.176 0.257 -0.304 0.199
stabilityIJT 0.846 -0.020 0.102 0.053 0.006 0.271
stabilityMIG 0.585 0.238 0.274 0.351 -0.239 0.346
stabilityPRS 0.437 -0.171 0.459 0.219 -0.273 0.447
stabilityBCRI 0.732 0.081 0.428 0.157 -0.421 0.071
voiceEIU 0.910 0.307 -0.173 -0.030 0.008 0.047
voiceFRH 0.728 0.606 -0.232 0.013 0.021 0.048
voiceGCS 0.851 -0.057 0.036 -0.014 0.211 0.226
voiceHUM 0.663 0.609 -0.279 0.029 -0.066 0.106
voicePRS 0.771 0.411 -0.025 -0.158 -0.080 0.205
voiceRSF 0.691 0.514 -0.133 0.029 -0.088 0.232
voiceBCRI 0.931 0.208 -0.033 -0.127 0.036 0.071
regulationGRS 0.593 0.137 0.359 -0.216 0.402 0.292
regulationEIU 0.833 0.132 -0.049 -0.057 0.043 0.280
regulationGCS 0.696 -0.333 0.163 -0.150 0.109 0.344
regulationHER 0.821 0.260 -0.050 0.045 0.081 0.247
regulationMIG 0.780 0.090 0.102 0.400 0.120 0.198
regulationPRS 0.807 0.174 0.150 -0.115 0.216 0.237
regulationBCRI 0.955 0.083 0.072 -0.124 0.034 0.059
rulelawGRS 0.848 0.098 0.416 -0.156 0.104 0.063
rulelawEIU 0.954 -0.005 0.002 0.015 -0.006 0.090
rulelawGCS 0.870 -0.318 0.096 -0.033 0.084 0.124
rulelawHER 0.942 -0.149 -0.146 0.050 0.080 0.061
rulelawHUM 0.784 0.270 -0.221 -0.082 -0.130 0.239
rulelawMIG 0.833 -0.151 0.049 0.375 0.159 0.115
rulelawPRS 0.759 -0.234 0.158 0.093 -0.052 0.332
rulelawQLM 0.939 -0.245 -0.161 -0.070 -0.075 0.022
rulelawBCRI 0.917 -0.106 0.088 -0.024 -0.093 0.130
gove¤ectGRS 0.813 0.023 0.446 -0.200 0.141 0.079
gove¤ectEGV 0.520 -0.329 -0.032 -0.036 0.203 0.579
gove¤ectEIU 0.913 -0.125 -0.097 -0.033 0.032 0.138
gove¤ectGCS 0.893 -0.233 0.157 -0.030 0.059 0.118
gove¤ectMIG 0.848 0.056 0.065 0.383 0.194 0.089
gove¤ectPRS 0.820 0.043 -0.200 0.074 0.144 0.260
gove¤ectBCRI 0.962 0.016 0.007 -0.100 -0.017 0.064139
QUARTIMAX ,	
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Uniqueness
corruptGRS 0.910 -0.009 0.060 0.294 -0.083 0.075
corruptEIU 0.946 -0.065 0.004 -0.144 -0.068 0.076
corruptGCS 0.898 -0.223 -0.038 -0.093 -0.038 0.132
corruptMIG 0.843 -0.046 0.087 -0.030 0.459 0.068
corruptPRS 0.879 0.037 -0.157 -0.202 0.164 0.134
corruptQLM 0.937 -0.100 -0.106 -0.267 -0.096 0.021
corruptBCRI 0.956 -0.005 0.019 -0.057 -0.102 0.071
stabilityGRS 0.781 0.050 0.296 0.384 -0.089 0.144
stabilityEIU 0.830 0.152 0.252 0.030 -0.031 0.223
stabilityGCS 0.434 0.112 0.649 -0.064 -0.003 0.374
stabilityHUM 0.774 0.041 0.428 -0.105 0.077 0.199
stabilityIJT 0.849 -0.029 0.073 0.028 0.041 0.271
stabilityMIG 0.582 0.150 0.497 0.028 0.213 0.346
stabilityPRS 0.447 -0.299 0.505 0.058 0.069 0.447
stabilityBCRI 0.732 -0.035 0.621 0.067 -0.046 0.071
voiceEIU 0.897 0.379 -0.053 -0.033 -0.027 0.047
voiceFRH 0.707 0.670 -0.029 0.023 0.036 0.048
voiceGCS 0.858 -0.053 -0.144 0.086 0.077 0.226
voiceHUM 0.639 0.695 0.014 -0.055 0.005 0.106
voicePRS 0.758 0.419 0.066 0.120 -0.161 0.205
voiceRSF 0.673 0.553 0.095 0.008 -0.002 0.232
voiceBCRI 0.926 0.234 -0.047 0.083 -0.094 0.071
regulationGRS 0.612 -0.021 -0.142 0.558 0.039 0.292
regulationEIU 0.829 0.166 -0.051 0.026 -0.036 0.280
regulationGCS 0.710 -0.353 -0.096 0.090 -0.099 0.344
regulationHER 0.815 0.281 -0.019 0.051 0.081 0.247
regulationMIG 0.785 0.061 0.132 -0.004 0.406 0.198
regulationPRS 0.813 0.115 -0.079 0.288 0.017 0.237
regulationBCRI 0.955 0.079 -0.008 0.114 -0.094 0.059
rulelawGRS 0.861 -0.048 0.124 0.418 -0.059 0.063
rulelawEIU 0.953 0.028 0.016 -0.036 -0.005 0.090
rulelawGCS 0.882 -0.306 -0.070 -0.013 -0.017 0.124
rulelawHER 0.941 -0.054 -0.142 -0.165 0.045 0.061
rulelawHUM 0.766 0.370 -0.004 -0.123 -0.145 0.239
rulelawMIG 0.842 -0.141 0.023 -0.100 0.382 0.115
rulelawPRS 0.767 -0.246 0.123 -0.044 0.037 0.332
rulelawQLM 0.936 -0.125 -0.097 -0.239 -0.142 0.022
rulelawBCRI 0.919 -0.093 0.096 -0.033 -0.082 0.130
gove¤ectGRS 0.830 -0.133 0.084 0.448 -0.081 0.079
gove¤ectEGV 0.531 -0.287 -0.233 -0.043 0.035 0.579
gove¤ectEIU 0.913 -0.048 -0.106 -0.113 -0.044 0.138
gove¤ectGCS 0.904 -0.249 -0.001 0.048 -0.016 0.118
gove¤ectMIG 0.854 0.041 0.045 -0.005 0.422 0.089
gove¤ectPRS 0.816 0.134 -0.178 -0.114 0.110 0.260
gove¤ectBCRI 0.960 0.046 -0.011 0.011 -0.108 0.06414
VARIMAX ,	
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Uniqueness
corruptGRS 0.550 0.382 0.615 0.277 0.147 0.075
corruptEIU 0.792 0.371 0.240 0.270 0.168 0.076
corruptGCS 0.808 0.206 0.292 0.224 0.192 0.132
corruptMIG 0.533 0.289 0.239 0.285 0.653 0.068
corruptPRS 0.722 0.425 0.129 0.084 0.375 0.134
corruptQLM 0.887 0.350 0.140 0.175 0.140 0.021
corruptBCRI 0.742 0.427 0.318 0.277 0.137 0.071
stabilityGRS 0.330 0.360 0.630 0.458 0.105 0.144
stabilityEIU 0.468 0.486 0.307 0.446 0.166 0.223
stabilityGCS 0.118 0.256 0.058 0.732 0.089 0.374
stabilityHUM 0.460 0.351 0.160 0.613 0.256 0.199
stabilityIJT 0.595 0.338 0.339 0.289 0.250 0.271
stabilityMIG 0.172 0.342 0.173 0.603 0.337 0.346
stabilityPRS 0.276 -0.108 0.233 0.615 0.179 0.447
stabilityBCRI 0.361 0.255 0.316 0.785 0.127 0.071
voiceEIU 0.532 0.740 0.255 0.159 0.183 0.047
voiceFRH 0.228 0.906 0.183 0.103 0.188 0.048
voiceGCS 0.640 0.329 0.405 0.080 0.292 0.226
voiceHUM 0.193 0.901 0.084 0.132 0.138 0.106
voicePRS 0.344 0.711 0.346 0.228 0.018 0.205
voiceRSF 0.231 0.783 0.172 0.225 0.144 0.232
voiceBCRI 0.578 0.622 0.400 0.177 0.132 0.071
regulationGRS 0.259 0.229 0.740 -0.020 0.199 0.292
regulationEIU 0.548 0.517 0.316 0.155 0.166 0.280
regulationGCS 0.679 0.008 0.415 0.118 0.094 0.344
regulationHER 0.447 0.601 0.301 0.165 0.271 0.247
regulationMIG 0.433 0.358 0.229 0.306 0.583 0.198
regulationPRS 0.447 0.449 0.550 0.104 0.219 0.237
regulationBCRI 0.641 0.494 0.460 0.232 0.144 0.059
rulelawGRS 0.458 0.314 0.709 0.317 0.160 0.063
rulelawEIU 0.698 0.445 0.320 0.265 0.229 0.090
rulelawGCS 0.803 0.122 0.369 0.188 0.213 0.124
rulelawHER 0.811 0.379 0.212 0.124 0.279 0.061
rulelawHUM 0.487 0.685 0.137 0.185 0.036 0.239
rulelawMIG 0.635 0.217 0.201 0.241 0.581 0.115
rulelawPRS 0.643 0.110 0.274 0.337 0.231 0.332
rulelawQLM 0.892 0.329 0.173 0.186 0.096 0.022
rulelawBCRI 0.716 0.324 0.332 0.345 0.148 0.130
gove¤ectGRS 0.473 0.227 0.742 0.276 0.135 0.079
gove¤ectEGV 0.585 -0.009 0.209 -0.062 0.178 0.579
gove¤ectEIU 0.774 0.374 0.256 0.152 0.185 0.138
gove¤ectGCS 0.751 0.175 0.420 0.250 0.217 0.118
gove¤ectMIG 0.513 0.375 0.259 0.242 0.617 0.089
gove¤ectPRS 0.615 0.486 0.178 0.036 0.305 0.260
gove¤ectBCRI 0.705 0.473 0.375 0.242 0.132 0.064141
1.2 Data Documentation
1.2.1 Variable Names
Variables in my analysis are named according to the convention categoryPROVIDER.
The names I use for categories reect the governance categories to which variables
were assigned by Kaufmann et al.:
Kaufmann et al. Governance Categories
Variable prex in this paper Governance category in Kaufmann et al. (2006a)
corrupt Control of Corruption
rulelaw Rule of Law
regulation Regulatory Quality
voice Voice and Accountability
gove¤ect Government E¤ectiveness
stability Political Stability/No Violence
1.2.2 Data Sources
The table below cross-references provider mnemonics used in the variable names with
the actual providers and publications from which governance data was taken.
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Data Sources
Mnemonic Data Provider Publication
BCRI Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indica-
tors
GRS Global Insight Global Risk Service





Country Risk Service, Country Fore-
cast
EGV Professor Darrell M.






Business Risk Service, Lender Risk
Rating, and Quantitative Risk Measure
in Foreign Lending







U.S. State Dept.: Country Report
on Human Rights Practices; Amnesty:













IJT Ijet Security Risk Ratings
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1.2.3 Variable Descriptions
The table below provides descriptions for all 45 governance variables used in this
paper. The descriptions are taken more or less exactly as they appear in Kaufmann
et al. Governance Matters V: Appendices (2006).
Governance Variables
Variable Description (Kaufmann et al., 2006b)
corruptBCRI Corruption: An assessment of the intrusiveness of the coun-
trys beaucracy. The amount of red tape likely to countered is
assessed, as is the likelihood of encountering corrupt o¢ cials
and other groups.
corruptEIU Corruption among public o¢ cials
corruptGCS Public trust in nancial honesty of politicians; Diversion of
public funds due to corruption is common; Frequency of
bribery in the economy; Frequent for rms to make extra
payments connected to: public utilities, tax payments, loan
applications, awarding of public contracts, inuencing laws,
policies regulations, decrees, getting favourable judicial de-
cisions; Extent to which rmsillegal payments to inuence
government policies impose costs on other rms; Extent to
which inuence of powerful rms with political ties impose
costs on other rms
corruptGRS A one-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in corruption
during any 12-month period
corruptMIG Corruption
corruptPRS Corruption: Measures corruption within the political system,
which distorts the economic and nancial environment, re-
duces the e¢ ciency of government and business by enabling
people to assume positions of power through patronage rather
than ability, and introduces an inherently instability in the
political system.
corruptQLM Political Risk Index - Internal causes of Political Risk: Men-
tality, including xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepo-
tism, willingness to compromise. Indirect diversion of funds
continued on next page
144
Governance Variables - continued from previous page
Variable Description (Kaufmann et al., 2006b)
gove¤ectBCRI Bureaucracy: An assessment of the quality of the countrys
bureaucracy. The better the bureaucracy the quicker decisions
are made and the more easily foreign investors can go about
their business. Policy consistency and forward planning: How
condence businesses can be of the continuity of economic
policy stance - whether a change in government will entail
major policy disruption, and whether the current government
has pursued a coherent strategy. This factor also looks at the
extent to which policy-making is far-sighted, or conversely
aimed at short-term economic advantage.
gove¤ectEGV Global E-governance index
gove¤ectEIU Quality of bureaucracy / institutional e¤ectiveness; Excessive
bureaucracy / red tape
gove¤ectGCS Competence of public sector personnel; Quality of general in-
frastructure; Quality of public schools; Time spent by senior
management dealing with government o¢ cials; Public Service
vulnerability to political pressure; Wasteful government ex-
penditure; Strength and expertise of the civil service to avoid
drastic interruptions in government services in times of politi-
cal instability; Government economic policies are independent
of pressure from special interest groups.
gove¤ectGRS An increase in government personnel turnover rate at senior
levels that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% during any
12-month period; A decline in government personnel quality
at any level that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during
any 12-month period; A deterioration of government capacity
to cope with national problems as a result of institutional
rigidity or gridlock that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1%
during any 12-month period.
continued on next page
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Governance Variables - continued from previous page
Variable Description (Kaufmann et al., 2006b)
gove¤ectMIG Bureaucracy
gove¤ectPRS Measures institutional strength and quality of the civil ser-
vice, assess howmuch strength and expertise bureaucrats have
and how able they are to manage political alternations with-
out drastic interruptions in government services, or policy
changes. Good performers have somewhat autonomous bu-
reaucracies, free from political pressures, and an established
mechanism for recruitment and training.
regulationBCRI Tax E¤ectiveness How e¢ cient the countrys tax collection
system is. The rules may be clear and transparent, but
whether they are enforced consistently. This factor looks
at the relative e¤ectiveness too of corporate and personal,
indirect and direct taxation. Legislation An assessment of
whether the necessary business laws are in place, and whether
there any outstanding gaps. This includes the extent to which
the countrys legislation is compatible with, and respected by,
other countrieslegal systems.
regulationEIU Unfair competitive practices; Price controls; Discriminatory
tari¤s; Excessive protections; Discriminatory taxes
regulationGCS Administrative regulations are burdensome; Tax system is dis-
tortionary; Import barriers as obstacle to growth; Competi-
tion in local market is limited; Anti-monopoly policy is lax
and ine¤ective; Environmental regulations hurt competitive-
ness; Complexity of Tax System
regulationGRS Exports: A 2Imports: A 2Other Business: An increase in
other regulatory burdens, with respect to the level at the
time of the assessment, that reduces total aggregate invest-
ment in real LCU terms by 10Ownership of Business by Non-
Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in
legal restrictions on ownership of business by non-residents
during any 12-month period. Ownership of Equities by Non-
Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10"
in legal restrictions on ownership of equities by non-residents
during any 12-month period.
continued on next page
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Governance Variables - continued from previous page
Variable Description (Kaufmann et al., 2006b)
regulationHER Regulation; Government intervention; Wages/Prices; Trade;
Foreign investment; Banking
regulationMIG Unfair trade; Unfair competition
regulationPRS Includes the risk to operations (scored from 0 to 4, increasing
in risk); taxation (scored from 0 to 3), repatriation (scored
from 0 to 3); repatriation (scored from 0 to 3) and labor costs
(scored from 0 to 2). They all look at the governments atti-
tude towards investment.
rulelawBCRI Judicial Independence An assessment of how far the state and
other outside actors can inuence and distort the legal system.
This will determine the level of legal impartiality investors can
expect.
Crime How much of a threat businesses face from crime such
as kidnapping, extortion, street violence, burglary and so on.
These problems can cause major inconvenience for foreign in-
vestors and require them to take expensive security precau-
tions.
rulelawEIU Violent crime; Organized crime; Fairness of judicial process;
Enforceability of contracts; Speediness of judicial process;
Conscation/expropriation; Intellectual property rights pro-
tection; Private property protection
rulelawGCS Common crime imposes costs on business; Organized crime
imposes costs on business; Money laundering through banks
is pervasive; Quality of Police; The judiciary is independent
from political inuences of government, citizens, or rms; Le-
gal framework to challenge the legality of government actions
is ine¢ cient; Intellectual Property protection is weak; protec-
tion of nancial assets is weak; Percentage of rms which are
uno¢ cial or unregistered / Tax evasion
continued on next page
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Governance Variables - continued from previous page
Variable Description (Kaufmann et al., 2006b)
rulelawGRS Losses and Costs of Crime: A 1-point increase on a scale from
"0" to "10" in crime during any 12-month period. Kidnapping
of Foreigners: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency of
kidnapping of foreigners that reduces the GDP growth rate
by 1% during any 12-month period. Enforceability of Gov-
ernment Contracts: A 1 point decline on a scale from "0" to
"10" in the enforceability of contracts during any 12-month
period. Enforceability of Private Contracts: A 1-point decline
on a scale from "0" to "10" in the legal enforceability of con-
tracts during any 12-month period.
rulelawHER Black market; Property rights
rulelawHUM Independence of judiciary
rulelawMIG Legal safeguards; Organized crime
rulelawPRS Law and Order. The Law sub-component is an assessment of
the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the
Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance
of the law.
rulelawQLM Enforceability of contracts; Direct nancial fraud, money
laundering and organized crime
stabilityBCRI Civil unrest How widespread political unrest is, and how great
a threat it poses to investors. Demonstrations in themselves
may not be cause for concern, but they will cause major dis-
ruption if they escalate into severe violence. At the extreme,
this factor would amount to civil war.
Terrorism Whether the country su¤ers from a sustained ter-
rorist threat, and from how many sources. The degree of
localisation of the threat is assessed, and whether the active
groups are likely to target or a¤ect businesses.
continued on next page
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Governance Variables - continued from previous page
Variable Description (Kaufmann et al., 2006b)
stabilityEIU Armed conict; violent demonstrations; social unrest; inter-
national tensions/terrorist threat
stabilityGCS The threat of terrorism in the country imposes signicant
costs on business.
stabilityGRS Military Coup Risk: A military coup detat (or a series
of such events) that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2%
during any 12-month period. Major Insurgency/Rebellion:
An increase in scope or intensity of one or more insurgen-
cies/rebellions that reduces the GDP growth rate by 3% dur-
ing any 12-month period. Political Terrorism: An increase in
scope or intensity of terrorism that reduces the GDP growth
rate by 1% during any 12-month period. Political Assassina-
tion: A political assassination (or a series of such events) that
reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month
period. Civil War: An increase in scope or intensity of one
or more civil wars that reduces the GDP growth rate by 4%
during any 12-month period. Major Urban Riot: An increase
in scope, intensity, or frequency of rioting that reduces the
GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
continued on next page
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Governance Variables - continued from previous page
Variable Description (Kaufmann et al., 2006b)
stabilityHUM Frequency of political killings; Frequency of disappearances;
Frequency of tortures; Political terror scale
stabilityIJT Security risk rating
stabilityMIG Extremism
stabilityPRS Government Stability. Measures the governments ability to
carry out its declared programs, and its ability to stay in of-
ce. This will depend on issues as: the type of governance,
the cohesion of the government and governing party or parties,
the closeness of the next election, the government command
of the legislature, and approval of government policies. In-
ternal Conict. Assess political violence and its inuence on
governance. Highest scores go to countries with no armed
opposition, and where the government does not indulge in ar-
bitrary violence, direct or indirect. Lowest ratings go to civil
war torn countries. Intermediate ratings are awarded on the
basis of the threats to the government and busines. Exter-
nal conict: The external conict measure is an assessment
both of the risk to the incumbent government and to inward
investment. It ranges from trade restrictions and embargoes,
whether imposed by a single country, a group of countries, or
the international community as a whole, through geopolit
continued on next page
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Governance Variables - continued from previous page
Variable Description (Kaufmann et al., 2006b)
voiceBCRI Institutional permanence An assessment of how mature and
well-established the political system is. It is also an assess-
ment of how far political opposition operates within the sys-
tem or attempts to undermine it from outside. Representa-
tiveness How well the population and organised interests can
make their voices heard in the political system. Provided
representation is handled fairly and e¤ectively, it will ensure
greater stability and better designed policies.
voiceEIU Orderly transfers, Vested Interests, Accountability of Public
O¢ cials, human Rights, Freedom of Association
voiceFRH Political Rights (includes many subindices); Civil Liberties
(includes many subindices); Freedom of the Press (includes
many subindices)
voiceGCS Newspapers can publish stories of their choosing without fear
of censorship or retaliation; When deciding upon policies and
contracts, Government o¢ cials favor well-connected rms; Ef-
fectiveness of national Parliament/Congress as a law making
and oversight institution
voiceHUM Restrictions on domestic and foreign travel; Freedom of polit-
ical participation; Imprisonments because of ethnicity, race,
or political, religious beliefs; Government censorship
voicePRS Military in Politics The military are not elected by anyone,
so their participation in government, either direct or indirect,
reduces accountability and therefore represents a risk. The
threat of military intervention might lead as well to an an-
ticipated potentially ine¢ cient change in policy or even in
government. It also works as an indication that the govern-
ment is unable to function e¤ectively and that the country has
an uneasy environment for foreign business. Democratic Ac-
countability. Quanties how responsive government is to its
people, on the basis that the less response there is the more
likely is that the government will fall, peacefully or violently.
It includes not only if free and fair elections are in place, but
also how likely is the government to remain in power or remain
popular.
continued on next page
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Governance Variables - continued from previous page
Variable Description (Kaufmann et al., 2006b)
voiceRSF Press Freedom Index
For a detailed description of all data providers, see Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi "Governance Matters V: Appendices", World Bank, September
2006
1.2.4 Summary Statistics
For reference, the table below presents summary statistics for each governance variable
- once for the balanced dataset sample of 73 countries, and once using all available
observations for each variable.
Summary Statistics, all governance variables
All available obs. Balanced panel
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N Mean (Std. Dev.) N
cgdp95 7,364.22 (7,473.33) 186 10,053.94 (7,650.32) 73
corruptGRS 0.622 (0.27) 121 0.697 (0.259) 73
corruptEIU 0.336 (0.345) 119 0.421 (0.351) 73
corruptGCS 0.541 (0.181) 117 0.575 (0.175) 73
corruptMIG 0.291 (0.161) 153 0.331 (0.167) 73
corruptPRS 0.415 (0.204) 139 0.46 (0.218) 73
corruptQLM 0.377 (0.291) 115 0.443 (0.299) 73
corruptBCRI 0.55 (0.262) 198 0.615 (0.272) 73
stabilityGRS 0.833 (0.147) 120 0.869 (0.133) 73
stabilityEIU 0.565 (0.263) 118 0.62 (0.253) 73
stabilityGCS 0.664 (0.134) 117 0.656 (0.149) 73
stabilityHUM 0.647 (0.253) 190 0.614 (0.253) 73
stabilityIJT 0.551 (0.257) 180 0.545 (0.206) 73
stabilityMIG 0.368 (0.16) 152 0.36 (0.161) 73
stabilityPRS 0.741 (0.104) 138 0.746 (0.097) 73
continued on next page
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Summary statistics - continued from previous page
All available obs. Balanced panel
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) N Mean (Std. Dev.) N
stabilityBCRI 0.696 (0.217) 198 0.686 (0.204) 73
voiceEIU 0.454 (0.284) 119 0.544 (0.272) 73
voiceFRH 0.595 (0.298) 194 0.676 (0.268) 73
voiceGCS 0.476 (0.138) 114 0.498 (0.138) 73
voiceHUM 0.628 (0.354) 182 0.659 (0.351) 73
voicePRS 0.671 (0.256) 134 0.756 (0.212) 73
voiceRSF 0.747 (0.22) 158 0.801 (0.188) 73
voiceBCRI 0.583 (0.248) 192 0.698 (0.223) 73
regulationGRS 0.885 (0.092) 121 0.904 (0.086) 73
regulationEIU 0.543 (0.24) 119 0.616 (0.212) 73
regulationGCS 0.486 (0.107) 115 0.505 (0.098) 73
regulationHER 0.503 (0.178) 152 0.559 (0.16) 73
regulationMIG 0.4 (0.138) 150 0.434 (0.147) 73
regulationPRS 0.73 (0.215) 135 0.794 (0.201) 73
regulationBCRI 0.599 (0.254) 197 0.707 (0.225) 73
rulelawGRS 0.785 (0.169) 121 0.831 (0.154) 73
rulelawEIU 0.512 (0.263) 119 0.585 (0.257) 73
rulelawGCS 0.527 (0.174) 117 0.560 (0.169) 73
rulelawHER 0.441 (0.278) 156 0.534 (0.285) 73
rulelawHUM 0.534 (0.384) 191 0.582 (0.391) 73
rulelawMIG 0.338 (0.136) 154 0.368 (0.146) 73
rulelawPRS 0.637 (0.21) 139 0.683 (0.195) 73
rulelawQLM 0.444 (0.301) 115 0.509 (0.302) 73
rulelawBCRI 0.608 (0.232) 201 0.666 (0.22) 73
gove¤ectGRS 0.692 (0.207) 121 0.755 (0.184) 73
gove¤ectEGV 0.256 (0.064) 194 0.278 (0.063) 73
gove¤ectEIU 0.376 (0.306) 118 0.455 (0.309) 73
gove¤ectGCS 0.509 (0.143) 114 0.542 (0.137) 73
gove¤ectMIG 0.309 (0.144) 149 0.347 (0.161) 73
gove¤ectPRS 0.536 (0.28) 135 0.653 (0.234) 73
gove¤ectBCRI 0.582 (0.232) 191 0.681 (0.213) 73
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2 Appendix to Chapter 2
2.1 Weak Instruments?
Some of my rst-stage regressions exhibit either low R2s, low F statistics, or both
(see, Columns (4) and (5) of Panel B, Tables 15-18). In addition, the same instrument
sometimes enters highly signicant for multiple endogenous regressors (see Panel B,
Tables 15-18). These are indications of potential weak-instrument problems. Low
correlation between instruments and endogenous regressors, high correlation between
instruments, or multiple endogenous regressors with overly similar dependencies on
the excluded instruments all can cause the concentration parameter from the rst-
stage regressions to be small i.e. - can cause its smallest eigenvalue to be small
(Dollar, Kraay 2003; Stock and Yogo, 2005) .71 When the concentration parameter
is small, the 2SLS estimator of ; ;  in (1) no longer follows a normal distribution in
nite samples, meaning standard errors, and therefore condence intervals for ; ; ,
will be miscalculated. I may falsely conclude variables are signicant when they are
not. In addition, the 2SLS estimator is biased in the direction of the OLS estimator
when instruments are weak (Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995; Stock and Yogo, 2005).
One approach to diagnosing weak instrument problems is to use a di¤erent esti-
mator. Chao and Swanson (2005) demonstrate that the LIML IV estimator is more
robust to instrument weakness than the 2SLS estimator, in the sense that consistency
of LIML is preserved under weaker restrictions on the growth rate of the concentration
71Letting Z be the nK matrix of observations on the instruments, letting   be the matrix of
coe¢ cients on the instruments from the rst-stage regressions, and letting  be the VC matrix of







parameter (it is allowed to grow more slowly relative to the number of instruments)
as n  ! 1. Thus one can say in a crude sense that LIML estimates are consistent
under a weaker set of assumptions on instrument strength than are 2SLS estimates. I
therefore re-estimate all specications in Tables 15-18 using the LIML estimator and
nd qualitatively similar results.
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IV (LIML) Results - balanced dataset
Panel A: second-stage results (Dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GEO 0.0186*** 0.0303*** 0.0165*** 0.432 -0.0221 -0.0361
(0.00690) (0.00607) (0.00592) (5.448) (0.0376) (0.0363)
INT 0.149 0.405 0.261 9.361 -1.104 -1.325
(0.250) (0.315) (0.216) (119.0) (1.378) (1.141)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.607*** 0.521*** -3.489 0.820* 0.983**
(0.179) (0.148) (53.00) (0.432) (0.395)
civil liberties 0.437*** 0.315*** -8.427 0.0457 0.447
(0.168) (0.116) (114.3) (0.389) (0.328)




Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64
R-squared 0.662 0.447 0.720
Basmann p-val 0.00289 0.00256 0.0160 0.113 0.482
Panel B: rst-stage results - regressing INT and governance on the instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INT mrkt. infrastructure civil liberties d-side. gov. risk order
GEO -0.00417 0.0279*** 0.0143*** 0.01000 0.00736
(0.00330) (0.00603) (0.00520) (0.00734) (0.00762)
TRADESHARE 0.460*** 0.342*** 0.0566 0.123 0.320**
(0.0650) (0.119) (0.102) (0.144) (0.150)
EURFRAC -0.171 1.015*** 0.0740 -0.0271 -0.000132
(0.164) (0.300) (0.259) (0.366) (0.379)
LEGORE -0.0408 0.836*** 0.223 -0.353 -0.393
(0.123) (0.225) (0.194) (0.273) (0.284)
LEGORGE -0.0777 0.415 -0.0743 -0.292 -0.0286
(0.219) (0.401) (0.346) (0.488) (0.506)
LEGORSC -0.271 0.988** 0.157 -1.675*** 0.392
(0.264) (0.482) (0.416) (0.587) (0.609)
CATHO80 -0.210 -0.119 0.911*** -1.210** -0.134
(0.214) (0.391) (0.337) (0.475) (0.493)
MUSLIM80 -0.326* 0.426 -1.280*** -0.274 -0.303
(0.179) (0.326) (0.281) (0.397) (0.412)
R-squared 0.536 0.599 0.629 0.261 0.218
F-stat. 7.937 10.28 11.67 2.431 1.912
Constants suppressed; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A1
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IV (LIML) Results - settler mortality sample
Panel A: second-stage results (Dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GEO -0.0764 0.0376*** 0.00630 0.0155 0.0348 0.0326
(0.0565) (0.0125) (0.0138) (0.0355) (0.0283) (0.0299)
INT -1.245 1.131** 0.519 0.264 2.031 1.757
(1.414) (0.451) (0.351) (0.899) (1.241) (1.564)
mrkt. infrastructure 3.472** 0.944*** 1.834 0.374 0.642
(1.419) (0.308) (1.421) (0.590) (1.134)
civil liberties 1.396*** 1.072*** 0.957* 1.165*** 1.128***
(0.295) (0.204) (0.497) (0.302) (0.336)




Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79
R-squared 0.439
Basmann p-val 0.000820 0.0346 0.163 0.523 0.789
Panel B: rst-stage results - regressing INT and governance on the instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INT mrkt. infrastructure civil liberties d-side. gov. risk order
GEO -0.00176 0.0160* 0.00327 0.0150 0.0273***
(0.00558) (0.00824) (0.00853) (0.0115) (0.00989)
TRADESHARE 0.405*** 0.0145 0.0171 -0.0246 0.621***
(0.0670) (0.0981) (0.102) (0.137) (0.118)
SETMORT -0.129** -0.273*** 0.0170 -0.0310 0.0893
(0.0498) (0.0730) (0.0755) (0.102) (0.0876)
EURFRAC -0.0663 0.377 0.975*** 0.361 -0.190
(0.160) (0.235) (0.243) (0.328) (0.282)
CATHO80 -0.201 -0.904*** 0.0566 -0.683* -0.254
(0.187) (0.274) (0.283) (0.382) (0.329)
MUSLIM80 -0.236 -0.251 -0.517* -0.0311 -0.848**
(0.200) (0.299) (0.310) (0.418) (0.359)
R-squared 0.405 0.463 0.416 0.127 0.317
F-stat. 8.171 10.06 8.294 1.701 5.409
Constants suppressed; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A2
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IV (LIML) Results - Rodrik et al.s large sample
Panel A: second-stage results (Dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GEO 0.0157 0.0352*** 0.0164** 0.0325 0.00839 0.0114
(0.0100) (0.00587) (0.00713) (0.0258) (0.00899) (0.0155)
INT 0.550** 0.520* 0.446** 0.548 -0.156 -0.117
(0.274) (0.306) (0.222) (0.386) (0.459) (0.509)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.877*** 0.616*** 0.664** 0.787*** 0.788***
(0.272) (0.173) (0.283) (0.205) (0.218)
civil liberties 0.729*** 0.592*** 0.409 0.540*** 0.512***
(0.177) (0.128) (0.324) (0.134) (0.183)




Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138
R-squared 0.560 0.281 0.586 0.542 0.478
Basmann p-val 3.21e-05 0.0165 0.173 0.164 0.273 0.149
Panel B: rst-stage results - regressing INT and governance on the instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INT mrkt. infrastructure civil liberties d-side. gov. risk order
GEO .0018 0.0287*** 0.0121*** 0.0199*** 0.00186
(0.00241) (0.00429) (0.00423) (0.00534) (0.00506)
TRADESHARE 0.363*** 0.130* 0.0380 0.0415 0.436***
(0.0424) (0.0751) (0.0741) (0.0934) (0.0885)
EURFRAC -0.187* 0.660*** 0.483** 0.0198 0.0150
(0.110) (0.195) (0.192) (0.243) (0.230)
LEGORE 0.1458 0.616*** 0.161 -0.00886 -0.470**
(0.0873) (0.155) (0.153) (0.193) (0.183)
LEGORGE -0.0578 0.893*** 0.0691 0.134 -0.115
(0.181) (0.320) (0.315) (0.398) (0.377)
LEGORSC -0.240 1.080*** 0.168 -1.036** -0.126
(0.218) (0.385) (0.380) (0.479) (0.454)
CATHO80 -0.0045 0.0501 0.431* -0.458 -0.540*
(0.147) (0.261) (0.257) (0.324) (0.307)
MUSLIM80 -0.2642** 0.693*** -0.956*** -0.0697 -0.705***
(0.128) (0.227) (0.224) (0.282) (0.267)
R-squared 0.40 0.506 0.434 0.142 0.218
F-stat. 10.77 16.49 12.34 2.669 4.504
Constants suppressed; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A3
158
IV (LIML) Results - full sample
Panel A: second-stage results (Dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GEO 0.0188** 0.0349*** 0.0168** 0.0434 0.00759 0.0680
(0.00780) (0.00593) (0.00671) (0.0414) (0.0215) (0.141)
INT 0.720** 0.568* 0.468** 0.731 -2.110 2.626
(0.297) (0.331) (0.233) (0.653) (4.364) (8.445)
mrkt. infrastructure 0.793*** 0.651*** 0.789* 0.900 0.717
(0.214) (0.167) (0.426) (0.550) (0.695)
civil liberties 0.695*** 0.549*** 0.410 0.473 0.368
(0.172) (0.125) (0.340) (0.299) (0.593)




Observations 155 155 155 155 155 155
R-squared 0.548 0.230 0.542
Basmann p-val 4.64e-05 0.00619 0.141 0.231 0.160 0.126
Panel B: rst-stage results - regressing INT and governance on the instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INT mrkt. infrastructure civil liberties d-side. gov. risk order
GEO 0.005* 0.0283*** 0.0107** 0.0215*** 0.00173
(0.00289) (0.00407) (0.00422) (0.00554) (0.00505)
TRADESHARE 0.373*** 0.146** 0.0219 0.0695 0.500***
(0.0500) (0.0701) (0.0725) (0.0952) (0.0868)
EURFRAC -0.159 0.632*** 0.515*** 0.0819 -0.0211
(0.132) (0.185) (0.192) (0.252) (0.230)
LEGORE 0.054 0.655*** 0.110 0.0482 -0.310*
(0.0999) (0.141) (0.146) (0.191) (0.174)
LEGORGE -0.161 0.900*** 0.0774 0.167 -0.0713
(0.222) (0.311) (0.322) (0.423) (0.386)
LEGORSC -0.401 1.080*** 0.223 -0.971* -0.110
(0.266) (0.372) (0.385) (0.506) (0.461)
CATHO80 -0.054 0.0563 0.427 -0.313 -0.517*
(0.178) (0.250) (0.258) (0.339) (0.309)
MUSLIM80 -0.345** 0.621*** -0.944*** -0.0832 -0.709***
(0.142) (0.199) (0.206) (0.270) (0.246)
R-squared 0.307 0.495 0.437 0.122 0.217
F-stat. 8.10 17.87 14.14 2.545 5.052
Constants suppressed; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A4
Another approach for assessing weak instrument problems is that of Stock and
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Yogo (e.g. - 2005). These authors develop two alternative formal denitions of weak
instruments and then tabulate cuto¤ values for the Cragg-Donald statistic (1993),
thereby enabling formal testing of the null hypothesis that instruments are weak.
The rst criterion deems instruments weak if the bias of the IV estimator relative to
the bias of the OLS estimator could potentially reach some threshold (e.g. - 20%).
The second criterion deems instruments weak if the actual size of a Wald test on
the IV parameters exceeds the tests nominal size () by some specied magnitude.
STATA implements the Stock and Yogo tests based on the relative bias denition. I
show those results in the tables below. Note that I can only implement Stock and
Yogos approach for specications with three or fewer endogenous regressors because
those authors have not tabulated cuto¤ values for specications involving more than
three endogenous regressors.
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Stock and Yogo (2005) Tests of Weak Instruments, Selected Specications
(IV estimator is 2SLS; dependent variable is log 2005 per capita income throughout.)
balanced panel settler mortality sample Rodrik et al.s large sample fullest sample
GEO 0.0152*** 0.00674 0.0160** 0.0166***
(0.00546) (0.0128) (0.00674) (0.00642)
INT 0.284 0.504 0.451** 0.477**
(0.192) (0.320) (0.210) (0.216)
market infrastructure 0.567*** 0.946*** 0.643*** 0.672***
(0.122) (0.273) (0.157) (0.154)
civil liberties 0.311*** 1.008*** 0.553*** 0.511***
(0.104) (0.188) (0.120) (0.118)
constant 7.389*** 6.337*** 6.458*** 6.307***
(0.868) (1.538) (0.962) (0.980)
Observations 64 79 138 155
R-squared 0.727 0.471 0.600 0.556
Cragg-Donald F-statistic 5.388 3.805 5.767 7.18
10% maximal IV relative bias 8.5 6.61 8.5 8.5
20% maximal IV relative bias 5.56 4.99 5.56 5.56
30% maximal IV relative bias 4.44 4.3 4.44 4.44
Constants suppressed; standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Instruments for Cols. (1), (3), and (4): GEO, eurfrac, legal origin dummies, catho80, muslim80
Instruments for Col. (2): GEO, eurfrac, SETMORT, catho80, muslim80
Table A5
For the specication shown above, I can reject 20% maximal IV relative bias in my
two largest samples (the Rodrik et al. large sample, and the fullest possible sample).
I can reject only 30% maximal IV relative bias in the balanced panel sample, and in
the settler mortality sample (where the estimation uses a di¤erent set of instruments)
I cannot reject even 30% maximal IV relative bias. I can take some heart in the
fact that my two largest samples enable the strongest degree of rejection of weak
instruments. However, the fact that I cannot reject smaller than 20% maximal IV
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relative bias suggests I should base inference about structural parameters on weak-
instrument-robust condence intervals.
Additionally, the specications shown above include the two governance factors
that my instruments explain best. Performing the same tests with either or both of
my downside governance risk and order factors (which have lower R2 and F statistics
in rst-stage regressions) leads to an inability to reject even 30% maximal IV relative
bias. Overall, then, I can say that weak instrument problems appear to be driven
principally by downside governance risk and order. Barring new instruments that can
better explain the variation in these two variables, a prudent course of action may be
to omit them from my growth regressions.
Correlation of tted regressors
(N=138) GEO ^INT f̂1 f̂2 f̂3 f̂4
GEO 1
^INT -0.0112 1
f̂1 0.794 0.080 1
f̂2 0.374 0.073 0.338 1
f̂3 0.782 0.081 0.641 0.046 1
f̂4 0.196 0.754 0.062 0.182 0.141 1
Note: Rodrik et al. large sample; excluded
insts.=eurfrac, legal origin, catho80, muslim80
Table A6
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3 Appendix to Chapter 4
3.1 Comparison of bE [f jX] to f
Tables 25-32 and 34-37 present comparisons of bE [f jX] with bE [f jX] (rather than
with f), reecting my interest in assessing the distortion in factor score prediction
due exclusively to the polytomous nature of governance data. In those results, I
demonstrate that over a wide variety of factor model DGPs, bE [f jX] and bE [f jX]
are highly correlated. However, I did not produce evidence on the absolute accuracy of
bE [f jX], i.e. how close the polytomous-data predictor bE [f jX] comes to a countrys
true factor score, f . Tables A7-A14 below present these results. The results were
compiled during the same simulation runs as the results in Tables 25-32. Tables A7-
A14 are structured exactly like Tables 25-32, but with the basis of comparison for
bE [f jX] switched from bE [f jX] to f .
There is little changed from Tables 25-32 except mean-squared error values are
generally a bit higher, and correlations generally a bit lower. The inuences of load-
ings complexity, number of factors, number of score categories and degree of censoring
on prediction accuracy appear unchanged from those observed in Tables 25-32.
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Simulation Results - Simple One-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f) E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f)
(a,b) f1 f1 (a,b) f1 f1
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.68 0.63 (0.1,1) 0.23 0.89
(0.5,1) 0.30 0.85 (0.5,1) 0.25 0.87
(0.75,1) 0.38 0.80 (0.75,1) 0.44 0.77
(0.4,0.6) - - (0.4,0.6) 0.26 0.87
(0.1,0.9) - - (0.1,0.9) 0.31 0.84
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.18 0.92 (0.1,1) 0.17 0.92
(0.5,1) 0.28 0.86 (0.5,1) 0.30 0.85
(0.75,1) 0.50 0.73 (0.75,1) 0.54 0.71
(0.4,0.6) 0.25 0.87 (0.4,0.6) 0.26 0.87
(0.1,0.9) 0.17 0.92 (0.1,0.9) 0.17 0.92
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.18 0.92 (0.1,1) 0.18 0.91
(0.5,1) 0.30 0.85 (0.5,1) 0.31 0.84
(0.75,1) 0.55 0.70 (0.75,1) 0.54 0.71
(0.4,0.6) 0.26 0.87 (0.4,0.6) 0.26 0.87
(0.1,0.9) 0.16 0.92 (0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.91
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.18 0.92 (0.1,1) 0.18 0.91
(0.5,1) 0.30 0.85 (0.5,1) 0.31 0.84
(0.75,1) 0.55 0.70 (0.75,1) 0.54 0.71
(0.4,0.6) 0.26 0.87 (0.4,0.6) 0.26 0.87
(0.1,0.9) 0.16 0.92 (0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.91
Design parameters: p=7, n=75, lambda=0.7, psi=0.51, 100 samples per DGP
Table A7
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Simulation Results - Simple Two-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f) E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f)
(a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2 (a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.75 0.72 0.60 0.61 (0.1,1) 0.23 0.23 0.88 0.88
(0.5,1) 0.31 0.30 0.84 0.84 (0.5,1) 0.26 0.25 0.86 0.87
(0.75,1) 0.41 0.40 0.78 0.78 (0.75,1) 0.42 0.43 0.78 0.77
(0.4,0.6) - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.25 0.26 0.87 0.87
(0.1,0.9) - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.32 0.30 0.83 0.84
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.18 0.18 0.92 0.91 (0.1,1) 0.18 0.17 0.92 0.92
(0.5,1) 0.29 0.28 0.85 0.86 (0.5,1) 0.30 0.31 0.85 0.84
(0.75,1) 0.48 0.50 0.74 0.73 (0.75,1) 0.53 0.52 0.72 0.72
(0.4,0.6) 0.26 0.27 0.87 0.86 (0.4,0.6) 0.27 0.26 0.86 0.86
(0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.18 0.92 0.91 (0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.18 0.92 0.92
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.18 0.17 0.91 0.91 (0.1,1) 0.17 0.18 0.91 0.91
(0.5,1) 0.31 0.32 0.84 0.84 (0.5,1) 0.31 0.31 0.84 0.84
(0.75,1) 0.54 0.56 0.71 0.70 (0.75,1) 0.57 0.56 0.69 0.71
(0.4,0.6) 0.27 0.27 0.86 0.86 (0.4,0.6) 0.26 0.27 0.87 0.86
(0.1,0.9) 0.17 0.18 0.92 0.92 (0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.18 0.91 0.91
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.17 0.18 0.91 0.92 (0.1,1) 0.18 0.17 0.91 0.92
(0.5,1) 0.33 0.33 0.83 0.83 (0.5,1) 0.32 0.32 0.84 0.83
(0.75,1) 0.58 0.58 0.69 0.70 (0.75,1) 0.58 0.57 0.69 0.69
(0.4,0.6) 0.27 0.28 0.86 0.86 (0.4,0.6) 0.27 0.27 0.87 0.86
(0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.17 0.92 0.92 (0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.17 0.91 0.92
p=14, n=75, lambda=0.7 or 0, psi=0.51, 100 samples per DGP
Table A8
165
Simulation Results - Simple Three-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f) E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f)
(a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3 (a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.58 0.59 0.57 (0.1,1) 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.88 0.88 0.88
(0.5,1) 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.83 0.83 0.84 (0.5,1) 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.86 0.87 0.87
(0.75,1) 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.79 0.77 0.77 (0.75,1) 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.77 0.78 0.77
(0.4,0.6) - - - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.86 0.87 0.87
(0.1,0.9) - - - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.83 0.82 0.82
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.91 0.91 0.91 (0.1,1) 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.92 0.91 0.92
(0.5,1) 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.85 0.85 0.85 (0.5,1) 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.84 0.84 0.85
(0.75,1) 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.73 0.73 0.73 (0.75,1) 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.71 0.71 0.70
(0.4,0.6) 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.86 0.86 0.86 (0.4,0.6) 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.86 0.86 0.86
(0.1,0.9) 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.92 0.91 0.91 (0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.91 0.91 0.91
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.91 0.91 0.91 (0.1,1) 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.91 0.91 0.91
(0.5,1) 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.84 0.84 0.84 (0.5,1) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.84 0.83 0.83
(0.75,1) 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.71 0.68 0.70 (0.75,1) 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.69 0.68 0.69
(0.4,0.6) 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.86 0.86 0.86 (0.4,0.6) 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.86 0.86 0.86
(0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.91 0.91 0.91 (0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.91 0.91 0.91
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.91 0.91 0.91 (0.1,1) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.91 0.91 0.91
(0.5,1) 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.83 0.83 0.83 (0.5,1) 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.83 0.84 0.83
(0.75,1) 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.68 0.68 0.68 (0.75,1) 0.58 0.60 0.56 0.69 0.68 0.70
(0.4,0.6) 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.86 0.86 0.86 (0.4,0.6) 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.86 0.86 0.86
(0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.92 0.91 0.91 (0.1,0.9) 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.91 0.92 0.91
p=21, n=75, lambda=0.7 or 0, psi=0.51, 100 samples per DGP
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Simulation Results - Complex Two-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f) E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f)
(a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2 (a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.97 1.02 0.48 0.47 (0.1,1) 0.45 0.44 0.76 0.77
(0.5,1) 0.56 0.58 0.70 0.69 (0.5,1) 0.46 0.46 0.76 0.76
(0.75,1) 0.70 0.71 0.63 0.62 (0.75,1) 0.70 0.72 0.62 0.62
(0.4,0.6) - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.48 0.48 0.74 0.75
(0.1,0.9) - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.65
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.32 0.32 0.84 0.84 (0.1,1) 0.30 0.29 0.85 0.85
(0.5,1) 0.47 0.48 0.75 0.74 (0.5,1) 0.52 0.51 0.72 0.73
(0.75,1) 0.77 0.76 0.59 0.60 (0.75,1) 0.82 0.81 0.56 0.58
(0.4,0.6) 0.49 0.50 0.74 0.74 (0.4,0.6) 0.49 0.49 0.74 0.74
(0.1,0.9) 0.29 0.30 0.85 0.85 (0.1,0.9) 0.29 0.28 0.85 0.86
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.31 0.31 0.84 0.84 (0.1,1) 0.30 0.31 0.84 0.84
(0.5,1) 0.52 0.51 0.73 0.73 (0.5,1) 0.52 0.51 0.73 0.73
(0.75,1) 0.81 0.86 0.57 0.54 (0.75,1) 0.87 0.85 0.54 0.56
(0.4,0.6) 0.51 0.52 0.72 0.72 (0.4,0.6) 0.50 0.53 0.74 0.72
(0.1,0.9) 0.29 0.29 0.85 0.85 (0.1,0.9) 0.29 0.30 0.85 0.85
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.29 0.28 0.86 0.86 (0.1,1) 0.30 0.30 0.85 0.84
(0.5,1) 0.51 0.53 0.73 0.73 (0.5,1) 0.53 0.51 0.73 0.73
(0.75,1) 0.84 0.86 0.56 0.55 (0.75,1) 0.85 0.86 0.55 0.55
(0.4,0.6) 0.50 0.51 0.74 0.73 (0.4,0.6) 0.52 0.53 0.72 0.71
(0.1,0.9) 0.30 0.30 0.85 0.85 (0.1,0.9) 0.30 0.30 0.84 0.85
p=14, n=75, lambda=0.7 or 0.4, psi=0.4, 100 samples per DGP
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Simulation Results - Complex Three-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f) E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f)
(a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3 (a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 1.08 1.08 1.09 0.44 0.44 0.43 (0.1,1) 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.76 0.76 0.77
(0.5,1) 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.68 0.68 0.67 (0.5,1) 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.75 0.76 0.76
(0.75,1) 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.60 0.59 0.60 (0.75,1) 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.62 0.62 0.62
(0.4,0.6) - - - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.75 0.75 0.75
(0.1,0.9) - - - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.69 0.64 0.62 0.63 0.65 0.67
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.85 0.85 0.86 (0.1,1) 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.86 0.86 0.85
(0.5,1) 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.76 0.75 0.77 (0.5,1) 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.74 0.73 0.74
(0.75,1) 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.58 0.58 0.60 (0.75,1) 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.55 0.54 0.56
(0.4,0.6) 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.74 0.74 0.75 (0.4,0.6) 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.73 0.74 0.72
(0.1,0.9) 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.86 0.86 0.86 (0.1,0.9) 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.86 0.86 0.86
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.85 0.86 0.85 (0.1,1) 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.86 0.85 0.85
(0.5,1) 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.73 0.73 0.74 (0.5,1) 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.73 0.74 0.72
(0.75,1) 0.85 0.83 0.89 0.56 0.56 0.52 (0.75,1) 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.53 0.53 0.54
(0.4,0.6) 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.73 0.72 0.74 (0.4,0.6) 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.73 0.73 0.71
(0.1,0.9) 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.86 0.86 0.86 (0.1,0.9) 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.86 0.86 0.85
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.85 0.86 0.86 (0.1,1) 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.86 0.85 0.86
(0.5,1) 0.52 0.50 0.52 0.73 0.73 0.73 (0.5,1) 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.73 0.72 0.71
(0.75,1) 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.54 0.54 0.54 (0.75,1) 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.54 0.55 0.54
(0.4,0.6) 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.73 0.73 0.73 (0.4,0.6) 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.73 0.73 0.73
(0.1,0.9) 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.85 0.85 0.85 (0.1,0.9) 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.86 0.86 0.86
p=21, n=75, lambda=0.7,0.4 or 0.3, psi=0.51, 100 samples per DGP
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Simulation Results - Complex Five-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f) E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f)
(a,b) f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 (a,b) f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.88 0.93 0.80 1.02 1.08 0.53 0.60 0.62 0.48 0.47 (0.1,1) 0.36 0.44 0.40 0.49 0.81 0.83 0.78 0.80 0.74 0.56
(0.5,1) 0.51 0.61 0.59 0.69 1.17 0.74 0.70 0.70 0.64 0.37 (0.5,1) 0.37 0.42 0.41 0.46 0.76 0.82 0.79 0.80 0.76 0.60
(0.75,1) 0.65 0.73 0.73 0.86 1.33 0.67 0.63 0.63 0.54 0.31 (0.75,1) 0.60 0.67 0.69 0.75 1.15 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.61 0.40
(0.4,0.6) - - - - - - - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.42 0.47 0.46 0.57 0.73 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.70 0.61
(0.1,0.9) - - - - - - - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.54 0.63 0.66 0.80 1.16 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.58 0.37
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.27 0.75 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.61 (0.1,1) 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.30 0.82 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.84 0.58
(0.5,1) 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.49 0.62 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.74 0.66 (0.5,1) 0.43 0.46 0.42 0.54 0.70 0.79 0.77 0.79 0.72 0.62
(0.75,1) 0.70 0.75 0.77 0.90 1.20 0.65 0.63 0.60 0.54 0.38 (0.75,1) 0.73 0.78 0.83 0.94 1.25 0.63 0.61 0.58 0.52 0.35
(0.4,0.6) 0.45 0.51 0.50 0.54 0.85 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.54 (0.4,0.6) 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.91 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.52
(0.1,0.9) 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.24 0.39 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.88 0.80 (0.1,0.9) 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.25 0.37 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.80
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.27 1.17 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.87 0.39 (0.1,1) 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.30 1.02 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.85 0.48
(0.5,1) 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.54 0.73 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.61 (0.5,1) 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.56 0.72 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.62
(0.75,1) 0.72 0.78 0.83 0.95 1.18 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.51 0.39 (0.75,1) 0.78 0.82 0.85 1.01 1.28 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.48 0.33
(0.4,0.6) 0.47 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.95 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.50 (0.4,0.6) 0.46 0.53 0.53 0.57 0.85 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.70 0.55
(0.1,0.9) 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.39 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.80 (0.1,0.9) 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.27 0.38 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.80
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.25 0.72 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.62 (0.1,1) 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.81 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.85 0.59
(0.5,1) 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.55 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.71 0.61 (0.5,1) 0.47 0.50 0.49 0.56 0.68 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.72 0.64
(0.75,1) 0.76 0.80 0.84 0.98 1.31 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.49 0.32 (0.75,1) 0.76 0.80 0.85 0.97 1.23 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.50 0.36
(0.4,0.6) 0.46 0.55 0.52 0.57 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.57 (0.4,0.6) 0.48 0.55 0.51 0.59 0.92 0.77 0.73 0.74 0.69 0.52
(0.1,0.9) 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.28 0.38 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.86 0.81 (0.1,0.9) 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.27 0.40 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.79
p=45, n=75, lambda, psi - see Appendix, 100 samples per DGP
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Simulation Results - Complex, Negative Two-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f) E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f)
(a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2 (a,b) f1 f2 f1 f2
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.90 1.42 0.52 0.22 (0.1,1) 0.49 0.94 0.73 0.48
(0.5,1) 0.55 1.07 0.70 0.41 (0.5,1) 0.54 0.87 0.71 0.52
(0.75,1) 0.63 1.17 0.65 0.36 (0.75,1) 0.67 1.11 0.64 0.40
(0.4,0.6) - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.53 0.88 0.72 0.53
(0.1,0.9) - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.57 1.09 0.69 0.40
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.51 0.74 0.73 0.60 (0.1,1) 0.49 0.75 0.74 0.60
(0.5,1) 0.58 0.87 0.69 0.54 (0.5,1) 0.59 0.90 0.68 0.51
(0.75,1) 0.75 1.22 0.60 0.34 (0.75,1) 0.78 1.20 0.59 0.36
(0.4,0.6) 0.54 0.89 0.71 0.51 (0.4,0.6) 0.54 0.98 0.71 0.46
(0.1,0.9) 0.48 0.76 0.75 0.59 (0.1,0.9) 0.50 0.74 0.74 0.60
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.50 0.75 0.74 0.60 (0.1,1) 0.49 0.74 0.74 0.61
(0.5,1) 0.61 0.93 0.68 0.49 (0.5,1) 0.60 0.98 0.68 0.47
(0.75,1) 0.79 1.23 0.58 0.35 (0.75,1) 0.78 1.30 0.59 0.31
(0.4,0.6) 0.53 0.91 0.71 0.50 (0.4,0.6) 0.53 0.93 0.71 0.49
(0.1,0.9) 0.50 0.75 0.74 0.59 (0.1,0.9) 0.49 0.74 0.73 0.62
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.49 0.77 0.74 0.59 (0.1,1) 0.49 0.74 0.74 0.61
(0.5,1) 0.60 0.99 0.68 0.47 (0.5,1) 0.59 0.94 0.68 0.50
(0.75,1) 0.78 1.29 0.58 0.30 (0.75,1) 0.82 1.25 0.57 0.33
(0.4,0.6) 0.54 0.95 0.72 0.50 (0.4,0.6) 0.55 0.97 0.72 0.46
(0.1,0.9) 0.49 0.77 0.74 0.60 (0.1,0.9) 0.50 0.75 0.74 0.60
p=14, n=75, lambda=0.7, 0.4, 0 or -0.3; psi = various; 100 samples per DGP
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Simulation Results - Complex, Negative Three-Factor Models
E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f) E[(f̂    f)2] (f̂ ; f)
(a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3 (a,b) f1 f2 f3 f1 f2 f3
(categories = 2) (categories = 3)
(0.1,1) 0.93 0.92 1.02 0.50 0.52 0.46 (0.1,1) 0.61 0.43 0.79 0.68 0.77 0.57
(0.5,1) 0.68 0.52 0.82 0.63 0.72 0.56 (0.5,1) 0.44 0.43 0.71 0.77 0.77 0.62
(0.75,1) 0.52 0.61 0.80 0.72 0.68 0.57 (0.75,1) 0.55 0.60 0.77 0.71 0.68 0.58
(0.4,0.6) - - - - - - (0.4,0.6) 0.59 0.45 0.76 0.69 0.77 0.59
(0.1,0.9) - - - - - - (0.1,0.9) 0.73 0.53 0.83 0.62 0.72 0.55
(categories = 7) (categories = 15)
(0.1,1) 0.50 0.36 0.82 0.74 0.82 0.57 (0.1,1) 0.52 0.37 0.76 0.73 0.81 0.60
(0.5,1) 0.41 0.43 0.66 0.79 0.78 0.65 (0.5,1) 0.43 0.46 0.67 0.77 0.77 0.64
(0.75,1) 0.63 0.68 0.87 0.67 0.65 0.55 (0.75,1) 0.63 0.72 0.89 0.67 0.61 0.54
(0.4,0.6) 0.66 0.46 0.78 0.65 0.76 0.58 (0.4,0.6) 0.61 0.47 0.81 0.67 0.76 0.58
(0.1,0.9) 0.56 0.35 0.79 0.70 0.83 0.58 (0.1,0.9) 0.47 0.35 0.78 0.75 0.83 0.59
(categories = 25) (categories = 50)
(0.1,1) 0.54 0.35 0.78 0.71 0.82 0.58 (0.1,1) 0.55 0.36 0.75 0.71 0.82 0.60
(0.5,1) 0.45 0.48 0.71 0.76 0.75 0.63 (0.5,1) 0.45 0.49 0.72 0.77 0.75 0.62
(0.75,1) 0.68 0.73 0.90 0.64 0.61 0.53 (0.75,1) 0.70 0.77 0.90 0.63 0.60 0.52
(0.4,0.6) 0.57 0.46 0.76 0.70 0.77 0.58 (0.4,0.6) 0.60 0.46 0.77 0.68 0.76 0.59
(0.1,0.9) 0.46 0.36 0.80 0.76 0.82 0.58 (0.1,0.9) 0.50 0.36 0.77 0.73 0.82 0.60
(categories = 250) (categories = 500)
(0.1,1) 0.42 0.34 0.73 0.77 0.83 0.61 (0.1,1) 0.49 0.35 0.74 0.73 0.82 0.61
(0.5,1) 0.46 0.49 0.71 0.76 0.75 0.62 (0.5,1) 0.46 0.47 0.73 0.76 0.75 0.62
(0.75,1) 0.70 0.74 0.91 0.63 0.61 0.53 (0.75,1) 0.67 0.73 0.91 0.65 0.62 0.51
(0.4,0.6) 0.63 0.46 0.80 0.67 0.76 0.57 (0.4,0.6) 0.55 0.45 0.75 0.71 0.76 0.59
(0.1,0.9) 0.53 0.35 0.74 0.71 0.82 0.61 (0.1,0.9) 0.50 0.35 0.78 0.74 0.82 0.60
p=21, n=75, lambda=0.7,0.40.3,0,-0.3, or -0.4; psi=various; 100 samples per DGP
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3.2 Monte Carlo Parameters
















































































































































0:9 0:1 0:2 0:2 0:2
0:9 0:1 0:2 0:2 0:2
0:9 0:1 0:2 0:2 0:2
0:9 0:1 0:2 0:2 0:2
0:9 0:1 0:2 0:2 0:2
0:9 0:1 0:2 0:2 0:2
0:9 0:1 0:2 0:2 0:2
0:9 0:1 0:3 0:2 0:1
0:9 0:1 0:3 0:2 0:1
0:5 0:8 0:2 0:2 0:1
0:5 0:8 0:2 0:2 0:1
0:5 0:8 0:2 0:2 0:1
0:5 0:8 0:2 0:2 0:1
0:5 0:8 0:2 0:2 0:1
0:5 0:8 0:2 0:2 0:1
0:5 0:8 0:2 0:2 0:1
0:5 0:8 0:2 0:2 0:1
0:5 0:8 0:2 0:2 0:1
0:5 0:3 0:7 0:2 0:2
0:5 0:3 0:7 0:2 0:2
0:5 0:3 0:7 0:2 0:2
0:5 0:3 0:7 0:2 0:2
0:5 0:3 0:7 0:2 0:2
0:5 0:3 0:7 0:2 0:2
0:5 0:3 0:7 0:2 0:2
0:5 0:3 0:7 0:2 0:2
0:5 0:3 0:7 0:2 0:2
0:5 0:3 0:3 0:6 0:2
0:5 0:3 0:3 0:6 0:1
0:5 0:3 0:3 0:6 0:1
0:5 0:3 0:3 0:6 0:1
0:5 0:3 0:3 0:6 0:1
0:5 0:3 0:3 0:6 0:1
0:5 0:3 0:3 0:6 0:1
0:5 0:3 0:3 0:6 0:1
0:3 0:3 0:2 0:6 0:1
0:3 0:3 0:2 0:2 0:5
0:3 0:3 0:2 0:2 0:5
0:3 0:3 0:2 0:2 0:5
0:3 0:3 0:2 0:2 0:5
0:3 0:3 0:2 0:2 0:5
0:3 0:3 0:2 0:2 0:5
0:3 0:3 0:2 0:2 0:5
0:3 0:3 0:2 0:2 0:5
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